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In this dissertation, I examine the role of population and transportation costs 
in determining agricultural expansion in 670 villages located in Forest Reserves of 
Thailand, over the period 1986-1996. Specifically, I examine the role of population 
and transportation costs as drivers of agricultural decisions regarding crop adoption 
and area planted, and in determining the intensity of cultivation and agricultural 
expansion. I also contrast the impact of these variables on two groups of villages in 
Forest Reserves – villages whose residents ‘have no secure property rights’ and those 
whose ‘land rights are ambiguous’. I examine Feder et al.’s (1988) conclusions about 
the importance of property rights in Thai forest reserves and find that there is some 
evidence supporting their conclusions in this study. Differences in property rights 
account for some difference in the agricultural decisions of the two groups of villages, 
but that the nature of data does not allow a sharper distinction. 
Results reported in the study are consistent with other studies of the area. The 
study suggests that decisions regarding crop adoption and crop area are sensitive to 
population but the magnitudes of impact are small. Lack of significance of transport 
costs in determining cropping decisions suggests that rural road building programs 
will not necessarily promote deforestation in the study area, contrary to evidence in 
other parts of the world. This is particularly important given the large number of 
Forest Reserve residents in Thailand, and the fact that, Forest Reserves are the last 
bastions of forests, and consequently of biodiversity, in Thailand. One policy 
implication of this is that investments in roads that help to increase access to markets 
and aid poverty alleviation may not have the deleterious effects on forests that would 
otherwise be expected. 
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“Protected areas are fast becoming islands of dying biodiversity because of the 
agricultural areas that surround them”
Jeff McNeely (2001)1
1.1 Overview
Agricultural expansion is widely believed to be the main reason for 
deforestation in developing countries (Barbier et al., (1991); Barbier, (2001); Brown 
and Pearce, (1994); Lambin et al. (2003)). A study conducted by FAO (2001) of a 
stratified random sample of the world’s tropical forests finds that 73% of the world’s 
forests are being converted to non-forest land due to agriculture. 32% of the forest 
cover change can be attributed to large-scale agriculture and 26% to small-scale 
agriculture. Intensification of agriculture in shifting agriculture areas was the third 
largest cause and accounted for 10% of tropical deforestation. Expansion of shifting 
cultivation into undisturbed forest accounted for 5%. Barbier (2004) also reports that 
cultivated area in the developing world is expected to increase by more than 47% by 
2050, with two-thirds of the new land coming from deforestation and wetland 
conversion (also see Fischer and Heilig, (1997)).  
These figures underscore the importance of examining agricultural land, and 
factors affecting agricultural decisions, especially in forested areas, such as protected 
areas and forest reserves. An understanding of the direction and magnitude of effects 
can help to inform forestry policy and help alleviate pressures on the forest frontier. 
 
1 Jeff McNeely, Chief Scientist of IUCN, The World Conservation Union and co-author “Common 
Ground, Common Future: How Ecoagriculture Can help feed the world and Save Wild Biodiversity”
2001. 
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Thus the following questions become important: What are the agricultural practices 
pursued within forested areas? What are their main determinants? What is their net 
impact on the forest frontier? And finally, to what extent can this knowledge help 
inform forest policy? Using an unbalanced panel data set of 670 villages located 
within Forest Reserves of Chiang Mai, Thailand, I examine the first two questions. 
Specifically I estimate separate random effects crop equations for three main crops 
grown in the region – paddy rice, soybean and upland rice, using biennial panel data 
for the period 1986-1996. Using the same explanatory variables as in the crop 
equations, I also estimate random effects models for intensity of cultivation and 
agricultural land in a village. Results show that qualitative differences in agricultural 
decisions amongst Forest Reserve villages exist mainly because of differences in 
transport costs and differences in property rights. Population within Forest Reserves 
is also a significant determinant of agricultural behavior; qualitatively it has largely a 
‘subsistence’ effect.  
There are several reasons for examining reserved forest villages in Chiang 
Mai over the period 1986-96.  Until 1985, North Thailand, where the province of 
Chiang Mai is located, had the country’s lowest population density and largest 
forested area, including the largest and critical watersheds (Kirananda, (1985)). 
During 1985-1993, Thailand lost 11% of its forested area (Royal Forest Department, 
(1994)). During this period the province of Chiang Mai lost almost 2000 sq km of 
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forest, which equals 10% of its provincial land area.2 Forest loss in the province was 
attributed mainly to agricultural practices (Panayatou, (1991); Feeny, (1988)).  
Forest loss in this area was particularly harmful because it resulted in large 
changes in local ecology and hydrology as well as in impacts nationwide. The period 
(1985-1993) witnessed reduced rainfall and dry-season water shortage caused by low 
infiltration rates (Walker, (2002); Supradit, (1997); Takahashi et al., (1983); Vincent 
et al. (1995)).3 Floods in Central Thailand in 1987 were also widely blamed on 
deforestation in North Thailand. As a consequence the period witnessed frequent 
resource-related conflicts between ethnic Thais who live in the plains and the tribes 
that reside within Forest Reserves. The tribes are popularly perceived as apathetic to 
forest conservation efforts and their clearing activities are seen as being responsible 
for downstream water troubles (Wittayapak, (1996); Lohmann, (1999)). Examining 
the extent to which agricultural practices are leading to increased land clearing and 
unsustainable land use is therefore also relevant for regional and national policy. 
1.2 Factors Affecting Agricultural Expansion in Forest Areas
In examining agricultural practices in forest villages in Chiang Mai I focus on 
three factors that have been found to be important drivers of agricultural expansion 
and deforestation: population, transportation costs and the absence of property rights.  
 
2 North Thailand lost approximately the same percentage of forest area. Forest area fell from 84126 
sqkm in 1985 to 75231 sq km in 1993.  
3 Walker (2002) notes that in North Thailand, “Forest cover and water supply have become 
inextricably linked in local and national debates.” 
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In this section I summarize the main conclusions from these studies. Details are 
presented in Appendix I. 
Population and Transportation: A seminal study examining the effect of 
population on tropical agriculture is one by Esther Boserup in 1965. In the study, 
Boserup asserted that the main effect of a change in population was on the intensity 
of cultivation, defined as the frequency of cropping. Specifically she asserted that the 
distinction between intensive and extensive cultivation could be explained by the 
frequency of cropping. She also argued that population increases lead to a shift from 
extensive to more intensive systems of land use. The Boserup paradigm in which 
population is the main determinant of land use has been used subsequently by many 
studies, that assume population to be the main driver of agricultural production: many 
agricultural tropical communities are modeled as aiming to reach an exogenously 
determined consumption basket. In these subsistence communities, increases in 
population are the only reason for increases in agricultural production (see for 
example, Godoy (1997); Dvorak (1992); Angelsen (1996)).  
The impact of transportation costs on agricultural decisions was first 
examined by Von Thunen in 1965. Von Thunen suggested that differences in crop 
choice could be attributed to transport costs alone (he assumed homogeneous soil 
fertility). He showed that farther farmers are more likely to shift from growing 
perishable cash crops such as vegetables, to growing crops that are more hardy and 
storable, such as staples and legumes.  
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Subsequently, both variables – population and transportation costs – have 
been cited in the literature examining agricultural expansion although few studies 
examine their impact in Thailand. Cropper, Griffiths and Mani (1999) and Panayatou 
(1991) are especially relevant since both examine the impacts of population and 
transportation costs in Thailand. Cropper et al. (1999) use province-level data to 
estimate an equilibrium model of land clearing between 1976 and 1989. They find 
that population density had a large impact on land clearing in North Thailand. The 
elasticity of land clearing with respect to agricultural household density is found to be 
0.41 in North Thailand. Road density (measured as length of road network divided by 
provincial area) however had no statistically significant impact on cleared area. 
Panayatou (1991) and Panayatou and Sungsuwan (1989) support these conclusions in 
their study of population impact in Thailand. Panayatou and Sungsuwan highlight 
population growth as the most important driver of land use change, using state level 
panel data for the period 1962-1989.4 Explanatory variables include agricultural 
prices, provincial income, population density and road density. For the study period, 
they estimated the elasticity of forest cover with respect to road density as -0.11. 
However, this estimate is probably biased, because the cost of access is also 
capitalized in land and timber prices, which are also found to be significant.  
 
4 It is interesting that there are several studies – albeit not in the applied economics literature – that 
assert that roads have had no impacts or very little impact in Thailand. Jones (1973) while studying the 
impact of improved primary highways, finds little impact on agricultural area in Northern Thailand and 
concludes that “most indicators continued much as they had earlier”. He also concludes the same in 
Southern Thailand “a greatly improved primary highway appeared not to have altered a declining 
economy”. Howe and Richards (1984) confirm their support (pp 158) to say that there seems “…no 
consistent pattern of response to the presence of new or significantly improved roads, either trunkline 
highways or feeder roads…”. They also comment on a baseline impact of roads, over and above which 
there seems little incremental impact “…No doubt the efficacy of peasant farming is dominated by 
6
In the larger agricultural land use literature, there are broadly two types of 
studies that examine agricultural land use. 
A Pixel as the unit of analysis: This group of studies follows Von Thunen 
(1965), and uses reduced form econometric models to explain and predict land use at 
the level of a pixel, assuming that land will be devoted to its most profitable use. 
These studies (see for example Chomitz and Gray, (1996); Nelson and Hellerstein 
(1996); Pfaff, (1997); Cropper, Puri and Griffiths (2001); Deininger and Minten 
(1996); and, Muller (2004)) customarily use physiographic information at the level of 
the pixel, such as soil type, elevation, slope to explain land use. Data are derived from 
a compendium of spatially explicit layers. Additional information such as population 
(usually measured at a much coarser level of aggregation, such as district or county or 
province) is used along with a complex measure of access to the market. The ‘access’ 
variable is weighted for road presence, road quality and location of population centers 
(a proxy for market locations). The results from such models are fairly straight 
forward and explicit: Steeper slopes, higher elevations and bad soil reduce the 
probability that land is converted to agriculture (from forest); Commercial crops are 
likely to be grown closer to markets, while subsistence crops are grown further away; 
and, higher population is correlated with a higher probability of the pixel of land 
being cultivated. 
Most of these studies find that physiographic variables have stronger 
explanatory power than socio-economic variables in predicting land use although 
 
factors other than the economic cost of farm-to-market transport, provided there is some kind of road 
available at the time of year it is needed.” 
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socio-economic variables such as population are measured at a much coarser level. 
The advantage of these studies is that all the explanatory variables are truly 
exogenous and study estimates are not biased by possible endogeneity. On the other 
hand, although these models are fairly rigorous, one disadvantage is that they are ill-
suited to providing insights into how socio-economic factors can affect agricultural 
decisions. 
An Agricultural household as the unit of Analysis: This limitation, that 
most studies using the pixel as the level of analysis are unable to explain the role of 
socio-economic characteristics in explaining deforestation, is alleviated, to some 
extent, by studies using the agricultural household as their main unit of analysis. 
These studies use socio-economic variables to analyze the role of main determinants 
with respect to the household. Households are modeled differently depending on how 
well they are integrated with input or output markets, and integration with markets is 
usually measured by transportation costs (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, (1996); Dvorak 
(1992); Godoy et al. (1997), Angelsen (1996); Dwayne (1992); Lopez (1984); 
Deininger and Minten (1996a); Sadoulet and Janvry (1995)).  Effects of changes in 
population and transportation costs on agricultural decisions vary depending on 
whether households operate within perfects markets (transportation costs have most 
impact) if they operate in autarky (population changes have most impact), or if they 
operate somewhere in the middle of this continuum (the relative weights matter). 
Measuring magnitudes of impact of these two variables on agricultural decisions is 
thus important. 
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In more recent studies (Sadoulet and DeJanvry, (1995)) transportation costs 
have been studied more assiduously. Sadoulet and DeJanvry aver that all households 
are profit maximizers. But, one of the reasons that some households do not participate 
in markets (markets are thus ‘missing’), is that difficult or non-existent physical 
access causes high transaction costs.5 These transaction costs include not just search 
costs, bargaining costs and other costs that are not priced by the market but also the 
cost of transportation that exacerbate them. Thus most studies use transportation costs 
as a proxy for transaction costs. Subsequent studies have used this paradigm to model 
agricultural decisions of households (See for example, Minten and Kyle (1999); 
Jacoby (2000); and Puri (2001a, 2001b)). Transportation costs lower (raise) the 
effective price for the seller (buyer), compared to his shadow price, increasing the 
likelihood that households will choose not to participate in markets.  
One implication of this is that households that are typically perceived by the 
outsider as being insensitive to market prices or uninterested in achieving higher 
levels of consumption/utility may not be so insensitive. In Africa for example, De 
Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) find the elasticity of peasant supply response 
of cash crops is 0.18% (implying a very low response). Peasants treat food 
consumption as a necessity and subsistence production is undertaken to hedge against 
the possibility of income shocks. A positive income shock does not alleviate this 
(perceived) low response. This is explained by most economists as an increased 
desire for leisure and an inability to hire non-family labor. But once the authors 
 
5 Missing markets in labor (Fafchamps, (1993)), for food (De Janvry (1991); Onamo, (1998)), credit 
(Eswaran and Kotwal (1996)); Rosensweig and Wolpin (1993)) and insurance (Bromley and Chavas 
(1988)) have been explored variously. 
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account for shadow prices, the results are different: Increases in output response come 
mainly from an increased use of fertilizers. The study finds that shadow prices of 
food and labor increase by 8.8% and 9.3% respectively in response to cash crop price 
increases. These conclusions underscore the importance of locating households on the 
‘autarky-market continuum’, which is a function of transportation costs and 
household attributes. 
Other studies use transportation costs to explain decisions to participate in the 
market (see for example, Stifel, Minten and Dorosh (2003), Jacoby (2000); Minten 
and Kyle (1999); Fafchamps and Shilpi (2003); Puri (2001b)); and, the mix of crops 
they grow (Omamo, (1998); Goetz (1992); DeShazo and DeShazo (1995); Lendleton 
and Howe (2000), Vance and Geoghan (1997); and, Chomitz and Gray (1996)). The 
main thesis in these studies is that crop choices are dependent on subjective shadow 
values associated with these crops, transportation costs and market prices. One 
implication of these studies is that households as a whole cannot be characterized as 
subsistence oriented or operating in perfect markets. Rather goods produced and 
bought/sold are individually characterized as either ‘for subsistence’ or ‘for the 
market’ or indeed as both.  
Property rights: The third important variable that I examine in this 
dissertation is property rights. The role of property rights in agriculture is summarized 
as follows: Firstly, farmers without secure land ownership will have fewer investment 
incentives than farmers with secure land ownership. Secondly, the absence of 
property rights has a negative effect on a farmer’s ability to invest in land, since he 
10 
 
cannot use land as loan collateral. Consequently, farmers with no secure titles are 
likely to have less productive land (see for example Feder et al. (1988)). 
Inhabitants living within Forest Reserve Areas are not allowed to have secure 
land titles. Instead they are only permitted user rights. In a study of 230 farmers living 
in Forest Reserves in the North-eastern region of Thailand, in 1986, Feder et al. 
(1988) find four important things. First, despite the absence of secure land titles, there 
is an active land market. They find that the socio-political environment has so 
evolved in the country that farmers ‘perceive’ themselves as owners of their land. 
This perception is strengthened by the very low risk of eviction; only 1-4% farmers 
have ever been evicted from lands in Forest Reserves of Thailand. Second, although 
the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Credit (BAAC) does not require land as 
collateral for loans, the average loan amount provided to a farmer who offers land as 
collateral is different from the average loan amount provided to a farmer who does 
not. Third, farmers behave differently if they have secure rights. In the absence of 
these rights, they invest less in land and own less capital. Fourth, farmers with no
legal usufruct rights behave no differently from farmers with legal usufruct rights. 
(Usufruct rights are rights to cultivate land.) 
Farmers in the study sample used for this dissertation cannot use land as 
collateral. However they have different perceptions regarding their ownership status. 
The importance of these perceptions are tested using a dummy variable that 
distinguishes between villages that are ambiguous about their ownership status and 
villages that clearly have no legal ownership to land that they own. The study thus 
examines the role of perceptions of property rights on agricultural decisions.  
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1.3 Ex Ante Hypothesis and Contribution of the Dissertation 
In this dissertation I examine the effects of population, transportation costs 
and property rights on agricultural decisions using panel data for the period 1986-
1996 for 670 villages located in Forest Reserves of Chiang Mai, Thailand. Villages 
grow three main crops – paddy rice, upland rice and soybeans. Thailand is among the 
largest growers of paddy rice and its biggest exporter. But rice is also a staple. Most 
villages in the study sample grow paddy rice. On average upland rice and soybean are 
grown by 25% and 26% percentage of villages respectively. Using variables such as 
village population, travel time to market, water availability, soil quality, credit use, 
security of property rights, use of high yielding variety seeds and education level, I 
estimate three different random effects, reduced form equations for these crops. For 
soybean and upland rice, random effects Tobit models are used to estimate the 
probability that villages grow these crops, and conditional on adoption, the amount of 
area devoted to these two crops. I use the same variables to estimate random effects 
equations for total agricultural area and land use intensity. Since I do not have data on 
deforested area, I cannot examine the impact of various factors on deforestation; 
instead I examine their impact on agricultural expansion.6
More than one-fifth of Thailand’s villages are located in Forest Reserves. 
Forest Reserves are the last bastions of forests in the country. Therefore examining 
and measuring the impacts of population and transportation costs, both of which can 
 
6 Barbier (2004) uses the same approach. 
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be influenced by the government, is important for policy. The dissertation makes 
several additional contributions to the literature.  
Firstly, the dissertation estimates the impact of population and transportation 
costs on the agricultural frontier. Although the impact of roads and population may 
seem obvious, a closer examination reveals that this may not be so simple. Consider 
the scenario of an increase in population. This could lead to an increase in land 
clearing. But the impact could be small if agricultural wages are low and labor is 
mostly absorbed by the urban sector. Similarly, a reduction in travel costs could lead 
to an increased incentive to cultivate land but it could also aid labor mobility. Clearly 
measuring the magnitude of impact is important. Additionally, most studies use 
physiographic variables to explain agricultural decisions. Although these are critical, 
they do not help to explain the impact of tools that human beings do have some 
control over – policies affecting road building, population migration and credit 
availability for instance. 
Secondly, the dissertation indirectly examines traditional assumptions about 
inhabitants living on the borders of, or within, legally designated Forest Reserve 
areas. Forest inhabitants are sometimes seen as detrimental to the forest and as non-
participants in markets. Available policy options are thus assumed to be limited. Thus 
in countries such as India, Tanzania, Philippines and Thailand, meager state resources 
are used to resettle forest residents and devise compensation schemes that are often 
ineffective and are usually controversial (Albers and Muller, (2002); Wells, Brandon 
and Hannah, (1992), Cernea (1999), Cernea and Kanbur, (2002)).  
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As a response, Integrated Conservation and Development Programs (ICDPs) 
have become a favored policy tool in other parts of the world such as Indonesia, 
Bhutan, Madagascar and Papua New Guinea – schemes that potentially sustain forest 
growth and simultaneously, improve welfare of forest communities. These programs 
concentrate on providing alternative livelihoods to these farmers (See Paine, Byron, 
Poffenberger, (2004); Bruner, Gullison, Rice and Fonseca, (2001); Muller (2001)) 
However one of the main drawbacks of ICDPs is that they seek to provide livelihood 
alternatives that are not market-viable. ICDP ignores the role of access/isolation and 
transportation costs in farmer decisions and farm profitability (see for example, 
Rayamajhi et al. (2004); Jambiya et al. (2004)). Measuring the role of transportation 
costs on agricultural decisions within Forest Reserves can shed some light on the 
extent to which residents are integrated with markets.  
Related to this, applied economic studies have frequently posited that farmers 
living at the forest frontier are not active market participants and their only goal is to 
cultivate their land for self-consumption. Irrational decisions deduced from low 
supply response to policy changes are explained using this logic. (This is the key 
reason for undertaking resettlement projects referred to above.) Although it is difficult 
to assess the validity of this conclusion with the data I have, the dissertation throws 
some light on factors that affect decisions to cultivate.  
Thirdly, I examine the role that perceptions of security play in agricultural 
decisions. Most Protected area advocates create buffer zones around core protected 
areas that have looser administrative controls, and allow residents to own land. 
Residents who believe that they have property rights are likely to behave differently 
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from residents who are poorer and have no rights on land that they cultivate. This 
presents a valuable opportunity to understand the importance of perceptions regarding 
land rights and the impacts that these have on crop choices and crop area.  
Finally, the use of panel data containing socio-economic variables to examine 
agricultural practices is rare. Most studies examining deforestation in developing 
countries use cross-sectional data or a shallow panel spanning two years. Only one 
study to my knowledge (Almeida and Campari, (1995)) examines land area responses 
to policy changes using a panel dataset (2 points in time: 1981 and 1991). Others use 
cross-sectional datasets (Godoy et al. (1997) in Honduras; Godoy et al. (1996) in 
Bolivia; Jones et al. (1995) in Brazil; Munoz et al. (1992) in Mexico; and Pichon 
(1997) in Ecuador). As compared to studies using cross-sectional data, panel data 
models can help to alleviate biases due to omitted variables. 
1.4 Conclusion: Assumptions in this Dissertation 
In this dissertation I examine the role of several factors in determining area 
devoted to three main crops within Forest Reserves of Thailand. Determining the 
magnitudes of these variables on whether crops are grown, and on the area devoted to 
these crops can help one understand agricultural choices and decisions about acreage. 
I also use the same variables to examine total agricultural expansion and agricultural 
intensification. The maintained hypothesis is that agriculture is the main reason for 
forest clearing in Forest Villages of Chiang Mai.  
The data used for the study has some features that recommend it for 
explaining land area decisions and crop choices in the survey area. The study panel 
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has detailed information on total agricultural land and area devoted to various crop 
types (rice, short run crops and long run crops). Being a village-level dataset, it 
enables me to abstract from intra-village effects and household neighborhood effects, 
and concentrate on net changes in land area.7 Another advantage of using village level 
data is that markets are rarely missing at the intra-village level, since reciprocal 
exchanges are common within villages located in remote parts of developing 
countries (Gilligan (2003)).  
There are two main assumptions that I make in this study:  
Firstly, that population within Forest Reserves is exogenous to crop choice. 
Populations within reserved areas of Thailand can be assumed to be controlled 
because administrative authorities do not allow mass migrations to occur in these 
areas; Villages are not allowed to exceed their sustainable carrying capacity.8 This is 
supported by data: During 1986-1996, although the population of Chiang Mai 
province rose by more than 15%, population within study villages grew at less than 
1% per year.  
Secondly, I assume that access to markets is exogenously determined. Road 
construction and investments related to improvements in access are undertaken by 
three agencies in Thailand: The Department of Highways of the Ministry of 
Communications, the Office of Accelerated Rural Development of the Ministry of 
 
7 See for example Case (1991) 
8 Personal communication, Gershon Feder, The World Bank, 2004. 
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Interior (ARD) and the Department of Land Administration (DOLA).9 I measure 
access to market using a composite variable – travel time to the market – which 
includes road presence, road quality and availability of transport, all three of which 
are usually highly correlated (Puri, (2002)). If road construction and road quality 
related investments within study Forest Reserves take place for reasons unrelated to 
agriculture, such as for security reasons or to provide access to parks, then this 
assumption is a plausible one. There is substantial evidence that road building before 
the study period took place to provide military access to remote areas. The 
assumption is also plausible for another reason: Unlike other forms of investment, 
roads investments occur in stages (Howe and Richards, (1984)). ‘Stage construction’ 
implies that early paths are often followed by animal trails, and these are gradually 
cleared to provide adequate width and ease difficult alignment. Road-related 
investments may thus consist of road construction, road maintenance or road 
rehabilitation (see e.g. Puri, (2002a)). This implies that road locations are determined 
almost at the same time as inhabitants start to settle in a location. Attributing road 
presence to increased agricultural activity may thus be erroneous. In addition, road-
related investments are frequently assumed to be endogenous because the beneficiary 
communities can exert political pressure. To the extent that Forest Reserve villages 
are inhabited by minority communities, political pressure is not expected to have 
much sway on government investments. 
In the next chapter I describe the creation of Forest Reserves in Thailand. 
 
9 There are some other agencies of the government and state, that construct roads for special purposes, 
but their role is relatively minor. 
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2 Reserved Forests in Thailand  
“Uncertainty in forest boundaries is a major reason for not adjudicating parcels, as 
the DOL staff, to ensure that forest parcels are not adjudicated in forest land, have 
tended to leave a buffer in areas where a forest boundary is uncertain. In some 
regions of the country, particularly in the North, where land eligible for registration 
is often narrow valley floors, between forested mountains, the impost (sic) of a buffer 
can mean a significant proportion of parcels are not adjudicated.”
(Rattanabirabongse, V. et al. “Thirteen Years of experience with Land Titling” Land 
Use Policy, 1998 )
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the history of forest legislation in Thailand. This is 
important because all villages in the dataset used for this study are located within 
Forest Reserves. But it is also important because it highlights two important attributes 
of villages examined in this dissertation: The first is that inhabitants of Forest Reserve 
villages are likely to be hill tribe people who are poor, and who inhabit villages that 
are relatively remote and have poor infrastructure. The second is that the boundaries 
of Forest Reserves are not strictly defined: Impermanent Forest Reserve boundaries 
are a result of changing legislation and a myriad of legislative and enforcement 
agencies. Unclear and ever-changing boundaries of Forest Reserves have, in turn, 
implied ambiguous property rights within Forest Reserve villages. Both these 
attributes have important implications for crop choice and agricultural decisions.  
2.2 The Creation of Forest Reserves - Forestry Legislation in Thailand 
Two pieces of legislation provide the backbone of modern, conservation-
related forest legislation in Thailand: The Forest Act of 1941 and the National Forest 
Reserve Act of 1964. The Forest Act of 1941 defined a forest as “land without any 
private rights following land laws”. The Act made a break with the past, because it 
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oriented forest legislation towards spatial conservation (Wataru, (2003)). The 
National Forest Reserve Act of 1964 converted forest area to National Forest 
Reserves (pa sanguan heang chat). It also laid out restrictions of use within Forest 
Reserves10: Holding, possessing, clearing land, burning, collecting timber and 
gathering forest products were made illegal within Forest Reserve boundaries (Bugna 
and Rambaldi, (2001)).11,12 Forestry legislation did not change significantly before 
1989 when all commercial logging was banned and forest policy “shifted to the 
protection of national environment” (op. cit.). It is important to point out that 
although there were commercial logging interests in this region before 1989, Forest 
Reserves did not coincide with logging areas. A chronology of important events and 
legislation in Thailand’s Forest sector is presented in Box 3.1 and more details are 
presented in Annex 7.2.  
Since 1964, the official procedure for establishing/altering Forest Reserves 
has been as follows (National Forest Reserve Act, 1964): New areas, boundary 
revisions and other changes require a geographic survey and a subsequent Ministerial 
Order. After approval, Reserve boundaries are marked by poles and signs, and a 
public announcement is made, directed mainly at district offices, offices of sub-
 
10 Literature differentiates between National Forest Reserves and Forest reserves, which were different 
before 1964. These are used interchangeably in the text since all Forest Reserves came under the RFD 
after this Act. Furthermore, although Forest Reserves had been in existence earlier, the Act of 1964 
was the first to lay down procedures for preserving forest areas and designating them as ‘Forests’.  
11 Simultaneously the first National Economic Development Plan of 1961 provided for 50% of the 
country to be kept forested. 
12 Forest land continued to be used. The 1964 Act did not recognize it. 
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district heads and all affected villages.13 A National Forest Reserve Committee is 
established for each forest. The Committee consists of one member each from RFD, 
the Department of Local Administration (DOLA), the Department of Land (DOL) 
and two members chosen by the Minister of Agriculture.  
Importantly, all appeals disputing Reserve boundaries are passed to the 
National Forest Reserve Committee. Villagers who claim usufruct rights to land 
within the reserved area can appeal only after an area is designated a Forest Reserve. 
This appeal is sent to the National Forest Reserve Committee and the Minister 
adjudicates.14 Since an appeal contesting boundaries must be made within 90 days of 
the area being designated a Forest Reserve, people living within boundaries of Forest 
Reserves are frequently deemed ‘illegal encroachers’ if an application is not 
presented within the mandated 90 day period. No distinction is made between older 
residents and newer occupants.  
The Royal Forest Department (RFD) is the main agency responsible for 
managing protected areas and Reserved Forests in Thailand.15 (Protected areas are 
 
13 The literature however contends that field level forest officers frequently do not recognize 
boundaries  –  which causes a lot of friction with local people. An interesting description of the process 
in North-east Thailand, is described as below: “…When they measured a planned area, they surveyed 
only along the boundary with assistance from the village headmen and sub-district heads. Border 
areas that were dangerous and difficult of (sic) access might have been demarcated only on the map. 
Large and well-established villages and their paddy fields would be excluded if forest officers found 
them during their survey. But small hamlets of several households would not be excluded for the 
national forest reserves, even though forest officers found them, because according to the previous 
officer, exclusion of these hamlets from national forest reserves would mean approving earlier illegal 
encroachment into national forestlands.” (Sato cited in Fujita, (2003)). Vague boundaries between 
forest and areas growing rain-fed paddy were called ‘rice-producing forest’. 
14 The National Forest Reserve Act, does not  provide for a prior investigation of people usufruct 
rights.  
15 It was established in 1896 with a mandate to protect and manage all Forests and implement laws. 
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different from Forest Reserves in that the former are recognized by the IUCN (World 
Conservation Union) as important preserves, and enforcement is stricter within 
Protected areas.) The RFD facilitates protected area management via its Natural 
Resources Conservation Office, which has amongst its other divisions the Natural 
Park Division which regulates the use of parks. The RFD is in turn part of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC).16 
While RFD is the main actor, conservation related policies are developed and 
executed by several agencies in Thailand. These include MOAC, the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Environment (MOSTE) and others outside these ministries, 
such as the National Resources and Biodiversity Institutes (NAREBI), the National 
Committee on the Conservation of Biological Diversity and the Office of 
Environmental Policy and Planning. 
16 Despite evidence of active policy making in this sector, many studies have decried the management 
of Protected and Reserved Forest Areas (see for example Augettante, (1996); Wataru, (2003)) and have 
commented on the difference between conserved forests and actual forest cover (See Table 3.1). 
Wataru (2003) contends that during the period of my study, the RFD lacked sufficient power to enact 
policies against local people who were traditional resource users as a result of which “forest reserves 
are a failure.” Ganjanapan (2000), based on field research in North Thailand, concludes that the state, 
by enclosing the forest and not recognizing people’s use of these forests, “removed the villagers’ 
incentive to protect the forests.” RFD’s own figures point out the discrepancy between reserved forests 
and actual forest cover.  Most of this is attributed to agriculture and shifting agriculture practiced by 
indigenous people, living within or close to forest reserve boundaries. 
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Box 2.1: Chronology of Important Events for Forest related Legislation in Thailand 
(Note: Relevant important legislation are starred.) 
1874: Local Governor’s Act of 1874 and Royal Order on Taxation of Teak and other logs. Central 
government/King becomes involved in managing logging concessions. 
1896: Royal Forest Department (RFD) founded. 
1897: Forest Preservation Order of 1897 regulates size of Teak to be logged. 
1901: Forest management completely under the control of the central government. 
1913: Forest Preservation Act controls species of Teak and others. Act legally defines a ‘forest’. Gives a 
minister the authority to designate non-logging areas and issue orders to prohibit land clearing.  
1916: Draft of Forest Conservation Act. “First attempt” at introducing spatial conservation. Regional 
forest offices begin to select forests to conserve and designate as ‘forest reserves’. Draft is not approved 
but temporary designations of ‘forests’ continue. 
1938: Forest Preservation and Conservation Act of 1938. Divides forests into two categories - 
‘Preserved Forests’ and ‘Forest Reserves’ 
*1941: Forest Act of 1941. Forest Reserves are promulgated. 
1952: Forest Ranger service for control and policing forests. However Rangers only monitor commercial 
logging concessions and are not assigned to particular Forest Reserves or Preserves. 
1953: Forest Preservation and Conservation Act is revised. Forest ‘designating’ committee must now 
contain a sub-district head as a member. Recognizing reality, temporary residence and use of forests 
start to be granted after investigation. 
1954: Forest Preservation and Conservation Act is made a ministerial order. 240 Preserved Forests and 8 
Reserved Forests are counted in the country. 
1960: Forest Police founded as a department of the Police Department. 
1961: National Park Act passed. First NESDP (1961-1965) provides for 50% of the country to be 
forested land. Forest rangers organized in ‘forest protection units’ are made responsible for forest 
protection. 
1963: Department of Land Development (DLD) established.  
*1964: National Forest Reserve Act of 1964 passed. The Act recognizes that procedures for designating 
procedures are too time consuming. Therefore it omits the hitherto mandatory investigation of usufruct 
rights before designating an area a ‘Reserve’ or a ‘Preserve’.  
1965: Rural Forest development Units established, to provide services additional to protection units such 
as extension services, while protecting forests. 
1966: Committee established to investigate local people’s land use in National Forest Reserves. 
1967: RFD starts to designate ‘project forests’ for logging.  
1973: Ministry of Interior sponsors the ‘Land distribution promotion project’, conducted by RFD. 
*1975: Cabinet approves legislation for establishing ‘Forest villages’. 
1979: The ‘Cultivation Rights Project’ in forest villages commences. 
1982: STKs start to be awarded. 
1993: Cultivation Rights Project ends. 
1989: All commercial logging is banned in Thailand.  
1991: Zoning of National Forest reserves starts (Zone A:  Land suitable for agriculture; Zone C: 
Protected forest zone; Zone E: Economic Forest). 
1992: Forest Protection Units transferred to provincial forest offices. 
1993: All degraded forest lands transferred to Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO), and excluded 
from National forest reserves.  ALRO issues SPK4s to landless farmers. 
Sources: Various. Mainly Bugna and Rambaldi (2001), Fujita (2003), Thailand (2003), Buergin (2000),
RFD (Various years), Wataru (2003).
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All Thailand North 
Thailand 
Chiang Mai 
Total Area 513,115 169,644 20,107 
National Reserves (1993) 230,186 111,983 19,556 
Forest  
1982 156,598 87,756 16,702 
1985 150,889 84,126 16,210 
1988 143,803 80,402 15,204 
1991 136,698 77,143 14,741 
1993 133,521 75,231 14,420 
Source: Forestry Statistics of Thailand, Royal Forestry Department, 1994. 
Table 2.1: Forest Area (square kilometers), Thailand, (1982-1993). 
2.3 Property Rights within Forest Reserves 
Before 1953, national forest policy in Thailand was exclusionary: legislation 
did not recognize de facto use of land within Forest Areas and recognized no rights of 
residents within its boundaries.17 In 1953, authorities realized that such exclusion was 
not practical given the large population dependent on forest resources and their 
traditional uses. As forest authorities realized the needs of villagers, limited use of 
forest areas began to be permitted. RFD, along with the Ministry of Agriculture and 
relevant officers, began to provide limited sanctions for use of Forest Reserves. 
Applications to secure sanctions/rights to use land within Forest Reserves and 
extracting forest products were accepted at the District forest offices and sent to the 
headquarters via provincial forest offices. The Director General of the Forest office 
made these decisions. In 1975, official forest villages were created, via a cabinet 
 
17 Vandergeest (1996) calls this ingress of the state prohibiting traditional uses and imposing modern 
tenure systems, the “territorialization of the forest” by the state. 
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resolution. 18 Landless peasants were allotted land within these settlements, which 
could be used, but not sold or used for collateral. 
A review of the literature reveals that although usufruct rights were granted, 
usufruct rights within Forest Reserves were being continuously investigated and re-
defined at least until the 1990s (Table 2.2). This contributed to a great deal of 
uncertainty amongst Forest Reserve inhabitants. Thus for instance, in 1957, people 
occupying forest land at the time were given land titles called SK-1 (So-Ko 1) and 
NS-3 (No-So 3). (SK-1s were claim certificates that were granted if residents 
successfully established possession before 1957. Land with an SK-1 certificate could 
not be used as collateral. NS-3s were granted for land that could be traded and used as 
collateral.) Then in 1976, the cabinet authorized the Department of Land and Ministry 
of Interior to issue NS-3K (No-So-Ko-3) land titles. (These were secure land titles but 
ownership could be challenged if land remained fallow for more than five years.)  
However since RFD opposed this strongly, titles were rescinded although the same 
freedoms remained in place (Roth, (2003); Wataru (2003)). In 1973 as part of a ‘Land 
Distribution Promotion Project’, the Ministry of Interior investigated land tenure and 
usage in National Forest Reserves. A sub-committee consisting of officials from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Promotion, the Director-General 
of the Department of Public Welfare and RFD decided one of four actions after 
reviewing the results: i) Exclude the occupied area from the national forest reserve; ii) 
Temporarily allow residence and cultivation; iii) Remove the encroacher; iv) Abolish 
 
18 Forest villages were of three types: National Forest Reserve Improvement projects (carried out by 
RFD), royal projects and rural development projects. The last were expressly for national security. 
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the entire national forest reserve. In most cases temporary residence and cultivation 
were allowed.19 
In 1990 according to TDRI, more than 20% of the country’s 56,000 villages 
were located within Forest Reserves (cited in Gray, (1991)). An increased frequency 
of conflicts between encroaching villagers and forest authorities is an indicator of the 
tension between forest preservation and rural livelihoods (Lohman, (1999); Fujita, 
(2003)).  
What this discussion brings out clearly is that user rights within Forest 
Reserves were in a state of continuous flux until the 1990s and depended on political 
will and on new programs adopted by different agencies engaged in protecting forests 
or developing land within them. In this context, the Department of Land Development 
(DLD) and RFD were particularly at odds with each other as each was keen to extend 
its domain but each had (and has) different mandates.  
This ambiguity in user rights within Forest Reserves was also aggravated by 
the fact that boundaries of Forest villages changed frequently because of separate 
investigations, often conducted independently of each other. Thus we find several 
seeming contradictions. Table 2.2 (reproduced and adapted from Feder et al. (1988)), 
for example, contends that No-So-3s cannot be issued inside Forest Reserves. 
 
19 This examination of usufruct rights continued till the 1990s although Annual Reports of the RFD 
indicate that the number of forests investigated each year varied from very few to 50-60. 
Simultaneously during the mid-1970s there were other investigations that aimed to do the same. But 




However Wataru (2003) states that these were issued to people living inside Forest 
Reserves.  
The following quotes (along with one at the beginning of the chapter) are 
eloquent: 
“Overlaps in jurisdiction are compromising key targets of the project by 
preventing the issue of titles for many parcels. This has been particularly been the 
case with forest boundaries and declared land reform areas…”
“Until phase III, field adjudication staff did not adjudicate near forests or in 
areas where forest boundaries were uncertain. This reduced the percentage of land 
adjudicated. Now, by mutual agreement, the RFD surveying resources are used to 
mark forest boundaries in adjudication areas, and to delineate forest boundaries in 
DOL maps.”
(Rattanabirabongse, V. et al. (1998 )) 
“…some members of a given family could be squatters while other members 
are legal owners. In areas on the boundary of the forest reserve, an individual’s 
landholdings could arbitrarily be split between land outside the reserve – for which 
he held a legal, secure land document – and land inside the forest reserve, for which 
he could be considered an illegal squatter.”    
“…In many instances it was several years before farmers learned that land 
they held or had acquired had been designated as forest reserves.”
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(Feder et al. (1988)) 
This discussion demonstrates two things: Firstly, that villages located on the 
boundaries of Forest Reserves were particularly likely to have ambiguous property 
rights, because of the ever changing boundaries of forest reserves and the buffer zone 
left around Forest Reserves that officials preferred to ignore while enforcing property 
rights. Secondly, villages located deep inside Forest Reserves were unlikely to have 
any secure property rights. 
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Title Type Year 
Introduced 
Rights Limits (as 
described by Feder 






1954 Most secure; full unrestricted 
ownership title.  
Can be used as collateral and is fully 
tradable. 





Certificate of Use 
1954 Very secure. Can be converted into 
NS-4. 
 
Tradable under certain conditions. 
Can be used as collateral. 
Issued only outside 
forest reserves, any 
transfer must be 







1972 Very secure. Can be converted to NS-
4.  
Fully tradeable.  
Can be used as collateral. 
 
Issued only outside 
forest reserves. 
Ownership may be 
challenged if land 
lies fallow for more 





1954 Authorizes temporary occupation of 
land. After a prescribed period may 
be converted to NS-3 or NS-4.  
Can be acquired only through 
inheritance. Cannot be used as 
collateral. 
Issued only outside 
forest reserves; 
validity of rights 
conditional on use 






1954 Particular to the period during which 
Thailand was adopting the Land code. 
Claim to ownership is based on 
possession before the enactment of 
land code. 
Certificate tradeable only after 
transfer is advertised. Cannot be used 
as collateral. 




1 and STK 2 
Temporary 
cultivation rights 
1982 Certificate of use only. Can be 
acquired only through inheritance and 
cannot be used as collateral. Cannot 
be converted into NS-3 or NS-4. 
Issued inside forest 
reserves; covers 
plots up to 15 rai. 
State reserves right 
to revoke usufruct 










 These are issued in specific areas 
under small official programs. They 
can usually be acquired through 
inheritance and usually cannot be 
used as collateral. These are usually 
usufruct rights and cannot be sold 
until 5 years after issue date. 
 7 
Source: Adapted from Feder et al. Land Productivity and Farm Productivity in Thailand, 1988. 
Table 2.2: Land Title and Land Use Rights in Thailand (1954-1990). 
2.4 Forest Reserves Villages – The Study Sample
There are seven different types of land titles that can be owned in this region 
(Table 2.2). Of these, three types of land titles allow land to be used as collateral. I 
use this definition to define secure and insecure ownership of land. Nineteen percent 
28 
 
of the observations in the study sample claimed that their residents had secure 
property rights even though de jure residents can possess only usufruct rights. 
Perceptions about land ownership are thus important in this area.  
As Feder et al. (1988) and Gine (2004) also document that residents of 
villages that have been in existence for a long period of time are likely to believe that 
they have secure property rights to the land that they cultivate, even if they do not 
possess land title papers. Feder et al. claim that despite the fact that land title 
documents are missing, there is an active land market in this part of the country, 
further underscoring this perception of secure land rights. Gine, when examining a 
sample of 191 villages in North East Thailand and Central Thailand, finds that 40% 
of the households located in  villages in Forest Reserve and Land Reform areas had 
titled land and only 20% of the households were landless. Another factor that has 
contributed to this belief of secure ownership is that most residents pay property 
taxes. Finally, widespread acknowledgement amongst Thai authorities, that the 
absence of property rights within Forest Reserves and the ambiguous nature of land 
titles is not conducive to investments in land, has led to many land titling programs 
that have attempted to delineate boundaries and ‘clarify’ and ‘re-clarify’ the status of 
property rights, often resulting in much confusion.  Frequently these changes of 
legislations have only taken place at administrative centers. 
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1 pt. 2 pts. 3 pts 4 pts 5 pts 6 pts 
Never secure  413 89 29 60 78 23 134 
Secure once 89 35 7 7 4 3 33
Secure twice 46  20 5 6 0 15
Secure three times 32   13 8 4 7
Secure four times 33    21 1 11 
Secure five times 21     2 19 
Secure six times 36      36 
 670 124 56 85 117 33 255 
* Secure title to land implies, land can be used as collateral. These are responses of Village Headmen. 
Source: Data provided by Thammasat University. 
Table 2.3: Security of land title cross-referenced with Frequency of Presence, 
Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai, 1986-96 
An important implication of ambiguous land rights is that the difference in 
perceptions regarding property rights may be a source of heterogeneity in agricultural 
decisions. As Table 2.3 shows 413 villages (62%) in the dataset never had secure 
rights to village land, irrespective of the number of years they are present in the data 
set. In contrast, of the 255 villages that are present in the data set for all years, only 36 
claim to have secure rights through-out the study period. For the remaining villages, 
the status of their land titles “flips” from year to year.  
One possible explanation for this flipping behavior is that these Forest villages 
are located in the buffer zones of Forest Reserves, where ambiguous legislation is 
likely to create confusion regarding boundaries and hence about land use rights. This 
group of 257 villages has ‘ambiguous property rights’ and constitutes 38% of the 
study sample. On the other hand, Forest villages that claim to have no secure rights 
consistently are likely to be located deep inside Forest Reserves, where changing 
Forest boundaries create no ambiguity. I use this division of the sample to divide the 
sample into two parts – those that have ‘no secure property rights’ (NPR villages),
and those that have ‘ambiguous property rights’ (APR villages). Because of what 
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this implies for their locations, I expect – although I cannot verify –the first group of 
villages (NPR villages) to be located far inside Forest Reserves, and, compared to 
villages with “ambiguous” property rights (APR villages), to be more remote and 
poorer. 




3 Description of Study Data Set 
“…agricultural expansion in Thailand has always been through a process of forest 
clearing and settlement…” (Feder et al. (1988)) 
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes characteristics of the 670 study villages used in this 
dissertation. The data for the study are provided by Thammasat University, which has 
been regularly collecting biennial data on rural villages in Thailand since 1986. The 
data are collected for the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB). Data for the study are present for the years 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992 and 
1996, for the province of Chiang Mai.  
The chapter begins with a description of the study area, Chiang Mai province. 
This is followed by explaining how I constructed the data set for 670 Reserved Forest 
villages from a data set consisting of all villages in the province. Section 3.4 describes 
characteristics of Forest Reserve Villages. This is followed in Section 3.5 by a 
detailed description of agricultural practices in study villages.  
One feature of the survey is that village headmen provide responses to 
questions and the survey records modal values of variables. Data are collected via 
questions such as: “What is the mode of transport most (popularly) used by 
households in the village?” or, “What is the method of sale for most households?” 
The data also answers questions such as “Average selling price of crop in baht per 
kilogram?” The disadvantage of village-level data is that micro-relationships cannot 
be modeled and shadow prices cannot be estimated. (See Annex 7.2 for a complete 
list of the questions and variables collected in the survey.)   
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3.2 The Survey Area 
The Chiang Mai valley is the largest valley in North Thailand and covers 
160,000 hectares (20,000 square kilometers). The topography of the area consists of 
high mountain ranges running in the north-south direction. Between the mountain 
ranges are narrow valleys. In 1986 it supported 100,000 agricultural households (Fox 
et al. (1995)). It contains important watersheds: the Ping, Wang, Yom, Na, Yuam, 
Moey, Kok, Lao and Wing rivers all rise here and are critical to the rice economy of 
the central plains. The region has a typical monsoon climate. The rainy season is from 
June to October, followed by a long dry season. About 70% of the wet season rice 
crop is irrigated by the Ping River and dry season irrigation is available for about 
60% of the land. Of the upland area, about 34.2% is agricultural land while the rest 
are rivers and forests (Deitrich, (1988)).  
In the next section I describe the construction of the study dataset. 
3.3 Construction of the Dataset
The study dataset is a subset of a larger dataset collected by Thammasat 
University for the province of Chiang Mai.20 The villages included in the study 
dataset all responded that they lay within Forest Reserves at least once during the 
years 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1996.  
All villages in the dataset are registered villages i.e. villages have to be 
registered with the Village Directory of the Department of Local Administration 
(DOLA). However all villages do not always respond that they lie within Forest 
 
20 The larger dataset consists of 784 villages. 
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Reserves for all the years that they are surveyed. Columns in Table 3.1 show the 
response pattern of villages in the study dataset.  Thus out of 117 villages that were 
present in the dataset four times, 73 said they were in Forest Reserves all 4 years; 
however 24 said they were in Forest Reserves for only 3 out of the 4 years and 20 
said that they were in Forest Reserves for at most 2 out of 4 years. This is consistent 
with the notion that Forest Reserve boundaries are ambiguous. 
The resulting panel dataset is unbalanced. Of the 670 villages that appear at 
least once in the dataset, 255 (38%) are present for all 6 years; in contrast, 124 
villages are present for only one year. (See table 3.1. Rows in the table show the 
number of times villages appear in the dataset.) Although attrition in panel data is 
common – villages may chose to not participate in certain years or may not be asked 
to participate in certain years for several reasons (e.g. lack of resources with the 
survey agency) – it is important to understand the cause of attrition or selection. 
Missing observations in a panel data may not be randomly missing and, if so, 
estimators may be inconsistent. Ignoring attrition and using a balanced dataset, as is 
common practice, may lead to inconsistent estimates (See Heckman, (1976); Nijman 
and Verbeek, 1992)).  
Table 3.2 shows the pattern of presence for villages in this dataset. (A note on 
interpretation: 1xx1xx means that a village is present in the first and fourth year of the 
study period. Since data started to be collected in 1986, this means that a village was 
part of the dataset in 1986 – the first year, and 1992 – the fourth year.) Villages that 
are surveyed and respond in all six years are the single largest group in the complete 
dataset. They account for 38% of the villages surveyed. The second largest group is 
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the villages that occur only once. These constitute 18.5% of the villages. It is 
interesting to see that there are very few villages that are missing from the panel for 
two or more consecutive waves. I thus assume that villages that fail to respond to the 
survey for two or more consecutive years are dropped in subsequent years by the 
survey agency. However it may also be possible that villages that do not respond for 
two consecutive years are not included in subsequent years, because the village has 
moved or disbanded. Additionally, the village could simply have been inaccessible, 
because of, for instance, high elevation or weather. Thus a variety of reasons could 
explain why almost 19% of the villages in the study panel appear only once.  
Number of times a village is classified within a Forest 
Reserve  









1 124      124 
2 17 39     56 
3 8 16 61 85
4 1 19 24 73 117
5 4 29  33 
Total Number 
of  
Times a Village 
is present in the 
dataset 6 91 164 255 
Total no. of villages in 
‘forest reserves’ 150 74 85 77 120 164 670 
Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Chiang Mai, Thailand. 




Pattern of Presence No. of 
Villages 
Percentage of 670 villages 
111111 255 38.1 
xx1111 57 8.5 
1111xx 16 2.4
x11111 15 2.2 
11x111 11 1.6
11111x 5 0.7





11xxxx 27 4.0 





















111111 (all Villages) 670 100 
Source: Dataset provided by Thammasat University; Note: ‘x’ denotes village is not present; ‘1’ denotes village is 
present. So xx11xx means village is present only in the third and fourth year of the dataset. Since data is collected 
biennially starting in 1986, this means the village is present in 1990 and 1992.  The above table shows there are 2 
such villages. 
Table 3.2: Pattern of Presence of Forest Villages, Chiang Mai, Thailand, (1986-
1996). 
 
There is another problem that requires mentioning: During the study period, 
several tambons changed boundaries (mostly in the early 90s). Since the unique 8 
digit village level identifier contains within it a 2 digit tambon identifier, this implies 
that during the study period, the same village could have a different identifying 
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number. This problem is not restricted to tambons. During the study period, the 
number of amphoes in the province increased from 22 to 24. This indicates that there 
was re-drawing of boundaries of amphoes and tambons. Maps for the province are 
further testimony to this but since the precise location of villages included in the 
dataset is not known, it is not possible to determine which villages changed their 
village identifiers.  
In the next sub-section I discuss some other features of the dataset. 
3.3.1 Crop Data  
The NRD2C survey questionnaire (hereafter called the ‘Thammasat dataset’ 
since it was provided by the University) asks the village headman to respond to the 
question “What is the most popularly grown short run (long run) crop this year?” For 
crops other than paddy rice, crop area, the number of households growing the crop 
and other attributes are recorded only for the short-run or long-run crop that is ‘most 
popular’. This means no crop is tracked for all years, other than paddy rice, unless it 
is ‘popular’ every year. 21 Furthermore, crops are tracked in groups i.e. ‘short run 
crops’ or ‘long run crops’. Thus there are a large number of villages every year that 
do not have data for soybean and upland rice even though these are the single most 
frequently grown short run crops and long run crops respectively (Table 3.3). 
Although other short run crops such as Maize, Groundnuts, Tobacco and vegetables 
 
21 Village headmen are also asked questions about “the second most important short (long) run crop” 
and the “third most important short (long) run crop”.  Data on these is scarcer.  
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etc., are grown, soybean is the single most grown ‘short run’ crop. 22 Similarly upland 
rice – a ‘long run crop’, is the single most grown crop by most study villages in the 
region although on average it is only grown by one-fourth of the villages in the 
sample. (See Annex 7.1 for details of the survey.) 
One way to deal with this problem of scarce crop specific data is to examine 
crop groups as a whole – short run crops (which include soybean, maize, peanuts, 
tobacco and vegetables) and long run crops (which include upland rice, tea and tree 
crops). Other than the obvious question about how similar these crops are, 
discrepancies in the way data are collected do not allow this. Aggregate data for area 
devoted to short run-crops or long run crops indicate that missing values and zeroes 
were confounded (Tale 3.4). For these two crop groups, there are no villages 
recording area as ‘zero’ in 1986, 1994 and 1996. In these years however the number 
of villages showing crop area as ‘missing’ is much larger than the other years. To do 
away with problems of comparability of crops and confounded data records, I 
examine only three specific crops – paddy rice, soybean and upland rice (Table 3.5).   
Table 3.5 also shows one important characteristic of available data. For data 
on area devoted to soybean and upland rice there are a large number of zeros. Thus, 
as the last row of Table 3.5 shows, there are 1118+849 +15 = 1982 observations for 
which soybean area is zero, and 672 for which soybean area is positive. Similarly for 
upland rice, there are 1673 + 284 + 16 =1973 observations for which upland rice is 
 
22 I estimated a multinomial logit model to explain whether a village reported zero, positive or missing 
area for short-run crops. The results showed that being closer to markets, having a higher population, 
being closer to Chiang Mai, and having adequate water increased the probability that data were 
recorded as positive for short run crops as a whole compared to data being missing. 
38 
 
zero, and 681 observations for which area devoted to upland rice is positive. This has 
important repercussions for estimation models, discussed later. 
3.3.2 Data on Prices of Crops  
Related to problems with the data described above are additional problems 
with the way crop prices are recorded. Since prices are an important determinant of 
agricultural decisions, these problems deserve a special note. The first problem with 
the way prices are recorded is that the price for a crop is recorded only if the crop is 
grown. This makes it difficult to use prices to explain why a crop is grown and also to 
explain area devoted to a crop since the prices of substitutes and lagged prices are 
often not available. Secondly it is not clear whether prices are farm gate prices or 
market prices from the question asked in the survey questionnaire. For both these 
reasons, I use travel time as a proxy for prices with the maintained hypothesis that it 
is the main cause of variation in prices that farmers see at the farm gate, and that 
prices otherwise equalize due to arbitrage.  
In the next section I describe the main attributes of the study villages. 
3.4 Characteristics of Study Villages 
Villages covered by the survey are distributed over 21 amphoes (districts) and 
147 tambons (sub-districts). Respondents to the questionnaire were village headmen. 
On average, more than 60% of the respondents answered that the main occupation of 
residents was agriculture. In 1996, 20% responded that factory work had become the 
main occupation in their villages. Characteristics of villages are presented in Tables 
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3.6 and 3.7.  T-statistics for differences between mean values of most variables are 
significantly different at the 10% level for the two groups of villages – those with 
ambiguous property rights (APR villages), and those with no secure property titles 
(NPR villages). The exception is agricultural land. There is no significant difference 
between average agricultural land between the two groups of villages. 
Village area and agricultural land: On average, villages are 4,350 rais in area 
(or 696.6 hectares).23 NPR villages are almost 1.4 times the size of APR villages. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that the first group of villages is located in forest 
interiors and the second group, on the boundaries of Forest Reserves, where property 
rights may appear more secure. NPR villages grew in area by 2% during the study 
period, while APR villages on average did not. Although village sizes are 
significantly different between the two groups, agricultural land within these villages 
is not. Average agricultural land is 918 rais (or 147 hectares). Agricultural land in 
NPR villages grew significantly by 1.5% over the study period, while APR villages 
did not witness any change. Intensity of cultivation is also much higher on average in 
APR villages compared to NPR villages. Area devoted to paddy rice accounted for 
the largest percentage of cultivated area. 
Population size: The average density of population in Forest Reserve villages 
is approximately 0.6 persons/hectare. This is less than the average density of 
population for all Thailand in 1985: 1 person per hectare (UN, (2005))24. APR 
 




villages are more densely populated than NPR villages: The ratio of population to 
land area is 0.85 persons/hectare in the first group, compared to nearly 0.45 persons/ 
hectare in villages with no secure rights. Again, this is expected, if villages with no 
secure rights are relatively remote. On the whole, villages in this area do not show 
any significant changes in population or area over time. Population within these 
villages grew by 0.4%, starting from an average number of approximately 600 people 
per village. In this context it is interesting to note that these villages have high 
dependency ratios: On average, only 42% of the village population is a productive 
adult (i.e. ages 18-50 years). The average household size in these villages is 4.8 
persons per household, which is equal to the national average. 
Asset ownership: The data also show that households are not very rich – on 
average only 7% of the households own small tractors and less than 1% own 
motorized carts. Inhabitants are not very oriented towards cattle rearing – four 
households own three cows on average. A very small percentage of population works 
off farm – less than 4% on average – and although this increases during the study 
period, the percentages remain small.  
Transportation costs: Transportation costs are measured using a variety of 
indicators: On average, villages are located a little more than an hour away from the 
nearest market but NPR villages are significantly further away from markets than 
APR villages. Travel time to market reduces slightly during the study period (1.7% 
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during the study period), but most of this decrease occurs in APR villages.25 
Similarly, villages are located almost an hour and a half away from administrative 
centers and this falls during 1986-96 (by 1.8%) and most of this decrease is seen in 
APR villages. I hypothesize that the decrease in travel time may be brought about by 
a change in mode of transport, or a change in road quality or a change in the number 
of roads going through the village. 89% of the villages in the dataset had a road going 
from the village to the district or to the market at the start of the study period (1986). 
91% of the villages had a road going to a district center or a market at the end of the 
study period (1996). This implies that there was not much road building during this 
period.26 (There could be maintenance or widening.) 
To summarize, Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that on average, compared to APR 
villages, NPR villages were larger, cultivated land less intensively, had less area 
devoted to paddy rice, had three times the area devoted to upland rice, had more cows 
per household, and were much more remote. Inhabitants were also poorer, much less 
literate and were much less likely to use credit from the BAAC or grow HYV rice. 
 
25 Adjusted R-square for fixed effects regression including village level village effects, time trend and 
time trend interacted with NPR dummy is 0.78. The regression is significant: F-statistic (2, 1740) = 
5.97; Prob>F = 0.002. 
26 There are data on the kilometers of asphalted road (surfaced road) and kilometers of dirt road for 
every village. But these are aggregate numbers for all routes from that village and there is no way to 
verify what changes are occurring in the most commonly used route, or indeed, whether the same route 
is being compared year after year. 
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3.5 Agricultural Practices within Forest Reserve Villages
Table 3.8 shows the number of villages growing the three crops, viz., soybean, upland 
rice and paddy rice, and the average number of households per village that grew these 
crops. A few things of note are as follows:  
The percentage of villages growing upland rice grew quite quickly from less than 
a percent of the villages at the start of the study period, to almost a third of the total 
villages in 1996. Within these villages, on average, more than half of the households grew 
upland rice; there is not much variance in this percentage. (The within-villages standard 
deviation for percentage of households growing upland rice is 14.5. This is less than one-
fourth the average percentage of households growing upland rice for the pooled data.) 
However there is large variation in the area devoted to upland rice within villages, across 
years. (The within-village standard deviation for average area devoted to upland rice is 
128.2 compared to the pooled average of 57 rais). The data also indicate that there is a 
significant increase in the average area devoted to upland rice, across villages. A village 
level fixed effects regression of the log of area devoted to upland rice on a time trend 
shows an increase of 14% in area during the ten year period (T-stat = 13.02).27 
During the same period, on average, more than one-fourth of the villages in the 
study sample grew soybeans. In contrast to upland rice, this figure remains fairly 
constant. A fixed effects regression with percentage of households growing soybean as 
the dependent variable and a time trend, shows that the percentage of households growing 
 
27 The adjusted R-square for this regression with village level dummies is 0.38; F statistic, (degrees of 
freedom = 1, 1893) is 169.6, showing that the regression is significant. 
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soybean within villages decreased during the study period. Average soybean area per 
village however grew relatively modestly by 4.0% for all villages during the study 
period. 
Paddy rice is grown by almost all villages in the study sample. In 1986, about 
three-fifths of the households within these villages grew paddy. By the end of the study 
period, this figure had reduced to half. The data also show that the area per village 
devoted to paddy rice decreased at the rate of 4% during the study period.28 
Some other facts are important to note: First, villages do not specialize in just one 
crop. The data show that households in Reserved Forest double crop. Although the 
proportion of households in villages that grow upland rice remains almost constant over 
the 10 year period, more and more villages adopted upland rice after 1988, and, in the 
first half of the panel period, area devoted to upland rice per village has a significant 
upward trend. Table 3.9 shows the number of villages that multiple crop in the study 
sample.  The table also shows that very few villages grow all three crops. Paddy rice and 
soybean are grown by almost one-fifth of villages, but this percentage falls.29 
This discussion suggests that both upland rice and short run crops may be 
contributing to the expansion of agricultural land which occurred within study villages. 
More importantly, for this ecologically fragile and important part of the region, fallow 
land decreased significantly during this period as shown by the percentage of villages in 
 
28 Village level fixed effects regression with time trend; Adjusted R-square=0.74; Observations=2563; F-
stat(1,1893)= 51.94, Prob>F=0.000) 
29 The statistic in Table 3.9 will change if “double crop” means growing any short run crop and paddy or 
any long run crop and paddy. 
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different fallow land categories. This shows that despite the reduction in area devoted to 
paddy rice, there was increased pressure on agricultural land during this decade. The 
extent to which this expansion was influenced by population changes and transport costs 
and other variables is thus important. This is the topic of the next chapter. 









Total # of villages
Responding* 
1986 33.1 22.3 15.1 6.0 23.5 251 of 367 
1988 43.0 17.8 15.5 3.1 20.5 258 of 392 
1990 47.5 18.0 9.4 5.9 19.2 255 of 429 
1992 47.6 9.6 5.9 9.2 27.7 271 of 469 
1994 54.4 15.6 8.9 0.8 20.3 237 of 477 
1996 43.2 12.1 6.1 1.1 37.5 264 of 520 
Note: *These include villages that do not give any response for the area question but give a response to 
whether they grow the crop at all. Source: Dataset provided by Thammasat University 
Table 3.3: Main Short Run Crops grown In Forest Villages, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 
1986-1996. 30 
Year Short Run crop Area (=0 & Missing) Short run crop area is 
Positive 
Total no.  
Of villages
1986 130 (130 & 0) 237 367
1988 133 (28 & 105) 259 392 
1990 175 (71 & 104) 254 429 
1992 199 (116 & 83) 270 469 
1994 246 (246 & 0) 231 477
1996 250 (249 & 1) 270 520
Total 1133 (840 & 293) 1521 2654 
Note: Figures are for respondents who provide positive responses to the area question. Source: Data 
provided by Thammasat University. 
Table 3.4: Patterns of data and Confounding of data in the Study Dataset 
30 An average of 110 villages per year respond that they grow another short run crop, with ‘second most 
frequency’. But  all villages that report a second most frequently grown crop, report a first most frequently 
grown crop. It is assumed thus that villages grow their second most popular short run crop on the same area 






















y -> Missing Zero Positive Zero Positive Zero Positive
1986 367 28 0 339 116 168 6 77 313 53 0 1
1988 392 1 33 358 134 147 1 110 279 63 0 50
1990 429 1 37 391 174 134 1 120 261 44 3 121
1992 469 6 36 427 198 142 3 126 257 38 2 172
1994 477 40 6 431 240 108 3 126 260 41 2 174
1996 520 15 49 456 256 150 1 113 303 45 9 163
Total 2654 91 161 2402 1118 849 15 672 1673 284 16 681
Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand.
Table 3.5: Data Patterns for Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai, 1986-96.
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All Sample APR Villages NPR Villages
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev
Population 2573 568.96 365.7 1067 597.8 354.7 1506 548.5 372
Village area (Rais) 2277 4354.2 6188.6 987 3561.5 5123.1 1290 4960.6 6833.6
Agricultural land (Rais) 2382 917.6 1085.4 999 945.15 917.1 1383 897.7 1192.2
Paddy rice area (Rais) 2563 279.6 292.4 1073 310.5 289.9 1490 257.2 292.3
Soybean area (Rais) 2654 41.9 143.8 1096 58.8 137.5 1558 29.9 147.1
Area devoted to upland rice (Rais) 2654 57.1 209.4 1096 23.3 98.7 1558 80.8 257.8
% villages with less than 10% fallow land 2614 17.8 1081 24.6 1533 13.1
% villages with more than 50% fallow land 2614 27.1 1081 18.0 1533 33.6
Assets
Avg. no. of cows per household 2586 0.82 2.25 1073 0.46 1.53 1513 1.072 2.62
Avg. Proportion hhs owning small tractors 2586 0.07 0.10 1073 0.09 0.11 1513 0.054 0.095
Avg. Proportion hhs owning motor carts 2651 0.002 0.02 1095 0.003 0.02 1556 0.001 0.02
% of hhs working outside tambon 2037 3.6 6.2 994 4.54 7.6 1043 2.7 4.2
Access Variables
Avg. One way travel time to mkt. (mins.) 2408 70.6 66.4 1075 42.52 39.53 1333 93.21 74.5
Avg. One way travel time to district (mins.) 2509 83.2 90.4 1091 45.47 34.67 1418 112.23 107.8
Avg. proportion. Hhs owning motor bikes 2466 0.26 0.23 1064 0.38 0.24 1402 0.16 0.18
Proportion of literate population 2487 0.41 0.28 1058 0.54 0.23 1429 0.32 0.28
Avg. proportion of hhs with electricity 2586 0.49 0.43 1073 0.72 0.34 1530 0.32 0.41
Inputs
Proportion of Adults 2573 0.42 0.13 1067 0.45 0.12 1506 0.39 0.13
% villages using HYV rice 2654 71.6 1096 92.2 1558 57.1
% villages w/ sufficient (SR) Water 2644 25.9 44 1094 32.5 47 1550 21.2 41
% villages w/ sufficient (LR) Water 2632 11.4 31.7 1087 9.6 29 1545 12.6 33
% villages that use BAAC credit 2650 43.7 49.6 1096 71 46 1554 25 43
Note: APR Villages: Villages with Ambiguous Property Rights; NPR: Villages with No secure Property Rights; Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand.
Table 3.6: Basic Characteristics of Villages located in Forest Reserves, Chiang Mai (1986-1996), Pooled Dataset.
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All Sample APR Villages NPR Villages
Year Mean S. Dev. Obs. Mean S. Dev. Obs. Mean S. Dev. Obs.
Population
1986 597.1 379.3 357 632.5 369.7 166 566.4 385.8 191
1996 544.4 338.7 501 583.8 335.0 193 519.7 339.1 308
Village Area (rais)
1986 4736.7 7209.9 269 3825.4 5785.1 143 5770.9 8450.1 126
1996 4347.8 5726.7 462 3273.1 4478.4 181 5040.0 6314.5 281
Agricultural Land (Rais)
1986 788.6 699.5 299 812.7 763.2 151 764.1 629.5 148
1996 1066.5 1803.9 473 963.5 1075.9 182 1130.9 2136.2 291
Paddy rice area per village (Rais)
1986 340.2 328.4 339 361.8 339.9 164 319.9 316.8 175
1996 250.4 297.2 505 265.4 262.8 197 240.8 317.3 308
Area devoted to upland rice per village (Rais)
1986 0.21 4.0 367 0 0 171 0.39 5.5 196
1996 51.8 192.0 520 20.7 76.9 199 71.1 234.9 321
Area devoted to soybean per village (Rais)
1986 28.25 102.2 367 37.7 99.8 171 20.0 103.7 196
1996 33.9 113.0 520 57.7 135.3 199 19.1 93.9 321
Percentage village with less than 10% fallow land (of agricultural land)
1986 17.8 359 25 168 11.5 191
1996 15.2 508 18.0 195 13.4 313
Percentage villages with more than 50% fallow land (of agr’l land)
1986 32.3 359 14.9 168 47.6 191
1996 22.6 508 16.9 195 26.2 313
Number of cows per household
1986 0.68 1.2 350 0.35 0.92 165 0.98 1.4 185
1996 0.96 2.3 506 0.64 2.7 197 1.2 2.1 309
Proportion of households owning small tractors
1986 0.035 0.066 350 0.05 0.08 165 0.019 0.05 185
1996 0.09 0.13 506 0.12 0.14 197 0.07 0.11 309
Proportion of households that own Motorized Carts
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1986 0.002 0.03 367 0.004 0.04 171 0.000267 0.001952 196
1996 0.003 0.015 519 0.004 0.015 199 0.002026 0.015986 320
Proportion of people working outside the tambon
1986 2.7 5.0 212 2.7 5.6 133 2.7 3.8 79
1996 4.8 7.0 388 6.0 8.5 182 3.8 5.1 206
One way time of travel to nearest market using fastest route possible by the most popular mode
1986 71.4 62.7 321 45.5 41.1 166 99.2 69.7 155
1996 69.5 66.2 480 36.9 33.1 196 92.0 73.7 284
One way time of travel to nearest district administrative center using fastest route possible by the most popular mode
1986 84.5 79.9 330 51.3 37.2 169 119.4 96.3 161
1996 83.3 97.5 497 37.7 28.3 198 113.6 114.0 299
Proportion of households that own motorcycles
1986 0.19 0.16 284 0.25 0.16 159 0.11 0.11 125
1996 0.35 0.27 497 0.54 0.25 196 0.23 0.21 301
Proportion of population that is literate
1986 0.45 0.28 315 0.55 0.23 163 0.34 0.28 152
1996 0.36 0.29 492 0.51 0.24 188 0.27 0.28 304
Proportion of households that have electricity
1986 0.29 0.38 350 0.47 0.40 165 0.13 0.29 185
1996 0.59 0.44 506 0.88 0.24 197 0.41 0.44 309
Proportion of adults (aged 18-50) in the population
1986 0.28 0.09 357 0.30 0.09 166 0.25 0.08 191
1996 0.46 0.11 501 0.51 0.07 193 0.44 0.11 308
Percentage of villages growing HYV rice
1986 76.0 367 92.4 171 61.7 196
1996 65.4 520 89.9 199 50.2 321
Proportion of villages in the sample for which water is sufficient for short run crops
1986 0.36 0.48 367 0.43 0.50 171 0.30 0.46 196
1996 0.26 0.44 513 0.35 0.48 197 0.20 0.40 316
Proportion of villages in the sample for which water is sufficient for long run crops
1986 0.1 0.29 366 0.09 0.28 171 0.11 0.31 195
1996 0.17 0.37 509 0.14 0.35 194 0.18 0.38 315
Proportion of villages that have households that use credit from the BAAC
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1986 0.33 0.47 367 0.58 0.50 171 0.12 0.33 196
1996 0.57 0.49 517 0.84 0.37 199 0.41 0.49 318
Note: APR Villages: Villages with Ambiguous Property Rights; NPR: Villages with No secure Property Rights; Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand;
Table 3.7: Basic Characteristics of Villages located in Forest Reserves, Thammasat Dataset (1986 and 1996)
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1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Total
soybean % villages growing 21 28.1 28 26.9 26.4 21.7 25.3




































Std. Dev. Between (100.2)
Within (78.8)
% villages growing 0.3 12.8 28.2 36.7 36.5 31.3 25.7upland




































Std. Dev. Between (149.3)
Within (128.2)
% villages growing 92.4 91.3 91.1 91.0 90.4 87.7 90.5paddy




































Std. Dev. Between (308.7)
Within (147.6)
Total Villages 367 392 429 469 477 520 2654
**Standard deviations for pooled data in brackets; * Is for households in 83, 110, 120, 122, 127, 111 villages for the six points in time respectively.
Table 3.8: Percentage of Study Villages growing different crops, Thammasat Data, Chiang Mai province (1986-96)
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Year 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
No crop at all 0 6.6 6.8 5.1 0.8 6.7 
One crop 78.8 57.1 45.2 41.6 44.4 48.1 
Only paddy 78.7 55.3 43.4 39.1 44.4 45.9 
Only soybean 0 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0
Only upland rice 0 1.3 1.6 2.3 0.2 2.1
Two crops only  21.2 33.4 41.7 45.6 47.0 40 
Paddy rice & soy 21.0 24.7 21.4 19.0 18.5 16.0 
Paddy rice and upland 0.3 8.6 20.3 26.6 28.5 23.5 
Soy and upland rice 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
Three crops  0 2.8 6.3 7.7 7.8 5.2 
Number of villages 367 392 429 469 477 520 
Note: Figures are for respondents who provide positive responses to the area question. Source: Data 
provided by Thammasat University. 
Table 3.9: Percentage of Villages growing different Crops, Forest Villages, 
Thailand, 1986-96. 
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4 Econometric Issues 
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I describe the econometric model that I use for estimating crop area 
equations. The first part of the chapter describes the reduced form model I estimate and 
the expected impacts of explanatory variables. The second part of the chapter describes 
some of the econometric problems that arise while estimating these reduced form models. 
The chapter concludes by describing the individual crop equation systems. 
For modeling crop choice and crop area, I estimate the following reduced form 
equation for the three crops i =paddy rice, upland rice, soybean; for j = 1,…,n (villages); t
= 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996.  
Log (Land devoted to crop i by village j in year t )= f(Pjt, Tjt , Wjit, Git, Nit, Lit , Ait, t) 
 
Where 
Pjt : Population of village j at time t
Tjt : Time taken to travel by most favored mode from village j to the market at 
time t
Ajt: Proportion of adults in village j at time t
Wjit : Availability of water in village j at time t for crop i
Gjt : Use of credit in village j at time t
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Njt : Land productivity in village j at time t
Ljt: Status of property rights in village j at time t
t : time trend  
The three dependent variables are logarithms of area devoted to paddy rice, area 
devoted to soybean and area devoted to upland rice. I estimate these using random effects 
models. In the case of soybean and upland rice, I estimate a random effects Tobit 
equation, since the data are truncated at zero, with a considerable mass (probability 
distribution not shown here). I also estimate reduced form equations for agricultural land 
in the village and intensity of cultivation, using the same variables. 
A few things are of note here: Firstly, credit use, as it is measured is endogenous 
to agricultural decisions. I thus estimate the equations for crop area and credit use 
simultaneously.  Secondly, I do not estimate share equations for crop area — although 
soybean, paddy rice and upland rice are the main crops, they are not the only crops grown 
in a village. Additionally, agricultural area is not fixed in a village. Village boundaries 
and areas are ill-defined and farmers routinely squat on land. Thirdly, I do not estimate 
crop areas for the three crops as a system of equations.  Estimating these crop equations 
as a system of equations would mean efficiency gains since they would account for 
contemporaneous correlation between error terms across equations. However I use 
different modeling techniques for the three crop areas. For paddy rice, I estimate a 
Random Effects Instrumental variables specification. For soybean and upland rice, I 
estimate Random Effects Tobit equations. To account for credit use being endogenous, I 
use a two-step procedure for the latter:  a reduced form credit equation is estimated in the 
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first stage using a random effects probit model. Predicted values from this equation are 
used to instrument for credit use in the crop area equations (the second stage). To correct 
standard errors in the second stage equation, I bootstrap standard errors. Ignoring 
contemporaneous correlation between error terms across crop area equations reduces the 
efficiency of estimates but this does not bias results. 31 
Finally, to measure the impact of population and transport costs on agricultural 
decisions, I also estimate equations on Intensity of Cultivation and total agricultural land 
using the same explanatory variables. 
4.2 Expected Impact and Explanation of Variables used in Reduced Model
This section discusses the expected impact of explanatory variables in the 
empirical model: 
Village population: Village population is expected to have two effects. The first is 
a scale effect: A larger number of households is expected to increase the demand for 
agricultural land. The second effect is the ‘food’ (or subsistence) effect. Demand for 
agricultural land is a derived demand. A larger population also means larger subsistence 
requirements. The subsistence effect is likely to be stronger for food crops in villages 
located far from the market. Furthermore, if villages are remote, access to markets is 
 
31 Note that in equations above, wage is not included. Data for wages are not collected for two of the six 
years. Further, like data for prices, it is not clear if these are market wages or if these are wages earned in 
the village. There is very little data on labor markets in the area. Although there does seem to be 
employment-related seasonal migration, the survey does not have data on it. Furthermore, in the absence of 
market prices, I assume that market prices are similar for villages in the sample (This is reasonable. 
Government support in the agricultural sector is extensive. See appendix 7.3.) The only source of variation 
in farmgate prices is assumed to emanate from differences in transportation costs. Thus transportation costs 
are used as a proxy for market prices and wages. 
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difficult and subsistence needs of the village population are expected to be met by village 
production of food crops. Both these effects are in the same direction.  
Travel time to market: The variable used measures the “average time taken one 
way, in minutes, to reach the market, using the most popular mode of transport.” It thus 
takes into consideration mode of transportation and road quality (see for example 
Dawson and Barwell (1993)).  Travel time to the market is used as a measure of cost of 
transporting crops to the market and inputs from the market. Additionally, I expect that 
farmers that are located far from the market exercise less leverage in getting the best 
farmgate price for their produce; are unable to spend much time searching for best 
bargains; are less willing to carry their produce back if a transaction does not go through; 
and, are likely to have limited access to information about markets. When farmers sell 
their produce to market intermediaries, the latter are more likely to exploit the lack of 
leverage caused by high travel times (Minten and Kyle, (1999)). Thus travel time is also a 
proxy for search costs, bargaining costs and, generally, costs of not being located in situ.
Thus, for crops that are produced for the market – such as soybean – travel time is likely 
to have a negative effect on the probability that they are produced and on the amount of 
land area devoted to them. To the extent that upland rice and paddy rice are grown for 
subsistence, this effect is expected to be insignificant. Moreover, if the only reason that 
the crop is grown is that it is a substitute for a staple that can be bought in the market, 
then the travel time coefficient is likely to be positive. 
Proportion of Adult population: The proportion of adult population is used as a 
proxy for available labor in the village and for the opportunity cost of labor. The 
proportion of adults in the village is expected to positively affect land brought under 
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cultivation and the intensity with which it is cultivated. Adult labor is required to grow 
crops on virgin land that requires preparation (See Godoy et al. (1997) for a similar 
argument).32 The presence of more adults is likely to increase the amount of land 
cultivated and ameliorate labor scarcity. (I also considered using the proportion of 
population of the village that works outside the tambon to measure the proportion of 
village population not available to work as labor on-farm. However the variable is 
ambiguously defined in the dataset. It is also not clear if the labor migrates to work off-
farm seasonally or for the year.) 
Productivity of Land: There are two dummy variables I use to measure land 
productivity. These are water availability and a dummy for acidic soil. Another possible 
variable is yield per acre but there are problems with measuring the variable since it is 
measured only when crop data are available. It is also potentially endogenous. 33 To 
model the area devoted to paddy rice I also use a time invariant dummy – HYV rice 
dummy – to indicate whether the village grew HYV rice at any time during the study 
period. HYV rice dummy =1 if the village ever grew HYV rice during the study period, 
and =0 otherwise. I expect this variable to have two impacts. The first is on paddy rice 
area. HYV rice is more resilient than non-HYV rice. It can thus be grown on land 
 
32 It would be useful to gauge the different impacts of adult males and adult females.  
33 For example for upland rice yield/hectare is available only for 541 observations, or 248 villages for at 
least one point in time. For the subset of variables for which data are available: For soybean, there is a 
positive time trend when the log of productivity is regressed on year, while controlling for other variables 
(~3%). when I regress this variable for soybean on time dummies, the time dummies are insignificant (and 
indeed in the first two years, negative, compared to 1986. They are positive in the next two years but 
insignificant. Only in 1996 is the time dummy significant and positive – when an average increase of 
almost 30% occurs). Similarly for upland rice, the time trend is not significant or large (although it is 
positive). This indicates that there were not very many productivity increases among farmers located in 
Forest Reserve villages of Chiang Mai, during 1986-1996, although some may have taken place in the last 
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otherwise unsuited to non-HYV rice. I expect it to have a positive effect on area devoted 
to paddy rice. The other effect I expect to capture is that of ‘attention’ from local 
authorities. To the extent that growing HYV rice requires additional knowledge and 
training provided by field officers and that the government has been encouraging the 
cultivation of HYV rice, mostly via the BAAC, the dummy is expected to be positively 
correlated with BAAC presence. Thus the variable is used as an instrument in the BAAC 
credit use equations.  
Water presence: A measure of the availability of water is used as a proxy for 
productivity of land. In this analysis, presence of water is measured by the response to the 
question “Did this village have sufficient water to grow short run (long run) crops?” The 
dummy variable is equal to 1 if there is sufficient water and is zero otherwise. Irrigation 
is usually provided by rain and, to a lesser extent, by small man-made weirs and canals 
(ASB, (2004)). Scarcity of water is an important resource constraint in this region. 
Walker (2002), in a detailed study of the Mae Uam catchment area of the Mae Chaem 
district of Chiang Mai, finds that even cultivation of dry-season varieties of soybean, 
which requires relatively less water, has reached its hydrological limit. Dry season 
varieties of soybean (typically grown in the region) and upland rice are crops that require 
little water. Although upland rice requires rainfall, it does not require standing water like 
paddy rice does. Paddy rice requires a lot of water to grow. I thus expect a positive and 
significant sign for water in rice area equations.  
 
year of the study period, for soybean. Witnessing an increase in area despite there being an increase in 
productivity, further strengthen my results. 
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Acidic soil: The other variable used to measure the productivity of land is an 
indicator for acidity of soil. It is recorded as 1 if soil within a village suffers from high 
acidity, and 0 otherwise. Exogenous increases in productivity are measured via the time 
trend variable. Acidity of soil is an undesirable quality. I expect the variable to have a 
negative coefficient. 
Perceptions of Land Ownership: I use a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the 
village headman responds that “secure land titles were held by most farmers in the 
village”. Secure land titles are defined as titles that allow land to be used as collateral or 
sold. From table 2.2, villages that respond that the most common title held is No-So-4, 
No-So-3 or the No-So-3-Ko, have secure titles.  I expect that farmers who have secure 
land titles will be more willing to invest in land and grow cash crops. This variable is a 
village level constant, un-varying over time. 
Credit use: is expected to increase the intensity of cultivation. The variable used 
to indicate use of credit in this study is ‘Do villagers use credit from the BAAC’. This 
variable equals 1 if people in the village use credit from the Bank of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Credit, and 0 otherwise. The BAAC is the lender of first resort in most of 
these villages, since it provides relatively low interest credit. Credit obtained from the 
BAAC is mainly for agriculture, unlike credit provided by private money lenders. 
Clearly, credit use is endogenous. I discuss this problem in more detail in the next 
section.34 
34 One reviewer suggests the use of a BAAC credit dummy which is =1 for the year that a village starts 
using BAAC credit and then, irrespective of response, is coded =1, for all years thereafter. The object here 
is to measure the use of credit and not so much the availability of credit. 
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4.3 Econometric Issues/Problems 
4.3.1 Endogeniety of Credit Use 
Credit use is measured by responses to the question “(In the village) Do villagers 
use credit from BAAC”. The response is recorded as a yes (response =1) or no (response 
=0). This question is asked for a variety of other credit sources also – ‘Farmers’ Savings 
Group’, Cooperatives, Commercial Banks, Private credit institutions, Revolving loan 
funds (instituted by the Government), Businessmen and merchants, and others. The 
percentage of villages that use these sources of credit are shown in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1 shows that within the group of study villages, loans are most commonly 
taken from either the BAAC or cooperatives (which are supported by the BAAC)35. I
only study credit taken from the BAAC, because other sources of credit can also be used 
for non-agricultural purposes. Credit from the BAAC can only be used for agricultural 
purposes.36 
35 There are two kinds of cooperatives in the region. The first are being phased out by the government 
because of lack of capacity and fraudulent activities. The second are actively promoted by the BAAC. 
Indeed use of cooperatives and BAAC, are highly correlated amongst the study villages. Only 11% of the 
observations have cooperative presence but not BAAC presence.  
36 There is very little ‘leakage’ in this, since i) the BAAC has a wide network of field offices; ii) Reputation 
matters. Field officers use previous action on a loan to give subsequent loans. 
60
Year 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Total 
Farmers’ Saving Group 7.6 7.2 7.0 6.4 7.8 10.2 7.8 
Cooperatives 32.2 32.6 33.7 39.5 40.0 43.5 37.4 
BAAC 33.5 39.0 38.7 41.0 47.4 57.5 43.7 
Commercial Banks 9.0 10.8 10.8 18.3 18.7 21.7 15.5 
Private credit institution Na Na Na 0 0 0.9 0.4 
Govt. Revolving Loan 
Fund  
0 0 0 0.9 5.6 27.1 6.4 
Businessmen/ merchants 19.6 19.2 15.4 15.1 21.8 25.9 19.7 
Others 13.6 13.6 11.4 7.8 9.5 12.9 11.3 
Total no. of villages 367 392 429 469 477 520  
Source: Data provided by Thammasat University; Na: Data was not collected for that year; *Data in 
percentages except where noted. 
Table 4.1: Percentage of Forest Villages using Credit from different Sources, 
Chiang Mai, Thailand (1986-1996) 
 
Use credit from 
BAAC 
Do not use credit 
from BAAC 
Total 
Use credit from 
BAAC 84.6% 15.4% 100% 
Do not use credit 
from BAAC 7.6% 92.4% 100% 
Average 54.1% 45.9% 100% 
Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Chiang Mai, Thailand. 
Table 4.2: (Non-Markov) Transition Probabilities for Use of Credit from the BAAC 
in Forest Villages, Chiang Mai, (1986-96) 
 
Table 4.2 shows that during the study period, villages that start to use BAAC as a 
credit supplier rarely stop using it in subsequent years. Furthermore 8% of the 
observations that do not use BAAC credit in a certain year, switch to using it, in a 
subsequent year, reflecting perhaps increased coverage by the BAAC field office 
network. 
To borrow from the BAAC, farmers have to establish that the loaned amount will 
be used for agricultural purposes. Farmers must then present a loan application to the 
business development officer at their local BAAC district field office, who also assists 
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farmers in preparing this document. The BAAC currently charges an average annual 
interest rate of 11%.37 Farmers who rent land or own land but do not have ownership 
documents are eligible for borrowing from the BAAC but loans have to be secured by 
personal guarantee or a ‘joint liability contract’ (or ‘group loans’ – which have become 
very popular) with other borrowers.38 BAAC documents reveal that most BAAC 
borrowers do not use land as loan security (Feder et al. (1988); Gine (2004); Bhisalbutra 
(1984)) 39. This implies that for my dataset, villages that have ambiguous property rights 
(APR villages) and villages that have no secure property rights (NPR villages) should use 
the BAAC equally, and should have equal access to its services.  
Inclusion of the BAAC dummy introduces problems in estimation. Ideally it is 
credit availability rather than credit use that one would want to include in the model. The 
BAAC variable signals whether inhabitants of a village used BAAC credit or not. This 
binary event will be affected by two things: whether BAAC credit is readily available in 
the village and whether farmers demand such credit. The first is likely to be exogenous in 
the sense that BAAC offices are located in district offices and field officer and offices are 
 
37 Till 1986 the BAAC’s interest rate structure was based on loan size. Using the principle of cross-
subsidization, larger loans were charged higher interest rates than smaller loans. The rate of interest varied 
with the Bank’s average cost of funds combined with its operation costs per year. However the BAAC was 
restructured in the 80s. Since then it charges a fixed minimum rate plus a risk premium not exceeding 3% 
based mainly on debtor quality classification. Present interest rates are as follows: 9% per year for clients 
with an excellent record of debt repayment and no overdue debts for 3 consecutive years; 10% for clients 
with a very good record and no overdue debts for 2 years; 11% per year for clients with a good record and 
no over due debts for 1 year; 12% for new or original clients with over due debts and late payment in full; 
13% for clients with over due debts incurred from causes that qualify for a waiver of penalties; 15% per 
year for clients with over due debts incurred from causes that do not qualify for a waiver of penalties.  
(BAAC regulation documents, http://www.baac.or.th/eng_baac/about/porobor/baac_act.htm)
38 Several studies have established that neighborhood or peer group effects can help farmers in the same 
village en masse to adopt innovations and new technology (See Case (1991); Southgate and Whitaker 
(1992), Moran (1993); Ledec and Goodland (1998); Southgate (1991)). 
39 Feder et al. (1988) present a disequilibrium model for institutional credit. In their model, credit demand 
and supply are modeled separately.  
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spread out according to BAAC policies. However, BAAC use is also affected by farmers’ 
demand for credit, making the BAAC variable endogenous. To summarize, endogeniety 
of BAAC credit use occurs as follows: Firstly, factors affecting agricultural decisions are 
likely to influence the demand for credit. The error terms for both equations are likely to 
be correlated; Secondly: Credit use is likely to be correlated with the omitted variable in 
the cultivation equation namely productivity, since credit provided by the BAAC can be 
used to purchase fertilizers and machinery. To understand the use of credit, as provided 
by the BAAC, it is important to understand the factors that affect its supply and demand.  
To understand the role of credit from BAAC, I estimate a reduced form equation 
for the BAAC credit use variable. Other than the variables that are included in the crop 
area equations, I use three identifying instruments in the equilibrium equation for BAAC 
credit use. The first variable that I include is ‘the proportion of people in the village that 
have completed compulsory education’. Compulsory education in Thailand is provided 
free by the Thai Government for the first nine years, of which the first six are considered 
primary, and the rest three are part of secondary level education.40 There are other 
education related variables in the survey that could serve, potentially, as identifying 
instruments. These include ‘proportion of the population in the village with high school 
 
40 A compulsory education law was passed in Thailand in 1921. It is well documented that although the 
Government is well intentioned, compulsory education is not used by all. This is either because of 
relatively uneven coverage of government resources in “outlying provinces” of which Chiang Mai is one, 
or, because of low propensity of families to send their children to school after they complete their primary 
education. Primary level schools are especially affected by this uneveness while secondary level education 
has remained concentrated in major towns. A report on the state of education contends “In the mid-1970s 
Bangkok with 10 percent of the country’s population, had 45% of the secondary school poulation, while the 
North and the Northeast combined, with 55% of the nation’s population, had only 26% of these 
students...In the late 1980s, the underlying problem of inequitable distribution of funds between the Center 
and the outlying provinces remained.”( http://countrystudies.us/thailand/59.htm). Other than coverage, 
related studies also report that most children do not attend school after finishing their primary school, 
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education’ and, ‘proportion of the population in the village with more than high school 
education’. The first variable is not measured for all years. The second variable suffers 
from the drawback that it is also likely to measure the non-agricultural propensity of the 
population and is a weak instrument.  
Since BAAC district offices are located at district centers, the second identifying 
variable is travel time to the district center. I expect use of BAAC credit to be negatively 
correlated with this travel measure. Loans from the BAAC are processed at the district 
offices. In non-rice area equations the third identifying instrument is a dummy variable 
that measures whether the village population ever used HYV rice. This village level, time 
invariant dummy, is equal to 1 if the village ever grew HYV rice, and =0 otherwise. It 
measures whether the village was visited by field officers and administrative officers and 
measures if the village has the attention of local authorities. The variable is not available 
for 1986 but is measured every year after that. Creating a time invariant dummy that 
measures the attention of authorities prevents me from losing data but captures the effect. 
I expect the variable to be positively correlated with BAAC credit use dummy.  
4.3.2 Selectivity of Response - Is it Non-Random?  
The dataset used for this dissertation is unbalanced. Villages enter and leave the 
dataset and only 38% of the villages are present for all points in time. Data sets in which 
respondents do not respond for certain times or waves are said to contain ‘wave non-
 
because of the high opportunity cost of time and the cost of school supplies and food that is not covered by 
the government’s mandate. (http://www.d-pal.org/english/thailand.asp)
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response’.41 Understanding whether wave non-response in the dataset is random or 
systematic is important because ignoring non-random or systematic selection of villages 
into the dataset can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates (Heckman (1976); Hausman 
and Wise (1979)). 
One possible way in which to deal with this is to use only the balanced data set 
but the literature presents compelling arguments for using a complete unbalanced panel 
and not just the balanced sub-panel for estimation purposes (Nijman and Verbeek (1992); 
Verbeek and Nijman (1992)). Estimates from balanced models may be biased if non-
response is endogenously determined.  
In the study data set, villages may be missing at random. If a village is missing at 
random, the fact that the village is missing is unrelated to the attributes of the village. To 
test if this is so, Verbeek and Nijman (1992a, 1992b) use the fact that inconsistency of 
estimates in unbalanced and balanced datasets are unlikely to be identical. They compare 
estimates from the complete unbalanced panel with those of a balanced sub-panel, using 
both fixed effects and random effects.42 I use data on paddy rice to examine if villages are 
selected non-randomly into the dataset. I estimate area equations for two panels – the 
complete unbalanced panel, and, the balanced sub-panel. These tests and results are 
 
41 ‘Wave non-response’ and ‘item non-response’ are terms used by Verbeek and Nijman ((1990), (1992)). 
Woodridge (2002) uses the terms ‘attrition’ and ‘incidental truncation’ respectively. However while 
defining ‘attrition’, Woolridge does not allow for subsequent appearance of the observed identity. He also 
assumes that incidental truncation occurs because of non-observation rather than simple non-response or 
non-reporting. Methodologically however, the appellations are treated similarly to those suggested by 
Verbeek and Nijman and Woolridge expands on some of Verbeek/Nijman’s methods. Item non-response 
occurs if the village itself entered the dataset, but data on a variable were missing. I use the 
Verbeek/Nijman terminology. 
42 The power of the tests they suggest is low since all estimators are inconsistent under the alternative. 
However for my purposes, these tests are sufficient.  
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discussed in detail in Appendix 7.4. The tests show two things: First, using the 
unbalanced data or the balanced data set for estimating a fixed effects regression yields 
estimates that are not significantly different. There is no selectivity bias here. However 
for random effects models, there is a difference between the balanced panel and the 
unbalanced panel. The estimates from the balanced sub-panel are inconsistent, showing 
selectivity bias. Hence I use the unbalanced panel.  
4.3.3 Absence of Crop data and Prices – Is it non-random? 
There is another type of missing data problem that requires special mention. (In 
the terminology of the previous section, this is called ‘item non-response’.) Data for area 
devoted to the two crop groups (‘short-run’ crops and ‘long-run’ crops) are recorded as 
positive, missing or zero. Because data are available for other variables for these villages, 
and data for paddy rice are recorded, it is unlikely that villages were not contacted for this 
part of the survey. To understand whether there is any systematic bias in recording these 
data, I estimate multinomial logit models to analyze the impact of village level attributes 
on data recording. These multinomial logit models are estimated for two crop groups – 
short run crops and long run crops. Results are presented in Appendix 7.5. The results 
show that villages that are located far from Chiang Mai are more likely to have missing 
values compared to zero values and villages located far from the market are also likely to 
have more missing values. This confounding of zeros and missing values can thus be 
explained in two ways: a) villages far from Chiang Mai are less likely to collect data 
rigorously or to record it carefully since they probably get less intensive training or 
oversight (data are recorded at the tambon office), or, b) crop acreage for villages with 
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little or no land devoted to the crop may be recorded as either missing or zero.43 Large 
magnitudes of land are unlikely to be recorded as zero but small ones may be. For want 
of a better solution, I replace missing values for crop areas with zeros. Because of the 
large number of zeros for areas devoted to soybean and upland rice, I estimate Tobit 
equations for these two crops (see table 3.5). The dependent variable is Log(area). In all 
crop area equations, log(0) is assumed to be zero.    
4.3.4 Random effects or fixed effects? 
Mundalk (1978) calls the distinction between fixed effects and random effects – 
‘spurious’. He asserts that one should always treat individual effects as random – and that 
the “Fixed effects model is simply analyzed conditionally on the effects present in the 
observed sample”. 
Fixed effects models have the advantage that they are robust to correlation 
between unobserved characteristics at the village level and explanatory variables. Fixed 
effects regressions may thus produce unbiased and consistent estimates. Generally fixed 
effects estimation procedures are not very efficient, since they account for unobserved 
characteristics by including village level dummy variables thus reducing the degrees of 
freedom (Greene (1997); Mundalk, (1976)). In the study dataset however, with 670 
villages and 2654 observations, this disadvantage is not likely to be significant.  
 
43 That crop group data is better available, suggests that one could potentially estimate an endogenous 
switching model to explain why villages move from one crop to the other. I do this using a multinomial 
logit model. Results are not presented here but easily available. This route was not taken because the data 
on non-soybean crops were too sparse to allow further analysis along those lines.  
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A greater drawback to using fixed effects models in that they tend to yield 
unstable parameters in Tobit and probit models. In contrast to linear models, in fixed 
effects Tobit models, village level effects cannot be swept away and hence the parameters 
cannot be estimated consistently for a finite time period (Hsiao, (1986)). Honore (1992) 
develops fixed effects Tobit estimates that are consistent and asymptotically normal. This 
approach requires trimming observations so that the symmetry lost by censoring is 
restored. Consistency and normality are established for sample sizes greater than N=200 
but it requires differencing which, given the dataset I am working with, is not practical. 
This is critical for this study. To overcome this drawback, I estimate random effects 
models. Where possible I compare the random effects estimates with the fixed effects 
estimates and test the difference between them using the Hausman test. 
Using random effects specifications also allows one to use village level time 
invariant regressors, which fixed effects do not. Moreover, random effects models usually 
perform better when there are measurement errors and allow one to make out-of-sample 
predictions which are not possible with fixed effects specifications (Nerlove, (2002); 
Hsiao, (1986)). For all these reasons, I estimate random effects specifications. 
4.4 Variable for measuring Intensity of Cultivation 
In the dataset the intensity of cultivation variable is measured as a categorical 
variable: 
Intense(jt) =1 if village j's cultivated land is more than 90% of agricultural land in year t. 
 =2  if village j’s cultivated land is 75-90% of agricultural land in year t.  
 =3  if village j’s cultivated land is 50-75% of agricultural land in year t   




















1986 17.83 32.31 17.55 32.31 100 
1988 21.59 29.56 18.51 30.33 100 
1990 20.84 31.15 18.74 29.27 100 
1992 19.05 28.35 28.35 24.24 100 
1994 13.65 29.00 31.13 26.23 100 
1996 15.16 28.94 33.27 22.64 100 
Total 17.83 29.76 25.29 27.12 100 
Notes: Numbers show percentage of villages in the category, for that year; Source: Data provided by 
Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 4.2: Percentage of Village Agricultural Land Cultivated, by Year, Forest 
Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai (1986-1996) 
 
Table 4.2 shows that, on average, there was a decrease in the percentage of 
villages cultivating less than half the village area. Table 4.3 shows that half the villages 
cultivating more than 90% of their land in a certain year, continued to do so, in the 
subsequent year. Similarly, half the villages that cultivated only 50% of their agricultural 
land, continued to do so. The large off-diagonal percentages show that there was 







































11.1% 15.9% 18.9% 54.0% 100% 
Average 20.1% 31.7% 26.6% 21.7% 100% 
Notes: Numbers show percentage of villages; Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 4.3: (Non-markov) Transition Probabilities for Intensity of Cultivation, 
Forest Villages, Chiang Mai, (1986-1996) 
4.5 The Estimation Models
For purposes of estimation the simplest form of equation for the three crops i =
paddy rice, soybean, upland rice for j = 1,…,n (villages); t = 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992,
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Where *jiu is distributed normally and is the unobserved influence of the village on 
repeated observations. jitε is the unobserved error term also distributed normally with 
mean 0 and variance 2εσ . This yields five separate equations. For each of these equations, 
to account for BAAC credit use being endogenous, I estimate a first stage random effects 
equation to get the predicted value for BAAC credit use. To model BAAC credit use, for 
each of the equations above, I estimate the following random effects equation, which 
includes all exogenous variables in the system, including the three identifying 
instruments. For paddy rice, the area equation is estimated as a linear random effects 
model, because very few villages do not grow paddy rice. For the paddy rice equation, I 
also include the dummy for whether villages have ever grown HYV rice.  For the other 
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The next chapter presents estimation results. 
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5 Results  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present results for area 
devoted to paddy rice, upland rice and soybeans while allowing for BAAC credit use to 
be endogenous. Areas devoted to the three crops are estimated using three different 
equations. Paddy rice area equations are estimated using Generalized two stage least 
squares (G2SLS) random effects.  Area equations for upland rice and soybean are 
estimated using a two-step variant of a random effects Tobit model. To account for 
endogeniety of BAAC credit use, I estimate a random effects probit model in the first 
step. This provides predicted values of BAAC credit use. The predicted value is used to 
instrument for BAAC credit use in the second stage Tobit equations. Bootstrapping 
standard errors in the second stage Tobit equations provide corrected standard errors.  
In the second part of the chapter I present reduced form equations for agricultural 
land and intensity of cultivation of land in the village, using the same explanatory 
variables as for the crop equations. These equations show the net effect that explanatory 
variables have on the extensive frontier of cultivation – for which village agricultural 
land is a proxy, and, the intensive frontier of cultivation – measured by the categorical 
variable intensity of cultivation.  
To tie the two sets of models together, simple linear regressions of agricultural 
land and intensity of cultivation on a constant, a time trend variable, and area devoted to 
the three crops show that the latter are significant. These are shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.  
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Table 5.1 shows that an increase in village agricultural land is associated with an 
increase in area devoted to Paddy rice and Upland rice. On the other hand, an increase in 
area devoted to Soybean is not: Villages that grow Soybean are likely to be those that 
have little agricultural land, and can only cultivate intensively. This is expected since 
Soybean is an input intensive cash crop. Table 5.2 shows that an increase in intensity of 
cultivation is associated with an increase in area devoted to Soybean and Paddy rice. 
Upland rice area is not significant. This too is expected. Upland rice is usually grown on 
forest frontiers, on land with low fertility but that is vulnerable to erosion. Land devoted 
to upland rice does not require much preparation. Soybean and Paddy rice on the other 
hand, require large amount of inputs and preparation. They are usually grown on land that 
is agriculturally important. Usually cultivated on fertile and flat river beds, and in 
watershed areas, this land is much more likely to have other crops grown on it, once 
Soybean and Paddy rice have been harvested.  
Given limited data it is not possible to estimate structural equations for village 
agricultural land and intensity of cultivation, since it is not possible to instrument for 
areas devoted to the three crops.  
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Dep. Variable: Village agricultural 
area Coefficient Std. Dev Z P>Z 
Year 15.35** 3.15 4.87 0 
Area devoted to Paddy Rice 0.46** 0.06 7.8 0 
Area devoted to Upland Rice 0.21* 0.09 2.36 0.018 
Area devoted to Soybean -0.19+ 0.11 -1.69 0.091 
Constant -641.17* 294.84 -2.17 0.03 
Sigma-u 1054.16    
Sigma-e 375.89    
Rho 0.89    
Observations 1979    
R-square Within 0.042    
Groups 622    
R-square Between 0.054    
R-square Overall 0.056    
Gaussian Wald Statistic (chi2, 4df) 85.5    
Prob > Chi2 0    
Note: ** denotes significance at the 1% level; * at the 5% level, and + at the 10% level. Source: Data 
provided by Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 5.1: Linear Random Effects regression results for Land devoted to 
Agriculture, Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai (1986-1996) 
 
Dep. Variable: Intensity of 
cultivation Coefficient Std. error Z P>z 
Year 0.0379 0.125 0.3 0.762 
Area devoted to Soybean 0.01399** 0.0037 3.76 0 
Area devoted to Upland Rice 0.0011 0.0034 0.33 0.738 
Area devoted to Paddy Rice 0.0037* 0.0019 1.95 0.051 
Constant 63.314** 11.5450 5.48 0 
Sigma-u 14.0611 0.6781 20.74 0 
Sigma-e 16.392 0.3547 46.21 0 
Rho 0.4239 0.0273 0.3712 0.478 
Observations 2174    
Groups 629    
Gaussian Wald Statistic (chi2, 4 df) 20.03    
Prob > Chi2 0.0005    
Note: ** denotes significance at the 1% level; * at the 5% level, and + at the 10% level. Source: Data 
provided by Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 5.2: Random Effects Interval Regression Results for Intensity of Cultivation, 
Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai (1986-1996) 
In the next section I present some common procedures followed for all five 
estimated equations – three equations for three different crops, one for the intensity of 
cultivation and one for agricultural land. 
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5.2 Method followed for all estimation equations
Three things should be kept in mind while examining the effects of explanatory 
variable in the five different estimation equations.  
First: I contrast results for two groups of villages – APR villages and NPR 
villages. To do this all explanatory variables are interacted with the NPR dummy. The 
dummy for NPR villages is defined as follows: NPR dummy =1 if villages do not have 
secure property rights and is equal to zero otherwise. The net effect of explanatory 
variable in the NPR villages is calculated by adding the marginal effect of the level 
variable (i.e. the non-interacted variable), to the marginal effect of the interacted variable. 
The net effect of the explanatory variable on NPR villages is significant only if the t-
statistic of the sum is significant.  
Second: for all five equations a first stage equation for BAAC credit use is 
estimated. The first stage BAAC credit use equations are estimated separately for each 
crop and are shown separately. This is because there are a different number of 
observations for each equation since data for all dependent variables are not available 
consistently for all villages for all times. For two crops – soybean and upland rice – and 
the intensity of cultivation equation, I use a variant of the two step procedure: For the 
first stage I estimate a random effects probit equation to estimate the equation for BAAC 
credit use. I use the predicted value from this equation in the second stage random effects 
Tobit equation. Since I use the predicted value in the second stage, standard errors need 
to be corrected in the second stage. To correct the standard errors in the second stage, I 
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bootstrap the standard errors using repeated sampling with replacement. Z-statistics in the 
second stage are based on these bootstrapped standard errors.  
Thirdly, I do not estimate the equations together in a SUR (seemingly unrelated 
regression) system. This is because of the difficulty of estimating equations that require 
different estimation techniques. This is required because the dependent variables are 
defined differently from each other.  The equations for paddy rice and village agricultural 
land are linear random effects equations; the equations for soybean and upland rice are 
random effects Tobit equations; and, the equation for intensity of cultivation is a random 
effects interval regression.  To the extent that these equations are not estimated in a 
system, the estimated coefficients are unbiased and consistent but not efficient.  
Furthermore, according to a well known result established by Dwivedi and Srivastava 
(1978), if equations have identical explanatory variables, then there is no difference 
between the estimates from a system of equations and those from single equations. 
In the next section I discuss results for the three main crops.  
5.3 Results for area devoted to three main crops
5.3.1 Paddy rice 
Paddy rice is grown in fields flooded with water throughout the growing season. 
On average rice needs abundant sunshine and 160-200 mm of water per month. The main 
crop of paddy rice is cultivated anytime between May and October and harvested 
between November and January. Paddy rice has various qualities but there are two main 
distinctions from the point of view of the consumer: Glutinous and non-glutinous rice. 
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Glutinous rice is also called sticky rice or sweet rice and is grown predominantly in the 
upper North and the North eastern part of Thailand. The market for glutinous rice is 
separate from that for non-glutinous rice and its demand is more elastic. It is usually 
grown for self-consumption and the price of glutinous rice is usually lower than that for 
non-glutinous rice. In Chiang Mai, in 1986, total area devoted to cultivating non-
glutinous rice was 102,098 ha while that to glutinous rice was almost 10 times larger: 
1,077,860 ha. Paddy rice, as defined in the survey, can be either glutinous rice, which is 
usually grown for subsistence or, non-glutinous rice, which is grown for the market. The 
data does not distinguish between the two.  
Table 5.3 presents some characteristics of paddy-rice growing villages in the 
study sample. Area devoted to paddy rice is a variable not directly available in the 
dataset. Instead, the dataset includes information on the following variables: “Number of 
households with less than 1 rai of rice paddy?”, “Number of households with 1-5 rai of 
rice paddy?” etc. To arrive at the area variable, I multiply the midpoint of the interval 
with the number of households growing it. For area greater than 50 rai, I use 50 rai as the 
assumed area. The table shows that on average area devoted to paddy rice has been 
falling over time, and that area devoted to paddy rice is not significantly different 
between the two sets of villages.  
The table also highlights another characteristic of paddy rice. In 1986, the average 
amount of rice produced annually in a village was approximately 142,816 kgs. Divided 
by the number of people in an average village in that year, this figure implies an average 
of 650 grams per person per day. The National Food and Nutrition Survey in 1986 
reported that the average Thai consumes less than half this amount – or an average of 
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302.7 grams of white rice (along with 34.2 grams of rice starch).  Even after accounting 
for losses during milling and transportation and demand for seeds, the data suggests that 
at least some portion of the crop must be marketed. The other thing to note in Table 5.4 is 
that the reported price of paddy rice shows little variation, consistent with the fact that 
prices for paddy rice are controlled by the government.  
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Variable Obs Avg SD Obs Avg SD Obs Avg SD Obs Avg SD Obs Avg SD Obs Avg SD
All sample 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
Area devoted to
rice (rai)* 339 340 328 391 292 307 428 279 284 463 260 265 437 277 273 505 250 297
% hhs growing
rice 340 57 36 373 55 36 409 52 36 443 52 36 451 52 36 474 50 38
Rice per rai
(kg/rai) 330 420 151 390 377 193 428 381 195 464 372 214 401 398 176 466 347 212
Rice price
(bahts/kg) 278 2 0.62 277 3 0.4 322 2.9 0.6 315 3.3 0.9 300 3.5 0.7 307 3.9 0.9
Propn HHs
growing HYV Na 344 0.4 0.4 377 0.4 0.4 403 0.5 0.4 322 0.6 0.5 343 0.6 0.5
APR Villages
Area devoted to
rice (rai)* 164 362 340 176 349 342 177 312 273 182 297 265 177 287 241 197 265 263
% hhs growing
rice 165 56 32 172 53 31 175 49 32 179 52 33 184 50 34 195 48 35
Rice per rai
(kg/rai) 165 491 138 176 464 172 177 468 184 186 469 199 171 482 159 190 428 211
Rice price
(baths/kg) 142 2 0.7 140 3 0.4 143 3.1 0.5 159 3.4 0.7 154 3.6 0.8 159 4.1 0.9
Propn HHs
growing HYV Na 166 0.6 0.4 166 0.7 0.4 175 0.7 0.4 156 0.8 0.4 155 0.8 0.4
NPR Villages
Area devoted to
rice (rai)* 175 320 317 215 246 267 251 255 290 281 236 262 260 269 293 308 241 317
% hhs growing
rice 175 58 39 201 56 40 234 54 39 264 52 39 267 53 37.9 279 52 40
Rice per rai
(kg/rai) 165 348 129 214 305 180 251 320 179 278 306 198 230 335 162 276 291 194
Rice price
(baths/kg) 136 2 0.5 137 2.7 0.5 179 2.9 0.6 156 3.2 1.0 146 3.3 0.7 148 3.8 0.8
Propn HHs
growing HYV Na 178 0.3 0.4 211 0.2 0.4 228 0.3 0.4 166 0.4 0.4 188 0.3 0.4
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Rounded off figures, Notes: APR villages: Villages with Ambiguous Rights; NPR: Villages with no secure property rights; Na: Data not collected for that year.
Area devoted to rice is a constructed variable. Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand.
Table 5.3: Characteristics of Villages growing paddy rice, Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai, Thailand (1986-1996).
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5.3.1.1 Results for paddy rice 
Results for area devoted to paddy rice are presented in Table 5.4 where the 
dependent variable is measured in logs. All results are for random effects models.  
The columns in Table 5.4 report results for the following five specifications:  
• Column (1) is a random effects specification, and treats BAAC credit use as 
exogenous;  
• Column (2) is a single equation random effects specification that includes the 
exogenous variable, ‘proportion of people with compulsory education in the 
village,’ in the list of right hand side variables. The ‘proportion of people with 
compulsory education in the village,’ is one of two identifying variables for the 
BAAC credit use equation.  
• Column (3) is a single equation random effects specification that includes both 
variables used to identify the BAAC credit use equation on the right hand side; 
namely, proportion of people with compulsory education in the village, and, the 
log of travel time to the district center.  
• Column (4) presents random effects results with instrumental variables that use 
only one identifying instrument in the first stage BAAC credit use equation; 
namely, the proportion of people with compulsory education in the village. Model 
is estimated using Generalized two stage least squares. 
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• Column (5) presents random effect results with instrumental variables that use 
both identifying exogenous variables in the first stage to estimate the BAAC 
credit use equation. These identifying variables are: the proportion of people with 
compulsory education, and, travel time to the district center. Model is estimated 
using Generalized two stage least squares.44 
The first column of Table 5.4 shows single equation results for the random effects 
model that assumes BAAC credit use is exogenous. BAAC credit use is not significant in 
this equation but population is. This result does not change when BAAC credit use is 
endogenous, as in columns (4) and (5).  In Table 5.4, moving from the left side to the 
right side increases the set of explanatory variables. However, the effect of population 
remains stable. The dummy for acidic soil is significant in the non-instrumented 
equations but not in the specifications with instrumented variables. This indicates that the 
presence of acidic soil is likely to affect the use of BAAC credit more than the area 
decision. Coefficients for all other explanatory variables remain similar and constant 
across specifications, indicating that the results are robust.  
Column (5) of Table 5.4 is the column I discuss here. To recap, in this 
specification BAAC credit use is endogenous. The equation for paddy rice area is a 
random effects equation with two instruments for BAAC credit use. The estimation 
equation for BAAC credit use is presented in Table 5.5 and discussed subsequently.  
 
44 The first stage equations for BAAC credit are estimated using linear regression for rice and total 
agricultural land. For Tobit equations for soybean and upland rice and intensity of cultivation first stage 
equations use a random effects probit model. To the extent that marginal effects for Tobit equations are 




For column (5) in Table 5.4, a test of differences between the constrained model 
(i.e. without interacting explanatory variables with the NPR village dummy) and the 
unconstrained model (allowing the NPR interactions variables to have a non-zero 
coefficient) shows a significant difference between the two groups (chi-square statistic, 9 
degrees of freedom = 33.8; Prob> Chi2 = 0). This indicates that it is important to allow 
for the NPR interactions to have non-zero coefficients. The model in column (5) in which 
explanatory variables are interacted with the NPR dummy is thus the appropriate model. 
A Hausman test of the null hypothesis that there is no systematic difference 
between a fixed effects specification and a random effects specification cannot be 
rejected (chi-square, 14 degrees of freedom = 7.36; Prob>chi2 = 0.92). The overall model 
is significant: Chi-square (17) = 162.3; Prob > Chi-square = 0. 
The specification shows that almost 68% of the unexplained error in the model is 
accounted for by the time invariant error term (rho = 0.68). This means that most of the 
variation is explained by inter-village variation rather than variation over time within the 
village.  
For all villages in the estimation sample, travel time is not a significant 
determinant of paddy rice area. This can be explained if the main motivation for growing 
paddy is subsistence and not the market. The significant and positive sign on Log(Village 
Population) provides further support. An increase in village population by 1% increases 
the area devoted to paddy rice in the village by 0.8%. The effect of HYV rice use is large 
and significant: Villages that start using HYV rice are likely to increase land devoted to 
paddy rice by 2.67%. As mentioned earlier, HYV rice is much more resilient to pests and 
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requires very little water. Other variables such as acidic soil do not have significant 
effects on area devoted to paddy rice. The effects for NPR villages are not significantly 
different, except in the case of HYV rice. 
For NPR villages the null hypothesis that after controlling for other covariates, 
paddy rice area in NPR villages is no different from paddy rice area in APR villages, 
cannot be rejected. Coefficients for population and travel time are not significantly 
different for this group of villages either. However, the effect of HYV rice use is 
significantly lower compared to APR villages. NPR villages that start using HYV rice are 
likely to devote 0.83% more area to paddy rice than those that do not (coefficient 
estimate for HYV dummy for NPR villages =0.834; z-statistic = 2.36; P>z = 0.018). 
Credit taken from the BAAC has a negative coefficient but is not significantly different 
for this group of villages (coefficient on BAAC credit use for NPR villages = -2.49; z 
statistic = -1.59; P>z = 0.112).  
The effect of BAAC credit use in the first stage equation for BAAC credit use is 
discussed next. 
5.3.1.2 BAAC credit use equation for paddy rice area 
Table 5.5 provides an analysis of the endogenous variable BAAC credit use, using 
a random effects linear model. The variables are jointly significant in explaining the use 
of BAAC credit (chi-square, 19 degrees of freedom = 494; Prob > Chi2 =0).  
The results show that, for villages in the paddy rice estimation sample, an increase 
of 1% in market travel time decreases the probability of BAAC credit use by 0.03%. 
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Factors that increase the propensity to cultivate land, such as soil fertility, sufficient water 
and presence of adult labor, are likely to increase the probability that credit from the 
BAAC is used: Availability of water increases the likelihood of using BAAC credit by 
0.05%; Presence of acidic soil has no significant effect. Proportion of adults increases the 
likelihood of BAAC credit use by 0.16%. 
All the identifying instruments for BAAC credit use are significant. HYV rice 
dummy has a large effect on the likelihood of BAAC credit use: A village that grows 
HYV rice is 0.29% more likely to use BAAC credit than a village that does not; An 
increase in the proportion of people who have compulsory education in the village by 1% 
increases the likelihood of BAAC credit use by 0.15%. Finally, an increase in travel time 
to the district by 1% reduces the likelihood of BAAC credit use by 0.07%. 
Population effects on BAAC credit use are quite different, depending on whether 
the village is an APR village or an NPR village. An increase of 1% in population leads to 
an increase in the probability of using BAAC credit by 0.09 %. These already modest 
effects disappear completely for NPR villages. BAAC credit use in APR villages is 























RE w/  
compulsory 
edn &  
Log(Travel 
to district) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NPR dummy=1 -0.04 0.381 0.879 14.722 -4.26 
 (-0.03) (0.24) (0.55) (0.58) (-0.83) 
Year -0.043 -0.041 -0.039 -0.038 -0.013 
 (-4.16)** (-4.00)** (-3.83)** (-0.9) (-0.54) 
(NPR Dummy=1)*Year 0.021 0.017 0.015 -0.15 0.071 
 (1.43) (1.19) (1.03) (-0.51) (1.25) 
Log(Village population) 0.656 0.669 0.692 0.673 0.812 
 (5.83)** (5.97)** (6.16)** (2.70)** (5.08)** 
(NPR =1)*Log(Village popn) -0.054 -0.071 -0.093 -0.1 0.172 
 (-0.36) (-0.48) (-0.63) (-0.34) (0.88) 
Log(One way travel time to market) 0.062 0.053 -0.017 0.044 -0.033 
 (1.08) (0.93) (-0.26) (0.3) (-0.36) 
(NPR =1)*L(Tr. Time to mkt.) 0.094 0.103 0.118 0.274 0.106 
 (1.29) (1.4) (1.4) (0.81) (0.88) 
SR Water  dummy 0.013 0.019 0.032 0.026 0.088 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.42) (0.18) (0.85) 
(NPR =1)*SR water dummy 0.02 0.013 -0.012 -0.171 0.035 
 (0.19) (0.12) (-0.11) (-0.46) (0.24) 
BAAC credit use dummy 0.118   -0.127 -1.31 
 (1.16)   (-0.07) (-1.42) 
(NPR =1)*BAAC credit dummy -0.161   5.107 -1.186 
 (-1.19)   (0.56) (-0.65) 
Proportion of adults in village 0.235 0.26 0.288 0.289 0.499 
 (0.75) (0.83) (0.91) (0.5) (1.19) 
(NPR =1)*Propn of adults -0.622 -0.613 -0.595 -1.815 -0.293 
 (-1.43) (-1.4) (-1.35) (-0.83) (-0.43) 
Acidic Soil dummy -0.183 -0.18 -0.164 -0.173 -0.158 
 (-1.68) (-1.66) (-1.51) (-1) (-1.19) 
(NPR =1)*Acidic Soil dummy 0.208 0.214 0.203 0.624 -0.031 
 (1.48) (1.53) (1.44) (0.8) (-0.14) 
HYV rice use dummy 2.244 2.28 2.27 2.31 2.674 
 (6.84)** (6.98)** (6.97)** (3.14)** (5.84)** 
(NPR =1)*HYV rice use dummy -1.892 -1.928 -1.906 -2.952 -1.839 
 (-5.18)** (5.31)** (-5.26)** (-1.54) (3.18)** 
Propn of villagers w compulsory edn.  -0.017 -0.003   
 (-0.1) (-0.02)   
(NPR =1)*Propn w comp. edn.  -0.134 -0.144   
 (-0.58) (-0.62)   
Log(Travel time to district)   0.167  
(2.30)*   
(NPR =1)*Log(Tr. Time to distt.)   -0.073   
 (-0.83)   
Constant 2.399 2.176 1.518 1.963 -0.516 
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(2.02)* (1.85)+ (1.26) -0.49 -0.23 
Observations 2268 2268 2268 2268 2268 
Number of Villages 631 631 631 631 631 
R-square Within     0.0011 
R-square Between     0.1081 
R-square Overall     0.1359 
Wald Chi2 (17)     162.3 
Prob > chi2     0 
Notes: NPR =1  if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. Z-statistics in brackets. ** 
significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level; + significant at 10% level. 
Table 5.4: Random Effects single equation structural and single equation Reduced form 






Dependent variable -> BAAC use dummy
Coeff. Std. Dev Z P>Z
NPR dummy =1 -0.9101 0.4937 -1.84 0.065
Year 0.0212 0.0032 6.66 0
NPR dummy =1 X year 0.0113 0.0045 2.53 0.011
Log(Population) 0.0891 0.0343 2.6 0.009
NPR dummy=1 X Log(Population) -0.0800 0.0450 -1.78 0.076
Log(Mkt Travel time) -0.0341 0.0201 -1.69 0.091
NPR dummy=1 X Log(Mkt Travel time) 0.0199 0.0261 0.76 0.447
Short run crop Sufficient water dummy 0.0521 0.0237 2.2 0.028
NPR dummy=1 X Short run crop Sufficient water dummy -0.0114 0.0338 -0.34 0.735
Proportion of adults 0.1565 0.0985 1.59 0.112
NPR dummy=1 X Proportion of adults 0.0815 0.1374 0.59 0.553
HYV rice use dummy 0.2866 0.0960 2.98 0.003
NPR dummy=1 X HYV rice use dummy -0.0973 0.1069 -0.91 0.363
Acidic soil dummy 0.0175 0.0340 0.52 0.606
NPR dummy=1 X Acidic Soil dummy -0.1049 0.0439 -2.39 0.017
Proportion with compulsory education 0.1522 0.0535 2.84 0.004
NPR dummy=1 X Propn. With compulsory education. -0.1612 0.0717 -2.25 0.025
Log(Travel time to district) -0.0670 0.0226 -2.96 0.003
NPR dummy=1 X Log(District travel time) 0.0294 0.0274 1.08 0.282
_Constant -1.8320 0.3743 -4.89 0
Notes: NPR =1 if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise.
Z-statistics in brackets. ** significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level; + significant at 10% level.
Table 5.5: First stage equations for BAAC credit use, for Log(rice area), Generalized Two Stage Least Squares, Forest Reserve
Villages, Chiang Mai, Thailand (1986-1996)
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5.3.2 Upland rice  
Upland rice is mainly grown on mountainous slopes in Thailand and is usually 
grown for subsistence. It does not require standing water like paddy does but it requires 
rainfall. The typical growing season lasts 5 months or more.  
During the study period the number of villages growing upland rice is increasing, 
as is the area. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show average area devoted to upland rice in forest 
reserve villages, and, the (non-markov) transition probabilities for villages growing 
upland rice, in the study panel. Table 5.7 shows that, on average, 16% of villages that do 
not grow upland rice in a particular year grow it in the subsequent year. Conversely, one-
fourth of the villages that grew upland rice in the previous year do not grow it in the 
subsequent year. On average, three-fourths of the villages that grew upland rice in a year 
grew it again. In the study panel, 31% of the villages grew upland rice every year.  
 Observations Mean Area (upland rice)
1986 50 76.5 (.) for 1 village 
1988 110 177 (245) for 50 villages 
1990 165 248 (316) for 121 villages 
1992 208 227 (381) for 172 villages 
1994 214 267 (446) for 174 villages 
1996 207 165 (315) for 163 villages 
Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 5.6: Average area devoted to upland rice, conditional on growing, by year, 
Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai, Thailand, (1986-1996) 
 
Upland rice growing dummy Not grow Grow Total 
Not grow 84.5% 15.5% 100%
Grow 25.34% 74.66% 100%
Average 69.2% 30.8% 100 
Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 5.7: (Non-markov) Transition Probabilities for Villages growing upland rice, 
Forest Villages, Chiang Mai, (1986-1996) 
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5.3.2.1 Results for upland rice 
Area devoted to upland rice is different from area devoted to paddy rice. Paddy 
rice is grown in well-watered flat fields while upland rice is grown on mountainous 
slopes. A large number of villages in the data set show that they did not grow upland rice. 
It is thus important to model the adoption of upland rice and then analyze area devoted to 
the crop. Upland rice is not grown in the amphoes of Doi Saket, San Kamphaeng, San 
Sai, San Pa Tong and Chai Prakhan. Villages located in these amphoes are not included 
in the estimation sample. 
To study the variables affecting area devoted to upland rice, I use a two-stage 
procedure. In the first stage I estimate a random effects probit model for BAAC credit 
use. I use the predicted values from this equation to instrument for BAAC credit use in 
the second stage equation. The second stage equation estimates a random effects Tobit 
model for Log(area devoted upland rice). A Tobit specification is used because there are 
a large number of villages that do not grow upland rice. A Tobit specification explains 
the probability of adoption of upland rice, and, the impact of variables, conditional on 
upland rice being grown. Second stage model results are presented in Table 5.8. Marginal 
effects for the Tobit equations are presented in Table 5.9. First stage results for BAAC 
credit use are presented in Table 5.10.  
Similar to the results reported in Table 5.4 for paddy rice, in Table 5.8 I estimate 
five different specifications for upland rice acreage with an increasing number of 
variables, to show the stability of results. The dependent variable is measured in logs. 
The columns in Table 5.8 are described as follows: 
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• Column (1) show a single equation random effects Tobit model with BAAC credit 
use assumed to be exogenous.  
• Column (2) assumes BAAC credit use to be endogenous and estimates a single 
reduced form random effects Tobit equation. It includes proportion of people with 
compulsory education in the village as an explanatory variable.  
• Column (3) also estimates a single reduced form random effects Tobit equation 
for upland rice area. It includes two variables that are used as identifying 
instruments for BAAC credit use. These are: proportion of people with 
compulsory education in the village, and, the log of travel time to the district. 
• Column (4) estimates a single equation random effects Tobit equation for upland 
rice. Additional to the two variables used as identifying instruments for BAAC 
credit use, it includes one more variable. This is the village level HYV rice 
dummy. The HYV rice dummy =1 if the village has ever used HYV rice, and =0 
otherwise. 
• Column (5) estimates a two-stage random effects Tobit equation. The first stage 
estimates the equation for BAAC credit use. (These results are shown in Table 
5.10 and are discussed below.) In this equation system, BAAC credit use is 
instrumented for by using three identifying variables: proportion of people with 
compulsory education in the village, log of travel time to the market, and, village 




As with paddy rice equations, going from the left side of the table to the right 
side, the coefficients remain relatively stable and robust to specifications. In column (1), 
where the BAAC use dummy is assumed to be exogenous, the variable is not significant 
in explaining area devoted to upland rice. This does not change in column (5), where it is 
endogenous. 
Since area devoted to upland rice is estimated using a random effects Tobit 
specification, it is clearly important to discuss the marginal effects. Before doing that, it 
is important to note a few things about the specification in column (5). The model in 
column (5) is estimated using a two-stage random effects Tobit specification to account 
for endogenous BAAC credit use variable. The model is estimated using quadrature 
procedures to maximize the Tobit log-likelihood function. If model estimates are stable, 
changing the number of quadrature points in STATA to maximize the likelihood function 
should not change estimated coefficients by more than 1%. To gauge stability, I estimate 
the model for 26 quadrature points and then again for 30 quadrature points (the maximum 
number allowable in STATA). Results shown here are for the model using 30 quadrature 
points but it is important to point out that all coefficients change by less than 1%, 
indicating that the results are reliable and stable.  
The results in column (5) of Table 5.8 show that the average amount of area 
devoted to upland rice is increasing over time. Increases in village population lead to 
increases in area devoted to upland rice in villages included in the estimation sample. 
This is expected. Upland rice is mainly a subsistence crop. The effect of travel time to 
market however is significantly different depending on whether the village is an NPR or 
an APR village. 
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Clearly, to understand the magnitudes of these effects on the probability of 
growing upland rice and the amount of area devoted to upland rice conditional on it being 
grown, one must look at the marginal effects of the model. Marginal effects of the 
specification in Column (5) are presented in Table 5.9.  
Results on the Probability of Growing upland rice: In Table 5.9 the first set of 
results shows the impact of variables on the probability of growing upland rice. These 
show that the number of villages growing upland rice increases annually at a rate of 
0.04% per year for the study sample, and that rates of adoption are not different for NPR 
villages. The unconditional increase in upland rice area is 0.19% per year. Population has 
a positive impact on the probability of adoption of upland rice. An increase in population 
of 1% leads to an increase in the probability of cultivation of upland rice by almost 0.1 % 
in the estimation sample.  
The effect of travel cost is different from the case of paddy rice. An increase in 
travel time to the market increases the probability that upland rice will be cultivated. This 
is to be expected since upland rice is a subsistence crop. An increase in travel times 
means that forest village residents will want to ensure that their subsistence needs are met 
and they are not dependent on the vagaries of the market. However this effect is 
alleviated in NPR villages. In NPR villages, changes in travel time have almost no effect 
on the probability that upland rice is cultivated (For NPR villages, coefficient on Log of 
travel time= 0.22; z-statistic = 0.85; Prob>z-statistic = 0.39).  
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Water is a constraint in most villages growing upland rice. This is shown by the 
significant and positive coefficient associated with the water availability dummy. Credit 
use seems to have no impact on the probability of growing upland rice. 
Results on area devoted to upland rice, conditional on adoption: The second 
group of results in Table 5.9 shows the elasticities of area devoted to upland rice, with 
respect to explanatory variables, conditional on upland rice being grown. It shows that 
area devoted to upland rice, conditional on it being grown, is growing at a rate of 0.18% 
per year in all forest villages. A 1% increase in population in forest villages leads to a less 
than 0.5% increase in area devoted to upland rice and a 1% increase in travel time 
increases the amount of area devoted to upland rice by less than 0.5% also. But this effect 
of travel time is mitigated in NPR villages, where area grows by less than 0.05% with a 
1% increase in travel time.  
5.3.2.2 BAAC credit use equation for upland rice area 
Table 5.10 presents results for the first stage of the two-stage Tobit equation 
discussed above. The sample of observations is smaller than the sample used to estimate 
the equations for paddy rice. This is because data are absent for some variables.  
Results here are similar to those for the BAAC credit use equation estimated for 
paddy rice area. Village population has a significant effect on BAAC credit use in APR 
villages. Increases in travel time to the district and to the market reduce the likelihood of 
BAAC credit use.  
All the identifying instruments are significant in explaining the likelihood of 
BAAC credit use: An increase in the proportion of population that has compulsory 
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education by 1% increases the likelihood of BAAC credit use by 1.3%; A village that has 
grown HYV rice is 1.8% more likely to use BAAC credit than a village that has not.  
For NPR villages the effect of population on likelihood of BAAC credit use is not 
significantly different from APR villages (coefficient for population in NPR villages = 
0.093; z = 0.55; P>z = 0.58). Similarly the net effect of travel time to the district on the 
likelihood of BAAC credit use is also not significantly different. However the HYV rice 
dummy is significantly different. Thus, if an NPR village grew HYV rice during the 
study period, it was much more likely to use BAAC credit. But compared to APR 
villages, HYV rice has only half the effect on the probability of BAAC credit use 
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Tr. Time to 
district   
HYV rice 
dummy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NPR =1 -1.493 1.658 4.009 4.27 -3.577 
 (-0.14) (0.15) (-0.37) (0.39) (-1.83) 
Year 0.373 0.347 0.353 0.355 0.383 
 (4.39)** (4.15)** (4.23)** (4.25)** (3.51)** 
( NPR =1)*Year 0.125 0.1 0.09 0.094 0.153 
 (1.17) (0.96) (0.86) (0.9) (1.96)* 
Log(village population) 1.723 1.598 1.65 1.615 1.77 
 (2.63)** (2.50)* (2.58)** (2.50)* (2.15)* 
( NPR =1)*Log(village population) -0.582 -0.583 -0.629 -0.71 -0.607 
 (-0.74) (-0.75) (-0.81) (-0.91) (0.64) 
Log(Travel time to market) 1.79 1.895 1.402 1.406 1.823 
 (4.43)** (4.82)** (2.94)** (2.95)** (3.02)** 
( NPR =1)*Log(Travel time to mkt.) -1.484 -1.589 -1.29 -1.309 -1.6 
 (-3.20)** (-3.51)** (-2.26)* (-2.30)* (-1.85)** 
LR Water dummy 1.457 1.443 1.506 1.504 1.466 
 (1.87)+ (1.85)+ (1.93)+ (1.93)+ (1.60) 
( NPR =1)* LR Water dummy -0.557 -0.707 -0.776 -0.711 -0.538 
 (-0.56) (-0.71) (-0.78) (-0.71) (0.19) 
BAAC use dummy -1.065    -1.171 
 (-1.52)    (-0.28) 
( NPR =1)*BAAC use dummy -0.438    -1.012 
 (-0.5)    (-0.59) 
Proportion of adults 2.258 1.859 2.069 2.024 2.386 
 (0.84) (0.69) (0.77) (0.75) (-0.02) 
( NPR =1)*Proportion of adults 3.274 4.117 4.097 4.143 3.369 
 (0.99) (1.24) (1.23) (1.24) (1.79)+ 
Acid soil dummy 0.029 0.015 0.238 0.246 0.092 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.28) (-0.29) (-0.46) 
( NPR =1)*Acid Soil Dummy 0.326 0.536 0.325 0.357 0.135 
 (0.33) (0.54) (0.33) (-0.36) (0.42) 
Propn with compulsory education  -0.812 -0.84 -0.898  
 (-0.64) (-0.66) (-0.7)  
( NPR =1)*(Prop’n w comp. education)  -2.602 -2.546 -2.587  
(1.65)+ (-1.62) (-1.64)  
HYV rice use dummy    0.6  
 (0.42)  
( NPR =1)*HYV rice use dummy    0.072  
 (0.05)  
Log(Travel time to district)    0.902 0.902  
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Notes: NPR =1  if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. Z-statistics in brackets.  
** significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level; + significant at 10% level. Bootstrapped T-statistics in 
column (5), using 100 replications.  Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 5.8: Random Effects Structural, Reduced Form and Two-step Tobit equation 
estimates for Log(upland rice Area), Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai, Thailand 
(1986-1996). 
(1.73)+ (1.74)+   
( NPR =1)*L(Trav. Time to dist).   -0.63 -0.617   
(-1.04) (-1.02)   
Constant -57.033 -54.247 -56.784 -57.221 -58.193  
(-6.41)** (-6.16)** (-6.36)** (-6.36)** (-5.83)**  
Observations 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930  




E(L(upland rice area) | L(upland rice area) >0) (
predict, e0(0,.))
E(L(upland rice area)*| L(upland rice area)
>0) (predict, ys (0,.))
Y 0.247391 3.380444 0.83629
Variable dy/dx std error z P>Z Dy/dx std error Z P>Z dy/dx std error z P>Z x
NPR dummy=1 -0.2022 0.7419 -0.27 0.785 -0.8870 3.3544 -0.26 0.791 -0.9436 3.6993 -0.26 0.799 0.5647
Year 0.0213** 0.0054 3.94 0 0.0920** 0.0233 3.96 0 0.0946** 0.0241 3.93 0 91.7005
NPR =1*year 0.0085 0.00723 1.17 0.243 0.0367 0.0314 1.17 0.243 0.0377 0.0324 1.17 0.243 51.915
Log(village pop’n) 0.0984* 0.0391 2.52 0.012 0.4257** 0.1684 2.53 0.011 0.4379* 0.17374 2.52 0.012 6.2198
NPR =1 x Log(popn) -0.0337 0.0464 -0.73 0.467 -0.1459 0.2009 -0.73 0.467 -0.1501 0.2064 -0.73 0.467 3.5040
Log(Tr time to mkt.) 0.1013** 0.0238 4.26 0 0.4384** 0.1032 4.25 0 0.4511** 0.1066 4.23 0 3.8109
NPR =1 x L(Tr. Time ) -0.0889** 0.0279 -3.19 0.001 -0.3848** 0.1209 -3.18 0.001 -0.3959** 0.1244 -3.18 0.001 2.3504
LR water dummy 0.0867+ 0.0488 1.78 0.075 0.3753+ 0.2126 1.77 0.077 0.4123+ 0.2474 1.67 0.096 0.1041
NPR =1 x LR water -0.0291 0.0525 -0.55 0.58 -0.1262 0.2297 -0.55 0.583 -0.12621 0.2229 -0.57 0.571 0.0606
Propn of adults 0.1326 0.1602 0.83 0.408 0.5737 0.6938 0.83 0.408 0.5902 0.7136 0.83 0.408 0.4178
NPR=1 x Propn adult 0.1873 0.1981 0.95 0.344 0.8101 0.8569 0.95 0.344 0.8336 0.8829 0.94 0.345 0.2235
Acidic soil dummy 0.0051 0.0477 0.11 0.914 0.0222 0.2064 0.11 0.914 0.0229 0.2139 0.11 0.915 0.1472
NPR=1 x Acidic soil 0.0075 0.057 0.13 0.896 0.0327 0.2488 0.13 0.895 0.0338 0.2593 0.13 0.896 0.0912
BAAC credit use -0.0650 0.0995 -0.65 0.513 -0.2816 0.4306 -0.65 0.513 -0.2896 0.4429 -0.65 0.513 0.4610
NPR=1 x BAAC credit -0.0562 0.1359 -0.41 0.679 -0.2433 0.5879 -0.41 0.679 -0.2503 0.6049 -0.41 0.679 0.118285
Notes: NPR =1 if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise; ** significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level; + significant at 10% level. Source:
Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand.
Table 5.9: Marginal Effects for Random Effects Tobit Model, Dependent variable (Log(upland rice area)), BAAC use
instrumented for, two-step procedure, Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai, 1986-1996.
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Dep. Variable: BAAC use=1 if used, 0 otherwise Coefficient. Std. Error Z P>z 
NPR dummy =1 -1.535 3.589 -0.43 0.669 
Year 0.145 0.026 5.53 0 
(NPR dummy=1) x Year 0.032 0.035 0.92 0.357 
Log(Village Population) 0.609** 0.188 3.24 0.001 
(NPR dummy=1) x Log(Popn) -0.529* 0.256 -2.06 0.039 
Log(travel time to market) -0.286* 0.137 -2.08 0.037 
(NPR dummy=1) x Log(Travel time) 0.079 0.182 0.43 0.665 
LR water availability dummy 0.151 0.302 0.5 0.617 
(NPR dummy=1) x LR water dummy 0.148 0.383 0.39 0.7 
Proportion of adults 1.961* 0.769 2.55 0.011 
(NPR dummy=1) x Propn of adults 0.139 1.055 0.13 0.895 
Acid soil dummy 0.085 0.254 0.33 0.739 
(NPR dummy=1) x Acid soil dummy -0.735* 0.337 -2.18 0.029 
Proportion with compulsory education 1.295** 0.408 3.17 0.002 
(NPR dummy=1) x Prop w compulsory education -0.730 0.543 -1.34 0.179 
Log(District Travel time) -0.454** 0.149 -3.05 0.002 
(NPR dummy=1) x Log(Travel time to district) 0.305+ 0.187 1.64 0.102 
HYV rice dummy 1.836** 0.398 4.62 0 
(NPR dummy=1) x HYV rice dummy -0.781+ 0.455 -1.72 0.086 
Constant -16.539** 2.779 -5.95 0 
lnsig2u 1.084 0.1767 0.7377 1.431 
Sigma-u 1.7196 0.152 1.446 2.045 
Rho 0.747 0.033 0.676 0.807 
Observations 1930    
Groups 538    
Log Likelihood -785.68    
Notes: NPR =1  if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. ** significant at 1% level; *  
significant at 5% level; + significant at 10% level. Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, 
Thailand. 
Table 5.10: (First Stage) Random Effects Probit Equation for Two-step Tobit, Dependent 
variable (BAAC credit use dummy), Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai (1986-1996) 
5.3.3 Soybean 
Soybean cultivation became important in the region in 1984 because its dry 
variety requires little water and the government started to promote it as part of an import 
substitution initiative. Soybean is usually planted in May and harvested by the end of the 
year. It is a typical ‘short run’ or a ‘short-duration’ crop and can be harvested within three 
months from planting. In 2002 soybean constituted one of the main non-rice crops in the 
region. Soybean has remained attractive since because of relatively stable prices, low 
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input costs and relatively modest labor requirements (TDRI, (1994)). Corn is a popular 
alternative although it is very water demanding.  
In Thailand, most dry season soybean (95%) is grown in the Northern region. 
Chiang Mai produces 60% of the dry season soybeans (AIT, (1988)). Notwithstanding 
the higher yield and quality of dry season soybean, 70% of the country’s production 
comes from the rainy season crop. Soybean produced during the rainy season is planted 
in ploughed fields at the beginning of May and harvested in August. Soybean crop can be 
planted in rice stubble fields without much land preparation.  
Since soybean needs to be processed before it can be consumed, it is expected that 
growers of soybean will be located near processing plants and markets. Furthermore, the 
main demand for soybean emanates from the cattle rearing sector, even though soybean is 
consumed by humans in the form of soy milk, tofu and soy oil. Domestic demand for 
soybean may be divided into three categories: demand for seeds, demand in the animal 
feed industry and demand for direct consumption (Sopin (1987)). Demand for soy oil is a 
large part of direct consumption. To meet this demand, soybean has to be sent to 
crushers, which produces mostly soybean meal used in animal feed.45 
These facts indicate that unlike paddy rice and upland rice, soybean is a cash crop, 
which must be sold either to a merchant or to a processing mill since it has very little use 
in its unprocessed form. 
 
45 Soybean meal  is mixed in feed at a percentage of 10-15% of the mixture, depending on livestock type 
and oil. Soybean sent off to the crushers, is mainly soy meant for feed – the crushing process yields 77% of 
soybean meal and only 14% of soy oil, which is in turn used for cooking or canning/printing ink/paint. 
Soybean oil is thus a very small percentage of total production and is often substituted for by palm oil. 
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1986 367 83 (22.6%) 125 (185) 65 (56) 45 (29) 2.1 (1.9) 212 (73) 
1988 392 111 (28.3%) 165 (298) 57 (52) 40 (26) 2.3 (2) 215 (159) 
1990 429 121 (28.2%) 182 (279) 60 (53) 44 (26) 2.6 (2) 223 (124) 
1992 469 129 (27.5%) 169 (255) 55 (53) 42 (27) 2.7 (2.1) 241 (132) 
1994 477 129 (27%) 163 (229) 57 (52) 43 (28) 2.5 (1.8) 255 (130) 
1996 520 114 (22%) 155 (200) 56 (42) 43 (23) 2.5 (2) 323 (249) 
Total 2654 687 (26%) 162 (246) 58 (51) 43 (27) 2.5 (2) 246 (159) 
* Standard deviation in brackets ** Figures in brackets show percentage of villages growing soybean as a 
percentage of villages in the sample that year; Source: Data provided by Thammasat University. 
Table 5.11: Characteristics of Villages growing soybean for the estimation sample, 
Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai, 1986-1996. 
 
Not Grow Grow Total 
Not Grow 92.1% 7.9% 100% 
Grow 19.6% 80.4% 100% 
Total 72.3% 27.7% 100% 
Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 5.12: (Non-markov) Transition Probabilities for Villages growing soybean, 
Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai, (1986-1996) 
 
Table 5.11 shows that on average a little more than one-fourth of the villages in 
the sample grew soybean and that on average, 43% of the households in a village grew 
soybean. Most households devoted a little more than two-fifths of a hectare to soybean 
cultivation.  
Table 5.12 show non-markov transition probabilities for villages growing 
soybean. It shows that there is some crop switching. Almost 20% of the villages that 
grew soybean in a previous year did not grow it in the subsequent one. The reverse 
switch happens less frequently however. Only 8% of the villages that did not grow 
soybean in a past year grew it in the subsequent year.  
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In the next sub-section I present results for area devoted to soybean.  
5.3.3.1 Results for soybean 
Similar to upland rice, there are a large number of villages that do not grow 
soybean at all. Thus it is important to model the adoption of soybean and to analyze area 
devoted to soybean conditional on a village growing soybean. To do this I estimate a 
two-step variant of the Tobit for area devoted to soybean, similar to the one estimated for 
upland rice. Table 5.13 presents single equation random effects Tobit results for 
Log(area devoted to soybean). The columns are explained as follows:  
• Column (1) shows the structural equation that assumes the BAAC credit use is 
exogenous.  
• Column (2) shows a single equation random effects Tobit equation results that 
includes the proportion of population that has compulsory education in the 
village.  
• Column (3) has the same specification as column (2) but with Log(Travel time to 
district) added as an explanatory variable.  
• Column (4) has the same specification as column (3) but has the HYV rice 
dummy added as an explanatory variable.  
• Column (5) presents results for a two-stage random effects Tobit model for area 
devoted to soybean. The first stage of the equation, for BAAC credit use, is 
estimated using a random effects probit equation, and three identifying 
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instruments. These are: proportion of population that has compulsory education 
in the village, travel time to district and the HYV rice dummy.  
In column (1) where BAAC credit use is assumed to be exogenous, BAAC credit 
use is significant for NPR villages. However in column (5) where BAAC credit use 
treated as an endogenous variable, BAAC credit use is an important determinant of 
soybean area for all villages. Coefficient estimates in the table, going from left to right, 
are similar.  
It is important to note that although the models for soybean area are also 
estimated using random effects Tobit, as they are for upland rice, the coefficient 
estimates are not as stable. Changing the number of quadrature points from 26 to 30 
changes the magnitude of coefficients from 1% to 14%. The coefficients for the 
sufficient water dummy, proportion of adults and acidic soil dummy change by more 
than 10%. So I do not discuss them here. Further, three amphoes do not grow soybean. 
Villages in these amphoes have been dropped from this sample. Column (5) in Table 
5.13 presents the model I discuss here. Clearly, differentiating between effects of 
variables on adoption and area is important. These results are presented in Table 5.14. 
First stage equation results for BAAC credit use are shown in Table 5.15. 
Results on probability of growing soybean: The first set of columns in Table 
5.14 shows that the number of villages growing soybean is falling over the study period 
but at a modest rate. An increase in village population by 1% reduces the likelihood that 
the village will grow soybean by 0.04%. Similarly an increase in travel time by 1% 
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reduces the likelihood that the village will grow soybean by 0.02%. Being able to use 
BAAC credit increases the probability of soybean adoption by 0.19%.  
For NPR villages, these results are a little different. On average NPR villages are 
less likely to grow soybean by 0.9%. A 1% increase in population leads to a 0.05% 
increase in the likelihood that soybean will be cultivated in an NPR village. Travel time 
to the market, has no effect on the likelihood of growing soybean in NPR villages. 
Results on area devoted to soybean conditional on it being grown: The 
second set of columns in Table 5.14 shows the area devoted soybean conditional on it 
being grown in a village.  
Along with the number of villages growing soybean, the area devoted to soybean 
also falls during the study period at a rate of 0.03%. An increase in population by 1% 
leads to a 0.15% decrease in the area devoted to soybean conditional on it being grown. 
A decrease in travel time to market increases the area devoted to soybean by 0.08%. 
BAAC credit use leads to a 0.73% increase in area devoted to soybean, conditional on 
being grown.  
The effects on area devoted to soybean are different for NPR villages. NPR 
villages that grow soybean are likely to devote almost 6% less area to soybean than APR 
villages. An increase in population and travel time to market leads to an increase in area 
devoted to soybean but these effects are quantitatively modest, albeit significant. 
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5.3.3.2 BAAC credit use equation for soybean area 
Results for the first stage of the two-stage equation are presented in Table 5.15. 
BAAC credit use is estimated using a random effects probit equation. Results for BAAC 
credit use for the larger soybean sample are similar to the results for BAAC credit use for 
the upland rice estimation sample with a few differences in magnitudes.  
BAAC credit use in the soybean estimation sample is growing over time at the 
rate of 0.28% per year. A 1% increase in village population increases the likelihood of 
BAAC credit use by 0.6% and a 1% increase in travel time reduces the likelihood of 
BAAC credit use by 0.4%. Similar to the upland rice sample, a 1% increase in the 
percentage of adults increases the likelihood of BAAC credit use by 1.7%. In the upland 
rice estimation sample, this percentage was 1.9%. The effects of identifying instruments 
on the likelihood of BAAC credit use are all significant.  
In NPR villages the some effects change significantly. NPR villages are 5% less 
likely to use BAAC credit than APR villages, although the rate of BAAC credit use is 
growing at the rate of 0.4% per year. Population has an insignificantly different effect in 
NPR villages on the probability that BAAC credit will be used. The presence of acidic 
soil in NPR villages in the estimation sample reduces the likelihood that BAAC credit 







































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)*** 
NPR dummy=1 -15.535 -23.689 -24.008 -18.258 -18.459 
 (2.24)* (3.49)** (3.48)** (2.70)** (-1.41) 
Year -0.032 -0.013 -0.016 -0.016 -0.065 
 (-0.84) (-0.35) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-1.44) 
(NPR =1) X year 0.028 0.112 0.124 0.146 0.066 
 (0.4) (1.70)+ (1.88)+ (2.21)* (0.61) 
Log(population) -0.317 -0.329 -0.353 -0.513 -0.597 
(-0.94) (-0.93) (-0.99) (-1.47) (-0.30) 
(NPR =1) X Log(popn) 1.071 1.198 1.199 0.424 1.346 
 (2.10)* (2.35)* (2.31)* (0.85) (1.29) 
Log(Travel time to market) -0.571 -0.587 -0.442 -0.427 -0.333 
 (2.82)** (2.89)** (1.86)+ (1.73)+ (-1.99)* 
(NPR =1) XL(Tr time to mkt.) 0.799 0.756 1.158 1.019 0.588 
 (2.31)* (2.19)* (2.73)** (2.44)* (2.00)* 
SR water dummy -0.015 0.093 0.075 0.057 -0.103 
 (-0.05) (0.34) (0.28) (0.21) (-0.24) 
(NPR =1) X SR water dummy 0.55 0.586 0.719 0.716 0.641 
 (1.11) (1.22) (1.49) (1.52) (0.42) 
Propn of adults 1.821 1.773 1.725 1.673 0.78 
 (1.63) (1.58) (1.54) (1.49) (0.59) 
(NPR =1) X Propn of adults -2.403 -2.146 -2.401 -2.645 -1.544 
 (-1.19) (-1.07) (-1.2) (-1.31) (-0.50) 
BAAC credit use dummy 0.651  3.011 
 (1.58)    (3.08)** 
(NPR =1) X BAAC credit  1.097  -1.078 
 (1.76)+    (-1.04) 
Acid soil dummy 0.356 0.369 0.367 0.339 0.372 
 (0.94) (0.99) (0.99) (0.91) (0.61) 
(NPR =1) X Acid soil dummy -0.166 -0.428 -0.422 -0.277 -0.169 
 (-0.28) (-0.74) (-0.73) (-0.47) (-0.16) 
Propn w compulsory edn.  1.352 1.315 1.236  
(2.16)* (2.10)* (1.94)+  
(NPR =1) X Propn w comp. edn.  0.121 0.164 -0.288  
 (0.13) (0.17) (-0.29)  
Log(Travel time to district)   -0.283 -0.283  
 (-1.05) (-1.04)  
(NPR =1) X L(Tr. Time to distt.)   -0.547 -0.495  
 (-1.29) (-1.19)  




(NPR =1) X HYV rice dummy    -1.063  
 (-0.71)  
Constant 4.479 2.661 3.637 -0.531 6.927 
 (1.17) (0.66) (0.88) (-0.13) (1.98)+ 
Observations 2086 2086 2086 2086 2086 
Number of ID 561 561 561 561 561 
Notes: NPR =1  if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. ** significant at 1% level; * 
significant at 5% level; + significant at 10% level. ***Bootstrapped t-statistics in column (5) using 200 
replications. Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 5.13: Showing Single equation structured (Columns 1), single equation 
reduced (Columns 2-4) and IV (Columns 5-6), Random Effects Tobit equations for 





E(L(soybean area)| L(soybean area) >0) (
predict, e0(0,.))
E(L(soybean area)*| L(soybean area)>0)
(predict, ys (0,.))
Y 0.25459 3.012101 0.76685
Variable dy/dx Std. Z P>Z dy/dx Std. Z P>Z dy/dx Std. Z P>Z x
NPR dummy =1 -0.89507 0.18624 -4.81 0 -5.81344 3.9518 -1.47 0.141 -6.75657 4.49738 -1.5 0.133 0.534036
Year -0.00414 0.00264 -1.57 0.117 -0.01577 0.01001 -1.58 0.115 -0.01647 0.01046 -1.58 0.115 91.4142
(NPR =1) x year 0.00425 0.00604 0.7 0.482 0.016207 0.02309 0.7 0.483 0.016929 0.0241 0.7 0.482 48.9664
Log(Population) -0.03814 0.02335 -1.63 0.102 -0.14542 0.09007 -1.61 0.106 -0.1519 0.09459 -1.61 0.108 6.2044
(NPR =1) x Log(Popn) 0.08601 0.03417 2.52 0.012 0.327963 0.13248 2.48 0.013 0.342568 0.13895 2.47 0.014 3.29975
Log(Tr time to mkt.) -0.0213 0.01367 -1.56 0.119 -0.08122 0.05163 -1.57 0.116 -0.08484 0.0539 -1.57 0.116 3.80416
(NPR =1) x L(Tr. Time mkt.) 0.037598 0.02327 1.62 0.106 0.143364 0.08849 1.62 0.105 0.149748 0.0927 1.62 0.106 2.22675
SR water dummy -0.00659 0.01708 -0.39 0.699 -0.02515 0.06518 -0.39 0.7 -0.02619 0.06768 -0.39 0.699 0.279482
(NPR =1) x SR water dummy 0.042246 0.03352 1.26 0.208 0.160938 0.12804 1.26 0.209 0.173403 0.14212 1.22 0.222 0.123202
Proportion of adults 0.049864 0.07618 0.65 0.513 0.190133 0.29005 0.66 0.512 0.198601 0.30308 0.66 0.512 0.418544
(NPR =1) x Prop of adults -0.09871 0.14339 -0.69 0.491 -0.3764 0.54545 -0.69 0.49 -0.39317 0.5694 -0.69 0.49 0.21083
Acid Soil dummy 0.02417 0.02439 0.99 0.322 0.092072 0.09283 0.99 0.321 0.097857 0.10022 0.98 0.329 0.139981
(NPR =1) x Acid soil dummy -0.01071 0.03807 -0.28 0.778 -0.0409 0.14554 -0.28 0.779 -0.04232 0.14923 -0.28 0.777 0.084851
BAAC credit use dummy 0.192497 0.07486 2.57 0.01 0.734 0.28178 2.6 0.009 0.766688 0.29468 2.6 0.009 0.506512
(NPR =1) x BAAC credit use -0.0689 0.12227 -0.56 0.573 -0.26272 0.46686 -0.56 0.574 -0.27442 0.48746 -0.56 0.573 0.109848
Notes: NPR =1 if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. Notes: NPR =1 if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. ** significant at
1% level; * significant at 5% level; + significant at 10% level. ***Bootstrapped t-statistics in column (5) using 200 replications.Source: Data provided by
Thammasat University, Thailand.
Table 5.14: Marginal Effects for Random Effects Tobit Model, Dependent variable (Log(soybean area)), BAAC use
instrumented for, two-step procedure used, Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai, 1986-1996.
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Wald chi2(19) = 256.21   
Log likelihood = -816.61501 Prob  
 Coef. SD Z p>z  
NPR =1 -5.6412 3.5553 -1.59 0.113  
Year 0.1373 0.0256 5.36 0  
(NPR =1) X year 0.0578 0.0342 1.69 0.091  
Log(Population) 0.5747 0.1769 3.25 0.001  
(NPR =1) X Log(popn) -0.4205 0.2629 -1.6 0.11  
Log(Travel time to  mkt.) -0.3933 0.1411 -2.79 0.005  
(NPR =1) X Log(Travel time mkt.) 0.2509 0.1859 1.35 0.177  
Short run water dummy  0.4296 0.1804 2.38 0.017  
(NPR =1) X Short run water  -0.1250 0.2548 -0.49 0.624  
Proportion of adults 1.7117 0.7309 2.34 0.019  
(NPR =1) X Prop’n of adults 0.5615 1.0323 0.54 0.587  
Acid soil dummy 0.1046 0.2498 0.42 0.676  
(NPR =1) X Acid soil dummy -0.7023 0.3382 -2.08 0.038  
Propn of population with compulsory edn. 1.4818 0.4058 3.65 0  
(NPR =1) X Propn w comp. edn. -0.7140 0.5412 -1.32 0.187  
Log(Travel time to district) -0.4060 0.1537 -2.64 0.008  
(NPR =1) X Log(Travel to distt.) 0.1485 0.1915 0.78 0.438  
HYV rice Dummy 0.8906 0.4628 1.92 0.054  
(NPR =1) X HYV rice Dummy -0.1723 0.5318 -0.32 0.746  
Constant -14.2557 2.6610 -5.36 0  
Lnsig2u 1.1478 0.1941 0.7672 1.528  
Sigma_u 1.775 0.1722 1.4676 2.147  
Rho 0.759 0.0354 0.683 0.8217  
Likelihood-ratio Test Of rho=0: chibar2(01) 369.43 
Obs = 2086    
Groups = 561    
Notes: NPR =1  if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. ** significant at 1% level; * 
significant at 5% level; + significant at 10% level.  Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, 
Thailand. 
Table 5.15: First stage Random Effects Probit equation for BAAC credit use, for 
Log(soybean area), Forest Reserve Villages, Chiang Mai, Thailand (1986-96) 
5.4 The Intensive and Extensive Frontiers of Cultivation
The main aim of the dissertation is to examine factors affecting deforestation in 
Forest Reserve villages of Chiang Mai. In the sections above I explore factors that affect 
adoption and area decisions for three main crops grown in these villages. However these 
are not the only crops that are grown and there is also double cropping. This is especially 
true for paddy rice and soybean. Thus there is no unique mapping of the sum of paddy 
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rice, upland rice and soybean into total agricultural land. Therefore it is useful to explore 
how the same factors that affect crop decisions affect intensity of cultivation and total 
agricultural land as a whole.  
5.4.1 Intensity of cultivation  
Boserup (1965) in her classic exposition of factors governing agricultural 
expansion in developing countries, especially in Asia, defined agricultural intensification 
as “…the gradual change towards patterns of land use which make it possible to crop a 
given area of land more frequently than before.” (pp 43). In this definition she thus 
departed from the definition of intensification that measured increased use of inputs per 
hectare of cropped area. In this dissertation, the Boserup measure of intensity is used: 
Intensity of cultivation is measured by a variable that is the response to the question 
“What percentage of agricultural land is being used (for cultivation) in the village, in this 
year?” Implicit in this question is the understanding that the village has agricultural land 
that has been left fallow. Thus the percentage of land cultivated in time t, by village i, is 
assumed to be defined as: 
% of land cultivated at time t in village i= [(Total land cleared and potentially fit for 
cultivation - Area left fallow at time t by village i)/Total land cleared and potentially fit 
for cultivation]X100  
5.4.1.1 Results for Intensity of Cultivation 
Since the intensity of cultivation is measured as a categorical variable, with each 
value representing an interval, I estimate the equations for intensity of cultivation using a 
random effects interval regression model. Similar to the procedure followed for the crop 
area equations, I estimate a reduced form equation where BAAC credit use is 
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endogenous. The results I discuss here use a two-step variant of the interval regression 
model in which the first step estimates a reduced form model for BAAC credit use, using 
a random effects probit model. Results are presented in Table 5.16. The specifications in 
different columns are explained as follows: 
• Column (1) presents a random effects interval regression which assumes BAAC 
credit use is exogenous.  
• Column (2) presents a single equation random effects interval regression model 
which includes, along with the other explanatory variables, the proportion of 
population in the village that has compulsory education. 
• Column (3) is the same as column (2) with an additional explanatory variable – 
dummy for HYV rice growing. 
• Column (4) is the same as column (3) with an additional explanatory variable – 
Travel time to district. 
• Column (5) is a two-step variant of the random effects interval regression, where 
the first stage uses a random effects probit equation to estimate the model for 
BAAC credit use. Results from the first stage are reported in Table 5.17. 
The estimation procedure for a random effects interval regression uses maximum 
likelihood, which is implemented using quadrature methods in STATA. Increasing the 
number of quadrature point from 26 to 30–the maximum allowable in STATA – does not 
change the magnitude of coefficients by more than 1% for all specifications. All reported 
coefficient estimates are thus stable. Reading Table 5.16 from left to right shows that the 
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estimates are similar. In Column (1) where BAAC credit is assumed to be exogenous, the 
variable is positive and significant. However the variable does not remain significant 
once it is instrumented for, in column (5). There are three instruments used to identify the 
BAAC credit use equation. These are proportion of population that has compulsory 
education, travel time to the district center and HYV rice use dummy. BAAC credit use is 
estimated using a random effects probit equation. Results are shown in Table 5.17 and are 
discussed below. The predicted value of BAAC credit use from this equation is used in 
the second stage equation to model the intensity of cultivation. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped over 200 replications. Rho, the proportion of total variance contributed by 
the panel level variance is 0.36 (standard error = 0.02) for this model. The panel level 
variance is significantly different from the pooled estimator.  
Results in Table 5.16 show that a 1% decrease in travel time to market increases 
the percentage of agricultural land cultivated by 2.9% points. Population has no effect on 
the intensity of cultivation for either group of villages. Short run crop water availability 
increases the percentage of area cultivated by almost 6 percentage points. This may be 
occurring if short run crops such as soybean and mung bean are grown on intra-marginal 
lands.  
Results show that the effects of explanatory variables are different for NPR 
villages. On average NPR villages cultivate land less intensively than APR villages. NPR 
intensity of cultivation is less on average by 71 percentage points. Secondly, for NPR 
villages, there is almost no effect of a change in travel time to market (travel time 
estimate for NPR villages = 0.343; z=0.42; Prob>Chi-square =0.67).  Short run water 
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availability also has no effect on intensity of cultivation in NPR villages (the short run 
water coefficient in NPR villages = 1.6; Z-statistic = 1.04; Prob>Z= 0.30).  
5.4.1.2 BAAC credit use equation for intensity of cultivation 
To estimate the first stage of the model in column (5) of Table 5.17, I estimate 
BAAC credit use using a random effects probit equation. Results are presented in Table 
5.17. For the villages included in this estimation sample, an increase in travel time to 
market by 1%, increases the likelihood of BAAC credit use by 0.4%. Sufficient water 
availability for short run crops increases the likelihood of BAAC credit use by 0.4%. A 
1% increase in the proportion of adults increases the likelihood of BAAC credit use by 
1.6%. All the identifying instruments are significant. A 1% increase in travel time to the 
district center decreases the likelihood of BAAC credit use by 0.4%, and the use of HYV 
rice in a village during the study period increases probability of use of BAAC credit use 
by 2%.   For NPR villages, the effects of growing HYV rice and proportion of population 
with compulsory education diminish significantly. Growing HYV rice during the study 

















































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NPR dummy =1     -71.091 
 (2.15)* 
Year 0.046 0.172 0.146 0.147 -0.269 
 (0.29) (1.1) (0.93) (0.94) (-1.26) 
(NPR =1)*year -0.122 -0.123 -0.053 -0.063 0.485 
 (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.37) (-0.43) (-1.43) 
Log(Village Population) 1.927 2.586 1.6 1.575 0.328 
 (1.32) (1.77)+ (1.08) (1.07) (0.2) 
(NPR =1)*Log(Village Popn) -2.476 -2.742 -2.21 -2.252 0.083 
 (-1.37) (-1.51) (-1.19) (-1.21) (0.04) 
Log(Travel time to market) -2.342 -2.595 -2.671 -1.878 -2.868 
 (2.57)* (2.87)** (2.96)** (1.72)+ (2.91)** 
(NPR =1)*Log(Tr time to mkt.) 2.554 2.673 2.86 2.807 3.212 
 (2.21)* (2.33)* (2.51)* (1.95)+ (2.52)* 
Short run water dummy 5.836 6.246 5.879 5.756 5.716 
 (4.01)** (4.29)** (4.04)** (3.95)** (3.87)** 
(NPR =1)*SR water dummy -4.399 -4.608 -4.399 -4.16 -4.11 
 (-2.11)* (2.21)* (2.11)* (1.99)* (1.92)+ 
LR water dummy -3.264 -3.436 -3.069 -3.126 -3.06 
 (-1.46) (-1.54) (-1.38) (-1.4) (-1.37) 
(NPR =1)*LR water dummy 3.474 3.799 3.843 3.856 3.343 
 (1.14) (-1.25) (-1.26) (-1.27) (1.1) 
Proportion of adults -9.643 -9.151 -9.145 -9.645 -7.157 
 (-1.65)+ (-1.56) (-1.57) (1.65)+ (-1.16) 
(NPR =1)*Propn of adults 32.385 31.478 31.273 31.152 28.112 
 (4.03)** (3.92)** (3.90)** (3.87)** (3.25)** 
Acidic soil dummy -8.274 -8.235 -8.141 -8.24 -7.973 
 (-3.96)** (3.94)** (3.90)** (3.95)** (3.82)** 
(NPR =1)*Acidic soil dummy -0.377 -1.076 -0.939 -0.885 -0.85 
 (-0.14) (-0.4) (-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.3) 
Propn with compulsory edn.  3.821 3.39 3.369  
 (1.23) (1.09) (-1.08)  
(NPR =1)*Propn w comp. edn.  0.531 0.774 0.701  
 (0.13) (0.19) (-0.17)  
HYV rice dummy   13.531 13.453  
(3.65)** (3.63)**  
(NPR =1)*HYV rice dummy   -10.329 -10.434  
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(2.50)* (2.53)*  
Log(Travel time to distt.)    -1.592  
 (-1.29)  
(NPR =1)* L(Travel time to dist)    0.467  
 (0.3)  
BAAC credit use dummy 4.959  4.93 
 (2.80)**    (1.09) 
(NPR =1)*BAAC credit dummy -1.202    -1.904 
 (-0.51)    (-0.28) 
Constant 65.433 51.902 48.576 51.837 104.437 
 (4.70)** (3.73)** (3.50)** (3.69)** (4.88)** 
Observations 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 
Number of ID 628 628 628 628 628 
Notes: NPR =1  if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. ** significant at 1% level; * 
significant at 5% level; + significant at 10% level. ***Bootstrapped t-statistics in column (5) using 200 
replications. Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 5.16: Random Effects Reduced form single equation and Interval regression 





Dependent variable: BAAC credit use dummy Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
NPR dummy =1 -3.723 3.504 -1.06 0.288 
Year 0.148** 0.026 5.75 0 
(NPR dummy=1) x Year 0.048 0.034 1.39 0.165 
Log(Village population)  0.581 0.179 3.26 0.001 
(NPR dummy=1) X L(population) -0.416 0.253 -1.65 0.1 
Log(Travel time to market) -0.361* 0.142 -2.54 0.011 
(NPR dummy=1) X Log(Travel time) 0.204 0.185 1.1 0.27 
Short run water sufficiency 0.455* 0.184 2.47 0.013 
(NPR dummy=1) X short run water. -0.151 0.262 -0.57 0.565 
Long run water dummy -0.132 0.286 -0.46 0.643 
(NPR dummy=1) X long run water dummy 0.293 0.381 0.77 0.442 
Proportion of adults 1.573* 0.722 2.18 0.029 
(NPR dummy=1) X proportion of adults 0.515 1.033 0.5 0.618 
Acidic soil dummy 0.065 0.249 0.26 0.795 
(NPR dummy=1) X acidic soil dummy -0.834* 0.338 -2.47 0.014 
Proportion with Compulsory education 1.398** 0.402 3.48 0.001 
(NPR dummy=1) X Propn with compulsory education -1.047+ 0.539 -1.94 0.052 
HYV rice dummy 2.065** 0.439 4.71 0 
(NPR dummy=1) X HYV rice dummy -1.021* 0.482 -2.12 0.034 
Log(Travel time to district) -0.408* 0.150 -2.71 0.007 
(NPR dummy=1) X Log(Travel time to District) 0.160 0.187 0.86 0.392 
Constant  -16.336** 2.688 -6.08 0 
/lnsig2u 1.234 0.171   
sigma-u 1.854 0.158   
Rho 0.775 0.030   
Notes: NPR =1  if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. Source: Data provided by 
Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 5.17: First-stage equation results for Interval regression, Dependent variable 
is BAAC credit use binary variable, Forest Villages, Chiang Mai 1986-1996. 
5.4.2 Total Agricultural Land 
I use village agricultural area to measure the extensive frontier of cultivation. This 
definition ignores de facto encroachment on surrounding forest land which may not have 
been measured if village headmen are trying to keep their responses consistent with data 
supplied on total (official) village area. In Forest Reserves where property rights are 
absent, encroachment is likely to be high. In this sense, estimation results represent a 
lower bound.  
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5.4.2.1 Results for Agricultural Land  
To investigate land expansion as measured by village agricultural land, I use the 
same variables as above. Variables that affect intensity of cultivation should also affect 
land expansion. Results are presented in Table 5.18. I estimate a random effects equation 
via Generalized two stage least squares to estimate the model for agricultural land. The 
dependent variable is in logs. Columns in Table 5.18 are defined as follows. 
• Column (1) presents the random effects equation for agricultural land, assuming 
BAAC credit use is exogenous. 
• Column (2) presents a random effects equation for agricultural land that includes 
the proportion of population with compulsory education amongst the explanatory 
variables. 
• Column (3) presents the same specification as in column (2) but adds the HYV 
rice to the list of explanatory variables. 
• Column (4) presents the same specification as in column (2) but adds travel time 
to the district to the list of explanatory variables.  
• Column (5) presents the same specification as in column (3) and adds the travel 
time to district to the list of explanatory variables.  
• Column (6) is a random effects model with BAAC credit use instrumented for, by 
using three identifying instruments. These are proportion of population with 
compulsory education, travel time to the district and HYV rice dummy. The 
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results from the first stage random effects equation for BAAC credit use are 
shown in Table 5.19.  
Results in column (6) show that a 1% increase in village population leads to a 
0.4% increase in area devoted to agricultural land in the villages in the estimation sample. 
BAAC credit use increases agricultural land by 1.1% in the villages constituting this 
estimation sample. A 1% increase in travel time to the market increases the area under 
cultivation in APR villages by 0.16%. Presence of acidic soil in APR villages reduces 
agricultural land by 0.3%.  
The effects of travel time to market and acidic soil disappear in NPR villages: the 
travel time coefficient for NPR villages = 0.032; z= 1.12; P>Z = 0.26) and, acidic soil 
dummy for NPR villages = 0.033; z= 0.48; P>z = 0.63). Presence of sufficient water for 
long run crops increases the total agricultural land in a village by 0.14%.  
5.4.2.2 BAAC credit use equation for agricultural land 
To estimate the equation in column (6) in Table 5.18, I estimate a first stage 
random effects equation for BAAC credit use. Results are presented in Table 5.19. A 1% 
increase in village population increases probability of BAAC credit use by 0.06%. 
Sufficient water for short run crops increases the probability of BAAC credit use by 
0.05%. The identifying instruments are all significant in explaining BAAC credit use: A 
1% increase in the proportion of population with compulsory education increases the 
likelihood of BAAC credit use by 0.12%; A village that grows HYV rice during the study 
period is 0.26% more likely to use BAAC credit; and, an increase in travel time to district 
by 1% reduces the likelihood of BAAC credit use by 0.06%.   
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For the subset of NPR villages in this estimation sample, the effect of population 
disappears. A 1% increase in the proportion of people who have compulsory education 
reduces the likelihood of BAAC credit use by 0.08%.  
The variables that are significant in explaining BAAC credit use in this sample 
are the same as those in the intensity of cultivation estimation sample, with some 
exceptions. In the intensity of cultivation sample, village population has no effect on 
BAAC credit use and travel time to market has a significant and negative impact on the 
probability of BAAC credit use. The proportion of adults in the village also has a 
significant effect on BAAC credit use in the intensity of cultivation sample. It does not in 
this sample. Acidic soil has a negative impact on the intensity of cultivation in NPR 
villages. The effect is much larger than the effect in this estimation sample (presence of 
acidic soil decreases the probability of BAAC credit use by 0.8% in NPR villages in the 
intensity of cultivation sample). The variables that are used to identify the BAAC credit 
use equation are all significant in both estimation samples, but the magnitudes are 
different. Particularly growing HYV rice in a village included in the intensity of 
cultivation sample, increases probability of BAAC credit use by 2%. In the agricultural 
land estimation sample, this increase is only 0.2%. Although the magnitudes are small, 
these differences can be explained by the fact that the estimation samples are different. 
The number of observations in the agricultural land estimation sample is 1989 (no. of 
villages are 622). The number of observations in the intensity of cultivation sample is 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NPR dummy =1 1.023 0.966 1.963 1.419 2.43 -0.651 
 (1.19) (1.15) (2.29)* (1.66)+ (2.79)** (-0.35) 
Year 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 -0.022 
 (0.97) (1.27) (1.27) (1.54) (1.56) (1.76)+ 
(NPR=1) x year -0.002 0 0 -0.001 -0.001 0.018 
 (-0.32) (-0.01) (-0.05) (-0.19) (-0.17) (0.86) 
Log(Village 
Population) 0.498 0.495 0.467 0.504 0.476 0.427 
 (7.63)** (7.63)** (7.22)** (7.78)** (7.37)** (5.33)** 
(NPR=1)x Popn -0.085 -0.089 -0.075 -0.096 -0.081 0.021 
 (-0.97) (-1.01) (-0.85) (-1.09) (-0.93) (0.21) 
Log(Trv  time to mkt.) 0.113 0.119 0.117 0.074 0.071 0.158 
 (3.75)** (3.98)** (3.94)** (2.27)* (2.17)* (4.04)** 
(NPR =1)xL(Trv time) -0.088 -0.095 -0.091 -0.056 -0.051 -0.126 
 (2.23)* (2.42)* (2.34)* (-1.31) (-1.2) (2.59)** 
SR water dummy -0.003 0.011 0.005 0.017 0.012 -0.055 
 (-0.09) (-0.28) (0.13) (0.45) (0.31) (-1.12) 
(NPR=1)x SR water -0.045 -0.057 -0.052 -0.065 -0.06 0.005 
 (-0.81) (-1.03) (-0.94) (-1.18) (-1.1) (0.08) 
LR water dummy -0.072 -0.078 -0.073 -0.075 -0.07 -0.041 
 (-1.28) (-1.41) (-1.32) (-1.35) (-1.26) (-0.62) 
(NPR=1)x LR water  0.181 0.191 0.192 0.189 0.19 0.145 
 (2.23)* (2.38)* (2.39)* (2.35)* (2.36)* (1.52) 
Proportion of adults 0.003 -0.017 -0.027 -0.009 -0.019 -0.056 
 (0.02) (-0.11) (-0.18) (-0.06) (-0.12) (-0.31) 
(NPR=1)x Propn adult 0.209 0.224 0.232 0.222 0.231 0.227 
 (0.93) (1) (-1.04) (0.99) (1.03) (0.83) 
Acid soil dummy -0.231 -0.228 -0.23 -0.217 -0.218 -0.28 
 (4.05)** (4.05)** (4.08)** (-3.83)** (3.86)** (4.13)** 
(NPR =1) x Acid soil 0.257 0.242 0.245 0.23 0.233 0.314 
 (3.48)** (3.32)** (3.36)** (3.15)** (3.19)** (3.22)** 
HYV rice dummy   1.376  1.384  
(5.75)**  (5.84)**  
(NPR=1)x HYV rice   -1.152  -1.158  
(4.33)**  (4.39)**  
L (Tr. Time to distt)    0.129 0.133  
(3.28)** (3.41)**  
(NPR=1)x Time to dist    -0.116 -0.118  
(-2.52)* (2.58)**  
Propn w comp edn.  0.27 0.258 0.275 0.263  
(3.12)** (2.98)** (3.17)** (3.03)**  
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(NPR=1)*Propn w   -0.156 -0.15 -0.161 -0.155  
Comp. education  (-1.31) (-1.26) (-1.35) (-1.3)  
BAAC credit use 0.015     1.11 
 (0.29)     (2.41)* 
NPR=1*BAAC credit 0.084     -0.83 
 (1.19)     (-1.32) 
Constant 2.313 2.062 1.005 1.567 0.49 4.339 
 (3.78)** (3.41)** (1.6) (2.52)* (0.76) (3.94)** 
Observations 1989 1989 1989 1989 1989 1989 
Number of ID 622 622 622 622 622 622 
Sigma u      0.96 
Sigma e      0.40 
Rho      0.85 
Rsq within      0.0096 
Rsq between      0.14 
Rsq overall      0.122 
Notes: NPR =1  if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. Source: Data provided by 
Thammasat University, Thailand. 
Table 5.18: Dependent variable Log(Agricultural area in village, in rais), Structural 
and Reduced form single equation Random Effects Model estimates for Log(Village 





Number Of Obs 1989
Wald Chi(21) 400
Dependent var: BAAC dummy Chi2 0
Coef. S.d Z P>z
NPR dummy -1.0051 0.5533 -1.82 0.069
Year 0.0245 0.0033 7.53 0
NPR=1 x year 0.0127 0.0047 2.71 0.007
Log(village population) 0.0632 0.0406 1.56 0.12
NPR=1 x L(population) -0.1026 0.0549 -1.87 0.062
Log(Travel time to mkt.) -0.0172 0.0211 -0.82 0.414
NPR=1 x L(Tr. Time to mkt.) 0.0250 0.0275 0.91 0.364
SR water dummy 0.0514 0.0248 2.07 0.038
NPR=1 x SR water dummy -0.0172 0.0359 -0.48 0.632
LR Water dummy -0.0384 0.0360 -1.07 0.286
NPR =1x LR water dummy 0.0708 0.0523 1.35 0.176
Proportion of adults 0.0232 0.1016 0.23 0.819
NPR=1 x Prop. Of adults 0.1897 0.1449 1.31 0.191
Acid soil dummy 0.0335 0.0367 0.91 0.361
NPR=1 x acid soil dummy -0.1326 0.0474 -2.8 0.005
Propn compulsory edn. 0.1193 0.0562 2.12 0.034
NPR=1 x Propn comp. edn. -0.2012 0.0769 -2.62 0.009
rice HYV dummy 0.2681 0.1355 1.98 0.048
NPR=1 x rice HYV dummy -0.0663 0.1509 -0.44 0.661
Log(Travel time to distt.) -0.0623 0.0252 -2.47 0.013
NPR=1 x L(Tr. Time to distt) 0.0265 0.0296 0.89 0.371
Constant -1.9417 0.4102 -4.73 0
Notes: NPR =1 if villages have no secure property rights; =0 otherwise. Source: Data provided by Thammasat University, Thailand.







In this dissertation I examine the key factors that influence decisions regarding 
adoption and area devoted to three main crops grown in the Forest Reserves of Chiang 
Mai province, Thailand.  
On the policy level, such a crop-wise exploration is useful for many reasons: 
First, if certain crops are responsible for encouraging new land being brought under 
cultivation or if agricultural practices associated with them are detrimental to the 
ecosystem, then a crop-wise analysis can help understand the factors affecting their 
cultivation. Secondly, if there has been an effort to promote certain crops, as there has 
been to promote soybean in North Thailand, then a crop-wise analysis can highlight 
factors affecting its adoption and acreage. Finally, understanding the magnitudes of 
impacts on crop adoption and acreage of population and roads can also help understand 
certain trade-offs. If for example, road building is being considered as a policy option in a 
region, but there is evidence that it affects crop adoption and acreage, then understanding 
which crops are affected most can help to understand otherwise unintended repercussions 
of this policy.  
I also explore the extent to which agricultural land within Forest Reserve villages 
is affected by the same factors as those influencing crop decisions. Although I cannot 
gauge the extent to which the three crops are driving agricultural expansion, an analysis 
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such as this can help to assess what factors are important to keep in mind when 
understanding the forces behind agricultural expansion. 
6.2 Summary of main results
In this dissertation I estimate random effects reduced form equations for three 
main crops – paddy rice, upland rice and soybean. I also estimate reduced form random 
effects equations for village agricultural land and intensity of cultivation. Some 
conclusions with respect to the main explanatory variables are below: 
Effect of population
Results from crop area equations show that a 10% increase in population leads to 
an 8% increase in area devoted to paddy rice and a 4.4% increase in area devoted to 
upland rice. This finding is consistent with home consumption constituting an important 
part of the Thai farmer’s production decisions. (The National Food and Nutrition survey 
of Thailand found that in 1986, home production accounted for almost 40% of food 
consumed at home for agricultural farmers in North Thailand.) Upland rice is mainly a 
subsistence crop; paddy rice is grown for the market and for home consumption. 
Significant population effects on the acreage of these two crops are expected. 
The study also finds that a 10% increase in population leads to a 4.3% increase in 
agricultural land. This is consistent with the findings in Cropper et al. (1999), who report 
that a 10% increase agricultural household density in North Thailand increases 
agricultural land by 4%. However, it is higher than the elasticity of cleared land with 
respect to population reported in a spatially explicit study of the effects of population and 
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transportation costs in Cropper et al (2001): In that study, a 10% increase in population 
leads to a 1.5% increase in cleared land in the forested areas of North Thailand.46 It is 
lower than the elasticity reported by Panayatou (1991) for Northeast Thailand. That study 
reports that a 10% increase in population leads to a 15% decrease in forest cover.  
The effects of population do not differ across the two sets of villages explored in 
this dissertation – Villages with ambiguous property rights and villages with no secure 
property rights. There is some evidence of a significant difference in direction of impact 
for soybean cultivation, but the magnitudes of impact are very small. 
Effect of travel costs
I find that transportation cost has a quantitatively modest impact on agricultural 
decisions in the study area.  
A 10% increase in travel time to the market leads to a 4.5% increase in upland 
rice area for the sample – with most of the increase being explained by an increase in 
acreage (and not adoption). The likelihood of adoption increases only by 1%. The effect 
on upland rice is much smaller for villages with no secure property rights (=0.2%). 
Although the direction of impact of travel time may seem counter-intuitive, it is 
important to note that upland rice is a subsistence crop. An increase in the likelihood of 
adoption and of area devoted to upland rice, due to an increase in travel time, may be 
driven by the propensity to produce a staple at home, rather than depend on the market.  
 
46 In this study the elasticity for cleared land with population is smaller.  
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Conversely, a reduction in travel time is likely to decrease this dependence on 
home production since markets become easily accessible. 
Area devoted to soybean is not affected much: A 10% increase in travel time to 
the market decreases soybean area by 0.8%. To the extent that travel time to market 
represents the main source of variation in prices in the area, these results may suggest that 
cropping decisions in the area are not very responsive to markets. But it is important to 
refrain from such a conclusion. To assess responsiveness to markets it is important to 
conduct a household level analysis of behavior in the vein of Sadoulet et al. (1991). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are market failures in the region. In the absence of 
complete markets household level shadow prices should be estimated, which the data for 
this study does not allow. Secondly, some effects of remoteness are also captured by the 
dummy for NPR villages, which are on average further away from markets than APR 
villages. Finally, these results are estimates from cross-sectional data. To the extent that 
villages in the panel do not witness a significant change over time in travel time to 
markets, these results may indicate an important role of location of villages rather than 
sensitivity to travel time.  
For total agricultural land in a village, the effects of travel time remain small. A 
10% increase in travel time to the market increases agricultural land by 1.6%.  
This finding that travel time has modest effects on agricultural decisions in Forest 
Reserves of Chiang Mai is consistent with other studies of the region: Cropper et al. 
(1999) find that a 10% increase in road density leads to a 2% decrease in forest cover in 
North Thailand. Cropper et al. (2001) find that a 10% increase in travel time to the 
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market leads to a 2.4% decrease in forested area in the forest areas of North Thailand. 
Similarly in North-east Thailand, Panayatou (1991) finds that changes in road density 
have an insignificant impact. 
One policy conclusion from this is that road building may not have a deleterious 
effect on forest cover in this area, contrary to what has been found in other parts of the 
world. To the extent that roads provide increased access to services and markets, 
improving access within Forest Reserves might help to alleviate poverty without 
affecting forests. However this result should also be treated with caution. The random 
effects estimators in the study reflect primarily cross-sectional variation in the data. 
Differences in effects of transportation costs could thus be picking up differences 
between location of villages.  
Property Rights
In this study, I make a distinction between NPR villages and APR villages. It is 
important to make this distinction: villages with no secure property rights are likely to be 
more remote and poorer than villages that have ambiguous property rights. However the 
importance of this distinction in affecting agricultural decisions is mixed.  
Two important effects in the study are that villages with no property rights are 
less likely to grow soybean and are likely to cultivate their land less intensively (being in 
an NPR village reduces intensity of cultivation by 71 percentage points). However 
magnitudes of impact of the two main variables—travel time and population—on 
cropping decisions are not very different for the two groups of villages. Particularly, 
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travel time to market has a negligible effect on upland rice cultivation and agricultural 
land in NPR villages.  
The mixed evidence is explained by the fact that the distinction between the two 
groups with respect to their property rights is not sharp. The data do not allow a sharper 
distinction. Villages with no property rights (NPR villages) are located in the same region 
as those with ambiguous property rights and are likely to behave similarly. First stage 
results also show that the two groups of villages do not differ significantly in their use of 
BAAC supplied credit. Feder et al. (1988) in their study of Forest Reserves in Northeast 
Thailand show that villages without secure property rights are less likely to invest in land. 
This may help to explain the significantly lower intensity of cultivation in NPR villages. 
They also conclude that secure property rights allow better access to credit. I am not able 
to draw such a conclusion from my study mainly because of the fuzzy distinction 
between the two groups, and, because such a conclusion merits a more detailed model of 
credit supply and demand. The distinction between the two groups may also be muted 
because residents may have different perceptions about their claims to land they occupy 
according to their length of residence (see for example Lanjouw and Levy (2002)). But 
my data does not allow this distinction. 
6.3 The role of crops
A more detailed study of agricultural expansion should be based on a dataset that 
allows the study of household behavior. Particularly it would be useful to examine the 
effect that individual crop areas have on total agricultural land and the effect of the latter 
on deforestation. Both these links are qualitatively established in case-studies of the 
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region and I assume them in this dissertation. However, using strong qualitative 
information from the region, it is possible to reach some further conclusions regarding the 
role of crops. 
Anecdotal evidence in Thailand shows that North Thailand witnessed a large 
increase in deforested area. One of main reasons for this is claimed to be agricultural 
expansion. A large literature also supports the view that upland rice area grew at a rapid 
rate during the study period (ASB, (2004)). Most of these findings are supported by the 
study: Area devoted to upland rice grew by 14% during 1986-1996 in the study villages. 
Agricultural area also grew by 1.8% during the period. To the extent that both these 
occurred concomitantly, and that upland rice cannot be grown on land devoted to other 
crops, the study suggests that it may be important to do a more detailed analysis of the 
factors affecting rice cultivation is detrimental to the environment. Upland rice is grown 
on mountain slopes with thin soil and low fertility, i.e., on land that is otherwise 
agriculturally marginal and undisturbed. Upland rice also has a much larger surrounding 
ecosystem compared to paddy rice and soybean. Paddy rice and soybean can be 
intercropped and are usually grown on agriculturally important land. Upland rice cannot 
be grown with other crops. Upland rice is grown on lands which are then deserted after 
two or three crops have been harvested. Understanding factors that may affect the 
growing of upland rice is thus important. One such factor suggested by the study is travel 
time to market. A reduction in travel time to market reduces the area devoted to upland 
rice.  Along with not affecting forest cover, a reduction in travel time to market may also 
help to reduce the incentive to adopt and cultivate upland rice. Another policy may be to 
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encourage crops that allow multiple rotation in the lowlands, and thus reduce pressures 
that push the agricultural frontier to mountain slopes that are easily erodable. 
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7 Appendices   
7.1 A Review of the literature on agriculture led deforestation
In this Appendix  I discuss studies that have examined the role of 
transportation costs and population in determining agricultural practices and 
deforestation. The underlying assumption of this dissertation is that agriculture is one 
of the main, but not the only driver of deforestation in Forest Reserves. It is relevant 
to examine other studies that analyze the causes of land use and deforestation.  
The first seminal study on the effect of population on tropical agriculture was 
done by Esther Boserup in 1965. In the study, Boserup asserted that the main effect of 
a change in population was on the intensity of cultivation, defined as the frequency of 
cropping. Population increases lead, in the long run  to a shift, from extensive to more 
intensive systems of land use. The other contribution she made to the literature was, 
classifying systems of land use, to show increasing intensity. These were: Forest-
fallow cultivation, Bush-fallow cultivation, short-fallow cultivation, annual cropping 
and multiple cropping. Under the forest-fallow system for instance, plots of land are 
cleared in forests each year and then planted on, for two years. Then land is left 
fallow for a number of years sufficient for forests to re-appear. Multiple cropping – 
the most intensive form of land use – occurs when the same plot of land bears two or 
more successive crops per year. The fallow period is non-existent. 
Both variables – population and transportation costs – have been cited in the  
literature examining agricultural expansion although few studies examine their impact 
in Thailand. Cropper, Griffiths and Mani (1999) and Panayatou (1991) are especially 
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relevant since both examine the impacts of population and transportation costs in 
Thailand. Cropper et al. (1999) use province-level data to estimate an equilibrium 
model of land clearing between 1976 and 1989. They find that population density had 
a large impact on land clearing in North Thailand. Road density (measured as length 
of road network divided by provincial area) however has no statistically significant 
impact on cleared area. Panayatou (1991) and Panayatou and Sungsuwan, (1989), 
support these conclusions in their study of population impact in Thailand. Panayatou 
and Sungsuwan highlight population growth as the most important driver of land use 
change, using state level panel data for the period 1962-1989.47 Explanatory 
variables include agricultural prices, provincial income, population density and road 
density. They find the elasticity of forest cover with respect to road density is -0.11. 
However, this effect is probably biased, because the cost of access is also capitalized 
in land and timber prices, which are also found to be significant.  
In the larger agricultural land use literature, there are broadly two types of 
studies in the literature that examine agricultural land use.  
Population and Transport Costs in Spatially Explicit Models 
 
47 It is interesting that there are several studies – albeit not in the applied economics literature – that 
assert that roads have had no impacts or very little impact in Thailand. Jones (1973) while studying the 
impact of improved primary highways, finds little impact on agricultural area in Northern Thailand and 
concludes that “most indicators continued much as they had earlier”. He also concludes the same in 
Southern Thailand “a greatly improved primary highway appeared not to have altered a declining 
economy”. Howe and Richards (1984) confirm their support (pp 158) to say that there seems “…no 
consistent pattern of response to the presence of new or significantly improved roads, either trunkline 
highways or feeder roads…”. They also comment on a baseline impact of roads, over and above which 
there seems little incremental impact “…No doubt the efficacy of peasant farming is dominated by 
factors other than the economic cost of farm-to-market transport, provided there is some kind of road 
available at the time of year it is needed.” 
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The first of these follow Von Thunen (1965), and use a reduced form 
econometric model to explain and predict land use at the level of a pixel, assuming 
that land will be devoted to its most profitable use. This group of studies (see for 
example Chomitz and Gray, (1996); Nelson and Hellerstein (1996); Pfaff, (1997); 
Cropper, Puri and Griffiths (2001); Deininger and Minten (1996); and, Muller (2004)) 
customarily use physiographic information at the level of the pixel, such as soil type, 
elevation, slope to explain land use. Data is derived from a compendium of spatially 
explicit layers. Additional information such as population (usually measured at a 
much coarser level of aggregation, such as district or county or province) is used 
along with a complex measure of access to the market. This access variable is usually 
weighted for road presence, road quality and location of population centers (a proxy 
for market locations). The results from such models are fairly straight forward and 
explicit: Steeper slopes, higher elevations and bad soil reduce the probability that land 
is converted to agriculture (from forest); Commercial crops are likely to be grown 
closer to markets, while subsistence crops are grown further away; and, higher 
population is correlated with a higher probability of the pixel of land being cultivated.  
Chomitz and Gray (1996), in one of the first analyses to employ farm-gate 
prices to this end, find evidence of strong declines in farm-gate price, and hence 
deforestation, with increasing distance from the road and with increasing on-road 
distance to market. They find each of these declines to be notably more pronounced 
for commercial than for semi-subsistence farming. They estimate a multinomial logit 
model for a spatially explicit GIS data set, and exclude forested areas in National 
Parks and Sanctuaries.  Specifically they find that roads are much more important for 
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commercial farming than for semi-subsistence farming. Plots of land that are 
otherwise well-suited to agriculture (moderate slope, moderate nitrogen and suitable 
soils) and located on a road have a probability of 63% of being cultivated (49% of 
which is the probability of being used for commercial cultivation, and 13% is the 
probability of being used for semi-subsistence cultivation). As distance to the road 
increases, the probability that land is being used for commercial cultivation reduces 
much more than the probability that the land is used for semi-subsistence cultivation. 
At a distance of 10 km from the road, the likelihood that a plot of land is cultivated is 
negligible (about 2%).  
Nelson and Hellerstein (1997) analyze the impact of access on different land 
uses using raster-based spatially explicit data for Mexico. They use three different 
measures of access: access of plot the nearest road, access to the nearest population 
center and access to the nearest small population center or village.  Using a 
multinomial logit model that weights the attributes of neighboring pixels to account 
for spatial dependence, they find, as predicted, that increasing the cost of access to the 
road and to a village increases the probability that a pixel remains forested. A fall in 
costs increases the probability that the plot is devoted to crop area.  
Most of these studies also find that physiographic variables have stronger 
explanatory power than socio-economic variables in predicting land use although 
socio-economic variables such as population are measured at a much coarser level. 
Most studies (with two exceptions – Muller (2004); and, Cropper, Griffiths and Mani 
(1992)) use a single cross-section dataset for examining land use.  
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To my knowledge there is only one other study that examines factors 
impacting land use within forest reserve areas: Nelson, Harris and Stone (2001) 
combine spatial and institutional analysis. They mainly analyze whether providing 
land users with secure property rights results in less deforestation in the Darien 
province of Panama. They estimate a multinomial logit model with spatial and socio-
economic data using land use maps for 1997 and raster grids of 500 x 500 meters. 48 
Although no economic activity is supposed to take place within the study area, the 
study finds that farmers have been able to encroach into these areas and clear them 
for agriculture. Other than geographic variables like slope of plot, elevation and soil 
quality, they use protection dummies and land use adjusted cost of travel to 
instrument for socio-economic variables. Their main conclusion is that protecting an 
area has not reduced the likelihood of deforestation. However the study does not 
provide any other implications for policy:  Since it mainly uses geographical variables 
to explain the likelihood of deforestation, it does not provide any other tools to policy 
makers such as what demographic or socio-economic category of households are 
more likely to undertake deforestation related activities. They also do not differentiate 
between land uses such as annuals and perennials – both of which have different 
implications for soil fertility and subsequent land quality.  Neither is the study able to 
make any conclusions about intensity of land use.  
There are two other studies that examine the role of access. Deininger and 
Minten (1996) and Cropper, Griffiths and Puri (2001) use impedance weighted access 
 
48 Although the study mentions a land use map for 1987 and present a transition matrix for it, they do 
not estimate the probability of transition. Only data for land use in 1997 is used.  
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as an explanatory variable to measure the effect of access on deforestation. The effect 
of road building on the probability that a pixel is cleared, within a protected area, 
obviously diminishes, but remains significant. Deininger and Minten (1996) use 
cross-sectional data for two Mexican states and use a ‘protected area’ dummy to 
identify pixels located in protected areas. Cropper, Puri and Griffiths (2001) similarly 
use cross-sectional data for Northern Thailand, and infer that plots of land located 
within protected areas in Thailand, are as likely to be cleared as those outside, if one 
accounts for the fact that plots located within protected areas are less fertile. The 
study assumes protected area (which include both, National Parks and Wildlife 
Sanctuaries) boundaries and locations to be endogenous. Additionally, the study finds 
that plots of land located within Wildlife Sanctuaries – that are more effectively 
protected from encroachers than National Parks are – are less likely to be deforested. 
The elasticity of population density in forest areas, measured at the means of 
explanatory variables is 0.15, the elasticity of cost of impedance weighted travel is -
0.24.  Effectively this means that doubling population density within forest areas, 
from an average of 40 persons per square kilometer, increases the probability of 
clearing, from 0.15 to 0.18. The impact of travel costs is higher. Bringing a pixel 
closer to a paved road by 1.5 kms increases the probability of clearing by 5%. Both  
studies group different non-forest land uses into one category, ‘cleared’, thus ignoring 
the different motivations that may affect different land uses. Both these studies use 
primarily plot level characteristics (other than population which is measured at the 
district/municipio level) to infer the likelihood that plots of land are cleared.  
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The advantage of these studies is that all the explanatory variables are truly 
exogenous and study estimates are not biased by possible endogeneity. On the other 
hand, although these models are fairly rigorous, one disadvantage is that they are ill-
suited to providing insights into how socio-economic factors can affect agricultural 
decisions. An exception is a study by Deininger and Minten (1996), in Mexico, that  
concludes that poverty has a significant impact on the likelihood that a plot will be 
cleared and consequently cautions that statements such as “roads cause deforestation” 
may be an exaggeration.  
This limitation, that most studies using the pixel as the level of analysis are 
unable to explain the role of socio-economic characteristics in explaining 
deforestation, is alleviated, to some extent, by studies using the agricultural household 
as their main unit of analysis. These studies use socio-economic variables to analyze 
the role of main determinants with respect to the household. 
Population and Transport costs in Agricultural Household Models.  
The role of population has been famously discussed by Boserup (1965) in her 
classic exposition of agricultural practices in Asia. Boserup laid out the fundamentals 
of agricultural expansion in under-developed and developing countries. Her main 
thesis was to emphasize the importance of population in determining the intensity of 
cultivation (and frequency of fallow). 
Studies that consider the subject of agricultural expansion often tend to 
concentrate on the role of population but ignore the role of market access. The role of 
population is fairly straight-forward: An increase in population should lead to an 
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increase in the demand for agricultural land. The magnitude of this effect depends on 
other counter-vailing attributes. Thus if the increase in population is absorbed by the 
manufacturing or the services sector, agricultural expansion is expected to be modest. 
Effects on the agricultural frontier are also not straight-forward if labor mobility is 
low or markets are not well developed.  
Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1996) in their study of factors affecting the 
agricultural frontier, define three types of agricultural households, depending on their 
objective functions. These are: ‘subsistence households’ – or households that aim to 
only achieve an exogenously specified consumption level; ‘perfect market 
households’ or households that face complete and perfectly functioning markets; and, 
households that face imperfect markets. Implicit in this typology is the assumption 
that transportation costs are exogenously imposed on households.6
It is instructive to see the implications of transportation costs and population 
changes in studies that use this typology: 
The subsistence household model is frequently used for households that are 
known to be remote from markets. In these models, as productivity of agricultural 
land increases (diminishes), households reduce (increase) the amount of land 
cultivated. Similarly as prices of agricultural commodities increase, the amount of 
land cleared increases. In these models, since the production target is to meet an 
exogenously determined consumption goal, the per hectare labor intensity is 
endogenous and since each farmer clears the same amount of land, the total amount 
of land cleared is a function of population which is assumed to be exogenous. A fall 
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in transport costs reduces the amount of area devoted to agriculture if it reduces costs 
of inputs. Outputs are not, typically, marketed. These models follow Boserup (1965) 
in that agricultural area, intensity of cultivation, frequency of fallow, are all 
determined by the farmer’s desired consumption goal, and not by the market.  
The subsistence model paradigm is used by, for example, Dvorak (1992) and 
Godoy et al. (1997). Godoy et al. (1997) examine a sample of 200 Amerindians (from 
Honduras) to assess the impact of roads and population on deforestation, using a 
Tobit model. The dependent variable is area of primary forest cleared. An important 
feature of the study is its discussion of the “continuum of integration to the market” 
which is a function of villages attributes. Villages thus differ in their responses to 
policy, depending on where they lie on this ‘autarky-market continuum’49, which in 
itself is a function of presence of physical infrastructure such as roads.50 However the 
‘autarky-market continuum’ or indeed the different effects of varying degrees of 
market access, are also not discussed further. Instead income levels are hypothesized 
to be correlated with access and accordingly, different effects on agricultural land. 
Income levels evolve as part of the household’s ‘life-cycle’. The life-cycle hypothesis 
used by the study, postulates that at low levels of income (and at relatively remote 
locations), households have primitive technology and clear small plots of land. Asset 
accumulation takes place by tree planting and leaving land fallow. At higher incomes, 
associated with better access to markets, households invest in annual crops. At the 
third level, still richer households reduce land clearing because of greater off-farm 
 
49 The economics literature generally discusses as a bifurcation – presence, or, absence of markets. 
50 They assume road placement and construction to be exogenous. 
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labor mobility and larger investments in productivity enhancing technologies. Their 
results are not very robust since these suffer from small sample limitations. Further 
though they present the ‘life-cycle hypothesis’ of forest clearing, they don’t test it.51 
The second type of models considered in the context of the agricultural 
households, are the Chayanovian models, named after a Russian Economist of the 
1960s. These assume that farmers maximize utility functions, which is a function of 
consumption and leisure. Similar to subsistence models, farmers make trade-offs 
between consumption and leisure.52 Models assume that labor markets are not perfect. 
So market prices do not guide the trade-off between consumption (labor) and leisure, 
and there is both, an income effect and a substitution effect. Thus when prices or 
agricultural productivity increase, a farmer desires more leisure (the income effect) 
but also increases the amount of cleared area, since per hectare output has increased 
(the substitution effect).  
Angelsen (1996) analyzes subsistence and Chayanovian models where labor is 
the only input, technology is specified and production costs are related to the time 
spent clearing plots of land. Transportation costs enter this study via a measure of the 
time taken to reach plots cleared. He uses a Stone Geary type of utility function with 
a pre-specified subsistence consumption target. For farmers that derive a large part of 
their income from agriculture, the impact on leisure (the income effect) is dominant. 
Thus increases in output farm gate prices (which may be generated by a fall in 
 
51 They also use the household head’s perception of the definition of primary forest, which respondents 




transport costs) or increases in agricultural productivity, lead to a decrease in the 
amount of land cultivated – as in the case of subsistence models. At higher levels of 
income, farmers are less willing to give up leisure. Importantly, an increase in 
population leads to a less than proportional rise in amount of land cleared, because 
farmers have to walk further. A decrease in transportation costs, on the other hand, 
leads to more cleared forest since the income and the substitution effects work in the 
same direction.  
The third type of household model – the perfect markets model – assumes 
agricultural households are price takers and prices are exogenously specified. These 
models assume that labor markets exist and are perfect. Thus labor is perfectly mobile 
and individuals can always find employment at the existing wage rate. Implicitly 
population is endogenous in these models.53 There are very few models of 
agricultural households that examine land area decisions and assume markets to be 
perfect (see for example, Dwayne, (1992); Lopez, (1984)). This is because small-
holder farmers are usually located in under-developed remote areas, and it is 
extremely unlikely that farmers face complete and perfect markets. An exception is a 
study of agricultural households by Deininger and Minten (1996a). Deininger and 
Minten model households that divide their time between on-farm activities and wage 
labor but they don’t hire labor to work on the farm.54 Depending on the constraint that 
 
52 And consumption is a function of (family) labor.  
53 Since households maximize utility and markets are perfect, it implies that production decisions are 
separate from consumption decisions. 




is binding, this model could be seen as either a Chayanovian model or a perfect 
markets model. If the hiring constraint is not binding, households are net sellers of 
labor and this can be seen as the typical open economy/ perfect model model. On the 
other hand, if the hiring constraint is binding, then the model is Chayanovian.  
The main message to take away from this section is that households are 
modeled differently depending on how well they are integrated with input or output 
markets and integration with markets is usually measured by transportation costs. 
Effects of changes in population and transportation costs on agricultural decisions 
vary depending on whether households operate within perfects markets 
(transportation costs have most impact) or if they operate in autarky (population 
changes have most impact), or if they operate somewhere in the middle of this 
continuum (the relative weights matter). This discussion also underscores the 
importance of measuring magnitudes of impacts of these two factors on agricultural 
decisions. 
Transport costs in ‘Missing’ Markets 
More recently these two broad motivations for household decision-making – 
one household wanting to achieve a subsistence consumption target and another 
wanting to maximize profits – has been re-interpreted and re-cast in the ‘missing 
markets’ paradigm (Sadoulet and DeJanvry, (1995)). This paradigm avers that all 
households are profit maximizers. But, one of the reasons that some households do 
not participate in markets (markets are thus ‘missing’), is that difficult or lack of 
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physical access causes high transaction costs.55 These transaction costs include not 
just search costs, bargaining costs and other costs that are not priced by the market 
but also the cost of transportation that also exacerbate them. Thus most studies use 
transportation costs as a proxy for transaction costs (See for example, Minten and 
Kyle (1999); Jacoby (2000); and Puri (2001a, 2001b)). Transportation costs lower 
(raise) the effective price for the seller(buyer), compared to his shadow price, and 
depending on how large the ‘acceptable’ band is, households choose to participate or 
not, in markets.  
One implication of this is that households that are typically perceived by the 
outsider as being insensitive to market prices or uninterested in achieving higher 
levels of consumption/utility, may not be as insensitive. In Africa, De Janvry, 
Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) find the elasticity of peasant supply response of cash 
crops is 0.18% (implying a very low response). Peasants treat food consumption as a 
necessity and subsistence production is undertaken to hedge against the possibility of 
income shocks. A positive income shock also does not alleviate this (perceived) low 
response. This is explained by most economists as an increased desire for leisure and 
an inability to hire non-family labor. But once the authors account for shadow prices, 
the results are different: Increases in output response come mainly from an increased 
use of fertilizers. The study finds that shadow prices of food and labor increase by 
8.8% and 9.3% respectively in response to cash crop price increases. Peasants for 
 
55 Missing markets in labor (Fafchamps, (1993)), for food (De Janvry (1991); Onamo, (1998)), credit 
(Eswaran and Kotwal (1996)); Rosensweig and Wolpin (1993)) and insurance (Bromley and Chavas 
(1988)) have been explored variously. 
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their part see themselves as responding sharply to external incentives, although this is 
not seen by outsiders.  
Although with the available data, I cannot estimate subjective shadow prices, 
one result of the missing markets discussion is important: Households as a whole 
cannot be characterized as subsistence oriented or operating in perfect markets. 
Rather goods produced and bought/sold are individually characterized as either ‘for 
subsistence’ or ‘for the market’ or indeed as both. Thus agricultural goods become 
differentiated depending on their shadow values, and, transportation costs and market 
prices. Whether a good is produced for subsistence (i.e. the household produces the 
good but does not sell it) or for the market (the household produces the good and sells 
all of it) or partly consumes it and partly sells it, is determined not only by the shadow 
price of the good (to the household) but also the market price of the agricultural good. 
Transportation costs are one of the main reasons that market prices and shadow prices 
diverge and agricultural product differentiation occurs. Thus one good may be 
consumed as a staple (a necessity, with low market supply responses) while another 
may be a luxury. This implication has been hitherto ignored in the literature. 
Transport Costs in Agricultural Crop Choice and Area 
Studies that use the pixel as the unit of analysis are discussed in Section 1.3.1. 
This section discusses impacts of transportation costs, using the agricultural 
household as a decision making unit. Studies presented in this section underscore the 
role of transportation costs in affecting crop choice and decisions to participate in the 
market. Overall, transportation costs increase the intermediate costs to farmers and 
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reduce farm gate prices for sellers, while increasing their prices for inputs. This 
affects households decisions to participate in the market (see for example, Stifel, 
Minten and Dorosh (2003), Jacoby (2000); Minten and Kyle (1999); Fafchamps and 
Shilpi (2003); Puri (2001b)); and, the mix of crops they grow (Omamo, (1998); Goetz 
(1992); DeShazo and DeShazo (1995); Lendleton and Howe (2000), Vance and 
Geoghan (1997); and, Chomitz and Gray (1996)). 
The genesis of the literature studying the impact of transport costs on crop 
mix is also Von Thunen’s (1965) study. Von Thunen suggests that differences in crop 
choice can be attributed to transport costs alone. (He assumes homogeneous soil 
fertility.) He shows that farther farmers are more likely to shift from growing 
perishable cash crops such as vegetables, to growing crops that are more hardy such 
as staples and pulses – that can be stored.  
Using these insights, Stifel, Minten and Dorosh (2004) study productivity and 
agricultural production in Madagascar, and confirm that there is a decline in land area 
devoted to vegetables, associated with greater isolation. However they also find that 
staples (the most important of which is rice) and pulses also decline in land area. This 
is because in more isolated areas, more land is devoted to industrial and export crops 
such as vanilla, cloves and coffee.  Similarly Minten and Kyle (1999) examine the 
effect of distance and road quality on food collection in the former Zaire and contend 
that road infrastructure is one of the main determinants of food price variation. Road 
quality, which has a large impact on access, has a significant impact on farm gate 
prices. They also conclude that margins earned by intermediate traders increase with 
worsening road quality.  
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Omamo (1998) shows that presence of transportation induced transaction 
costs can explain the seemingly ‘inefficient’ cropping choices of farmers in Kenya 
where greater resources are devoted to low-yielding food crops, instead of cash crops 
that have higher market returns. Omamo argues that one of the main reasons that 
agricultural households diversify their crops is that diversification reduces transaction 
costs.56 Despite low yields associated with mixed crop strands (compared to pure crop 
strands) small-holder farmers decide to grow mixed crops because of high transaction 
costs associated specialization (pure strands). These transaction costs are often 
ignored by studies who thus undervalue purchased goods and overvalue goods sold. 
External observers therefore perceive the cropping decisions of these small holders as 
irrational. He uses a GAMS (Generalized Algebraic Modelling System) to simulate a 
linear programming production system and parametrizes it using data from East 
Africa.57 
Goetz (1992) uses transport costs to model market participation and quantity 
decisions conditional on participation using cross-sectional data for 142 households in 
South-eastern Senegal. His principal thesis is that high fixed transaction costs result 
in failure to participate in markets. He uses a selectivity framework (bivariate probit 
specification) to model households switching between participation and non-
 
56 Omamo draws from Douglas North’s ‘tension between specialization and transaction costs’ as the 
mainstay of his hypothesis. 
57 Contrary to this, Perz (2004) claims that agricultural diversity leads to higher and more stable 
incomes among remote small-holders in the Amazon, while ensuring the same level of forest cover. 
Although he does not examine the impact of market access on participation and productivity amongst 
remote farmers, he hints at these considerations when he concludes that diversification stabilizes 




participation, thus correcting for bias caused by the exclusion of unobservable 
variables affecting both discrete and continuous decisions. He finds that improved 
market information increases the probability of participation by sellers, and access to 
technology increases quantities transacted by market participants.  
Lendleton and Howe (2000) measure the extent of market participation use an 
array of variables in their household level study of agricultural decisions in Bolivia. 
These include distance to the road, distance to closest major town and the ratio of 
future prices to present prices. Since they do not have a panel dataset, they cannot 
measure the change in transaction costs. They assume that village prices reflect 
market prices plus transaction costs. Thus a change in price may indicate a change in 
transaction costs, or, a change in price at the central market (although that change 
would be the same across all villages). Thus the relative difference in change in prices 
reflects village specific characteristics – most of which, they assume, is derived from 
the difference in the degree of market integration. They use the ratio of future prices 
to present prices for bananas (a cash crop in this region) as a unitless proxy for the 
rate of market integration. However they do not define market integration and 
although they find that “an increasing rate of market integration leads to a large and 
significant increase in forest clearance”, their result remains unexplained. They also 
find that distance to the road has a negative impact on forest clearance while distance 




7.2 Appendix: Variable List for Thailand Study
Variable  Description     Pg. on    Years missing 
 Q’aire     
id  Village ID (8 digit, 1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.) 1  
 1.2. changwat name, 3.4. amphoe name, 
 5.6 tambon name, 7.8 village name          
hh  No. of households in village   1       
male  No. of males in village   1     
fem  No. of females in village   1     
adlmale No. of males aged 18-50 in village  1     86, 88 
adlfem  No. of females aged 18-50 in village  1     86, 88 
adltot  No. of people aged 18-50 in village  1     
fordum whether village is situated in reserved 1        
 forest area (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
ag_w2r Does water supply for agr. use adequately  3     
 supply water for second rice farming? 
 (1=not enough, 2=enough, 3=N.A., i.e. 
don’t use water) 
ag_wsc Does water supply for agr. use adequately  3     
 supply water for short-lived upland crops? 
 (1=not enough, 2=enough, 3=N.A., i.e. 
don’t use water) 
ag_wlc  Does water supply for agr. use adequately  3     
 supply water for long-lived upland crops? 
 (1=not enough, 2=enough, 3=N.A., i.e. 
don’t use water) 
ag_wve Does water supply for agr. use adequately  3     
 supply water for vegetables/flower gardens? 
 (1=not enough, 2=enough, 3=N.A., i.e. 
don’t use water) 
ag_wfr  Does water supply for agr. use adequately  3     
 supply water for fruit orchards? 
 (1=not enough, 2=enough, 3=N.A., i.e. 
don’t use water) 
eledum Is there electric supply in village?   4     
 (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
elehh  If yes, how many households?  4     
eledis  If no, how far in kms is village located  4     
 from nearby village with power supply?   
no_tv:  no. of TVs in the village   4 
roddum Is there any through road from village 4    
to district? (1=No, 2=yes.)       
Rddnum         How many routes connect the village   5 
 to the district? 
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The most convenient routes from the village 
to the district can be divided into (kms each):   
aspdkm asphalt/concrete     5 
dirdkm  dirt, or just like previous (good road) but 5 
without the top asphalt layer  
eardkm just plain earth road, or simple path 
cleared 
trdmin  How long does it generally take to travel 5     
 by most popular vehicle from district? 
 (not counting return trip, in minutes) 
romdum Is there any through road from village 5     
 to market? (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
rdmnum In case yes, how many routes are there? 6     
The most convenient routes from the village 
to the market can be divided into (kms each):   
aspmkm asphalt/concrete     5 
dirmkm dirt, or just like previous (good road) but 5 
without the top asphalt layer 
earmkm just plain earth road, or simple path 
cleared 
trmmin   How long does it generally take to travel 6     
 by most popular vehicle from village to 
 market (not counting return trip, in km)? 
hhpkp  No. of hhlds owning pickup trucks  6     
pkpnum: No. of pickup trucks in village  6     
hhmbk  No. of hhlds owning motorbikes  6     
mbknum: No. of motorbikes in village   6     
hhbck  No. of hhlds owning bicycles   6     
bcknum: No. of bicycles in village   6     
hhmct  No. of hhlds owning E-Tan/power cart 6     
mctnum: No. of E-Tan/power cart   6     
hhovh  No. of hhlds owning other vehicles  7     
ovhnum: No. of other vehicles in village  7     
prddum Are there any places for selling   7  86, 88,90
 input factors? (fertlizer, machinery,..)    
 (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
cemdum Are agr. products sold at central market? 7     86, 88,90 
 (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
sumdum Are agr. products sold at Sunday market? 7     86, 88,90 
 (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
cosdum Are agr. products sold at Co-op store? 7     86, 88,90 
 (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
fagdum Are agr. products sold at store of  7     86, 88,90 
 Farmers’ Assocn. Group (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
oshdum Are agr. products sold at other places? 7     86, 88,90 
 (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
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Ftydum What do most villagers use as fuel for  8     
 cooking?    
 (1=gas, 2=charcoal or fuelwood) 
Fdum  If villagers use wood and charcoal, do they 8     
 buy it or prepare it themselves? 
 (1=buy, 2=prepare themselves) 
Flotkm  If prepare themselves, how far is woodlot 8     
 from village in km? 
Ftrmin  if prepare themselves, how long (in  8     
minutes) usually to get there, one way? 
Fredum If prepare themselves, is woodlot located 8      
 in reserve forest? (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
agrmem No. of villagers who are members of  8     86 
 agricultural cooperative** 
agrpro  No. of villagers who are members of  8     86 
 agricultural occupational group**   
crsvdu  Do villagers use credit from “Saving for  8      
 Production group”? (1=No, 2=yes.) 
crcodu  Do villagers use credit from cooperatives? 8     
 (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
crbadu  Do villagers use credit from BAAC   8     
 (agricultural and cooperative bank)? 
 (1=No, 2=yes.) 
crbkdu  Do villagers use credit from commercial   8     
 banks? (1=No, 2=yes.) 
crpvdu  Do villagers use credit from private credit  8     86, 88,90 
 institution? (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
crgvdu  Do villagers use credit from Revolving   8     86, 88,90 
 Loan fund from government? (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
crmrdu  Do villagers use credit from businessmen/  8     
 merchants? (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
crotdu  Do villagers use credit from others?   8     
 (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
mildum Are there any rice mills in village?  8     
milnum If yes, how many are there?   8     
hhhag  How many households in this village do  
agricultural activities in the housing area  
for home consumption and only the  
surplus is sold (e.g. vegetables, fruits  
 and others)? *** 
hhagr  How many households earn a living  8  86, 88,90 
(occupation) by agriculture (e.g. rice  
growing, farming, orchard planting and  
others?) *** 
hhmnum no. of hhlds having more than one   9     86, 88,90 
 occupation      
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hhmincaverage income of such hhlds (baht/year) 9  86, 88,90 
hhsnum no. of hhlds having just one occupation 9     
hhsinc  average income of such hhlds (baht/year)   86, 88,90 
hhrnum no. of hhlds engaged in just rice farming 9     86, 88,90 
hhrinc  average income of such hhlds (baht/year) 9  86, 88,90 
hhpnum ????no. of hhlds engaged in just plantations/ 9  86, 88,90 
 upland cropping      86, 88,90 
hhpinc  average income of such hhlds (baht/year) 9     86, 88,90 
hhanum no. of hhlds engaged in just annual farming 9      86, 88,90 
hhainc  average income of such hhlds (baht/year) 9     86, 88,90 
hhfnum no. of hhlds engaged in just fishing  9     86, 88,90 
hhfinc  average income of such hhlds (baht/year) 9     86, 88,90 
hhonum no. of hhlds engaged in just one other agr. 9     86, 88,90 
 activity      
hhoinc  average income of such hhlds (baht/year) 9  86, 88,90  
hhgnum no. of hhlds engaged just in agriculture   92,94,96
 but not necessarily in only one kind of    
 (This appears only in 1986-1990 surveys. In    
 1992-1996 surveys this question is dropped, 
and instead replaced by (5) questions asking  
how many households are engaged (i) only in 
rice farming (hhrnum); (ii) only in plantations 
(hhpnum); (iii) only in annual farming (hhanum); 
(iv) only in fishing (hhfnum); (v) only in one other 
agricultural activity other than the above 4 (hhonum). 
 These variables are listed above.) 
hhcnum no. of hhlds engaged in just trading/  9   
 commerce 
hhcinc  average income of such hhlds (baht/year) 9     86, 88,90 
hhhnum no. of hlds engaged in just household 9     
 industry/cottage industry 
hhhinc  average income of such hhlds (baht/year) 9       
hhenum no. of hhlds engaged in just paid  9     
 employment/hired labor    
hheinc  average income of such hhlds (baht/year) 9     




 4=services e.g. taxis 
 5=skilled services, e.g. mechanic, 
 carpenter, bricklayer, plumber 
 6=miner 
 7=plantation worker (forestry worker) 




hh?num no. of hhlds engaged in other occupations  9   
 (but just one occupation)      
hh?inc  average income of such hhlds (baht/year) 9     86, 88,90 
agwage average wage for hired labor (baht)  9     86, 88 
 (per day) *For any type of activity, i.e. general 
 wage and not just agricultural wage. 
hh1rai  no. of hhlds with less than 1 rai of rice 9     
paddies  
hh5rai  no. of hhlds with 1-5 rais of rice paddies 9     
hh10rai no. of hhlds with 5-10 rais of rice paddies 9     
hh20rai no. of hhlds with 10-20 rais of rice paddies 9     
hh50rai no. of hhlds with 20-50 rais of rice paddies 9     
hhmorai no. of hhlds with more than 50 rais of rice 9     
 paddies 
r1frq  no. of hhlds growing rice once a year  9     86 
rn2frq  no. of hhlds growing rice twice a year 9     86 
 (but not every year) 
r2frq  no. of hhlds growing rice twice a year 9    86 
rm2frq  no. of hhlds growing rice more than   9     86 
 twice a year 
rkgrai  yield (harvest) per rai for majority of  9      
 hhlds in previous year, in kg 
rprba  average selling price of rice in baht  10    
 (per kg)  
rprsa  average selling price of rice in satang  
 (per kg) 
rmos  common method of selling rice  10     86 
 1=sell to cooperative 
 2=sell to rice-mill 
 3=advance selling (futures selling) 
 4=trader comes to buy rice 
 5=others 
ricesup  no. of hhlds using rice crops promoted  10     86 
 by government (improved variety) 
hhfenm no. of hhlds using fertilizer   10      
hhfeex  fertilizer expenses per household (baht/rai) 10  86 
hhfeap  common type of fertilizer application 10   
 1=natural (e.g. manure, compost, fresh vegetation) 
 2=chemical  
 3=mixture of natural and chemical 
*sr1c  most-grown short-lived crop   10     
 This is defined as crops with growing period 
4 months or less. It includes corn for  animals 
(only, not humans), mung beans, yellow 
beans (soybeans?), peanuts, ??, ??, a type of 
rice. It does not include vegetables like 
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pepper, garlic, cucumber, young corn, 
corn-on-cob, potatoes, sweet potatoes, taro, 
asparagus, tomato, and other vegetables.  
hhsr1c  no. of hhlds. growing this crop  10       
sr1frq  no. of times of farming/cropping per year 10     
sr1se  What season was crop grown?  10     
 1= rainy season (June to September) 
 2=dry season 
sr1rai  area used for each hhld’s crop (rai)  10      
sr1nga  area used for each hhld’s crop (ngan)  10     
sr1kgrai harvest/yield per rai in kg (for majority of 10     
 hhlds) 
sr1prba average selling price per kg (baht)  10     
sr1prsa  average selling price per kg (satang)  10     
sr1mos  most common method of selling  10      86 
 1=sell to cooperative 
 2=sell to mill or processing plant 
 3=advance selling (futures selling) 
 4=trader comes to buy crop 
 5=others 
sr1hhfe no. of hhlds using fertilizer   10     86 
sr1hhfex each hhlds’ expense on buying fertilizer 10     86 
sr1fert  most common method of fertilizer used 10     86 
 1=natural (e.g. manure, compost, fresh vegetation) 
 2=chemical  
 3=mixture of natural and chemical 
*sr2c  2nd most-grown short-lived crop  10 
 (See notes above for sr1c.)     
hhsr2c  no. of hhlds. growing this crop  10       
sr2frq  no. of times of farming/cropping per year 10     
sr2se  What season was crop grown?  10     
 1= rainy season (June to September) 
 2=dry season 
sr2rai  area used for each hhld’s crop (rai)  10      
sr2nga  area used for each hhld’s crop (ngan)  10     
sr2kgrai harvest/yield per rai in kg (for majority of 10     
 hhlds) 
sr2prba average selling price per kg (baht)  11     
sr2prsa  average selling price per kg (satang)  11     
sr2mos  most common method of selling  11      86 
 1=sell to cooperative 
 2=sell to mill or processing plant 
 3=advance selling (futures selling) 
 4=trader comes to buy crop 
 5=others 
sr2hhfe no. of hhlds using fertilizer   11     86 
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sr2hhfex each hhlds’ expense on buying fertilizer 11     86 
sr2fert  most common method of fertilizer used 11     86 
 1=natural (e.g. manure, compost, fresh vegetation) 
 2=chemical  
 3=mixture of natural and chemical 
*sr3c  3rd most-grown short-lived crop  11     
 (See notes above for sr1c.) 
hhsr3c  no. of hhlds. growing this crop  11       
sr3frq  no. of times of farming/cropping per year 11     
sr3se  What season was crop grown?  11     
 1= rainy season (June to September) 
 2=dry season 
sr3rai  area used for each hhld’s crop (rai)  11      
sr3nga  area used for each hhld’s crop (ngan)  11     
sr3kgrai harvest/yield per rai in kg (for majority of 11     
 hhlds) 
sr3prba average selling price per kg (baht)  11     
sr3prsa  average selling price per kg (satang)  11     
sr3mos  most common method of selling  11      86 
 1=sell to cooperative 
 2=sell to mill or processing plant 
 3=advance selling (futures selling) 
 4=trader comes to buy crop 
 5=others 
sr3hhfe no. of hhlds using fertilizer   11     86 
sr3hhfex each hhlds’ expense on buying fertilizer 11     86 
sr3fert  most common method of fertilizer used 11     86 
 1=natural (e.g. manure, compost, fresh vegetation) 
 2=chemical  
 3=mixture of natural and chemical 
*lr1c  most-grown long-lived crop   11     
 This is defined as a crop having growing 
period more than 4 months in length, but is 
still an annual crop, e.g. sugarcane, rice, 
tapioca, jute/seisel, cotton, pineapple, 
tobacco, ?? (some fibercrop), ??, big 
watermelon). Note that perennial crops or 
tree crops such as mangoes, fruits, coconuts, 
are not included. (See later for question on 
these, under “tre”.)   
hhlr1c  no. of hhlds. growing this crop  11       
lr1rai  area used for each hhld’s crop (rai)  11      
lr1nga  area used for each hhld’s crop (ngan)  11     
lr1kgrai harvest/yield per rai in kg (for majority of 11      
 hhlds)  
lr1prba  average selling price per kg (baht)  11      
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lr1prsa  average selling price per kg (satang)  11      
lr1mos  most common method of selling  11     86  
 1=sell to cooperative 
 2=sell to mill or processing plant 
 3=advance selling (futures selling) 
 4=trader comes to buy crop 
 5=others 
lr1hhfe  no. of hhlds using fertilizer   11     86 
lr1hhfex each hhlds’ expense on buying fertilizer 12     86 
lr1fert  most common method of fertilizer used 12     86 
 1=natural (e.g. manure, compost, fresh vegetation) 
 2=chemical  
 3=mixture of natural and chemical 
lr2c  2nd most-grown long-lived crop  12     
 (See notes above under lr1c for this.) 
hhlr2c  no. of hhlds. growing this crop  12       
lr2rai  area used for each hhld’s crop (rai)  12       
lr2nga  area used for each hhld’s crop (ngan)  12      
lr2kgrai harvest/yield per rai in kg (for majority of 12      
 hhlds) 
lr2prba  average selling price per kg (baht)  12     
lr2prsa  average selling price per kg (satang)  12     
lr2mos  most common method of selling  12      86 
 1=sell to cooperative 
 2=sell to mill or processing plant 
 3=advance selling (futures selling) 
 4=trader comes to buy crop 
 5=others 
lr2hhfe  no. of hhlds using fertilizer   12     86 
lr2hhfex each hhlds’ expense on buying fertilizer 12     86 
lr2fert  most common method of fertilizer used 12     86 
 1=natural (e.g. manure, compost, fresh vegetation) 
 2=chemical  
 3=mixture of natural and chemical 
*lr3c  3rd most-grown long-lived crop  12     
 (See notes above under lr1c for this.) 
hhlr3c  no. of hhlds. growing this crop  12       
lr3rai  area used for each hhld’s crop (rai)  12       
lr3nga  area used for each hhld’s crop (ngan)  12      
lr3kgrai harvest/yield per rai in kg (for majority of 12      
 hhlds) 
lr3prba  average selling price per kg (baht)  12     
lr3prsa  average selling price per kg (satang)  12     
lr3mos  most common method of selling  12      86 
 1=sell to cooperative 
 2=sell to mill or processing plant 
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3=advance selling (futures selling) 
 4=trader comes to buy crop 
 5=others 
lr3hhfe  no. of hhlds using fertilizer   12     86 
lr3hhfex each hhlds’ expense on buying fertilizer 12     86 
lr3fert  most common method of fertilizer used 12     86 
 1=natural (e.g. manure, compost, fresh vegetation) 
 2=chemical  
 3=mixture of natural and chemical 
hhfro  no. of hhlds with fruit orchards  12     
Note: This does not include households 
doing these activities on a small-scale basis, 
i.e. for their own consumption only or 
selling just surplus; it does not include  
households included in 9-5 of survey (hhhag).     
arfror  average orchard size per hhld (rai)  12     
arfron  average orchard size per hhld (ngan)  12     
incfro  average income (per hhld) from orchards 12     
hhveg  no. of hhlds with vegetable gardens  12    
Note: This does not include households 
doing these activities on a small-scale basis, 
i.e. for their own consumption only or 
selling just surplus; it does not include  
households included in 9-5 of survey (hhhag).     
arvegr  average veg. garden size per hhld (rai) 12     
arvegn  average veg. garden size per hhld (ngan) 12     
incveg  average income (per hhld) from veg. gdns. 12     
hhflo  no. of hhlds with flower gardens  13     
Note: This does not include households 
doing these activities on a small-scale basis, 
i.e. for their own consumption only or 
selling just surplus; it does not include  
households included in 9-5 of survey (hhhag).     
arflor  average flo. garden size per hhld (rai) 13     
arflon  average flo. garden size per hhld (ngan) 13     
incflo  average income (per hhld) from flo. gdns. 13     
*tre  Most common tree crop or perennial crop. 
These are crops with growing periods or 
cycles exceeding a year (not annual crops). 
They include coconut, pine, palm, coco, 
cashew nut, tea, teak, betel nut, rubber, 
eucalyptus, gum, other trees with rubbery 
sap like rubber and eucalyptus.  
hhflo  no. of hhlds engaged in commercial   13     
 crop plantation, of this crop      
arflor  average plantation size per hhld (rai)  13     
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arflon  average plantation size per hhld (ngan) 13     
incflo  average income (per hhld) from these 13     
 plantations 
*mengag Other than what has been mentioned,  14     
most-engaged-in agricultural activity. 
 These include bamboo planting, mushroom 
farming, silkworm rearing, jute, palm- 
tree type (?). 
hhmeng no. of hhlds in this activity   14     
incmen income from this activity, for majority 14     
 of hhlds 
*2engag Other than what has been mentioned,  14     
2nd most-engaged-in agricultural activity 
hh2eng no. of hhlds in this activity   14     
inc2en  income from this activity, for majority 14     
 of hhlds 
*3engag Other than what has been mentioned,  14     
3rd most-engaged-in agricultural activity 
hh3eng no. of hhlds in this activity   14     
inc3en  income from this activity, for majority 14     
 of hhlds 
dryagr  Is there dry season farming in village? 14     
(1=No, 2=Yes.) 
watdry  If yes, what is source of water?  14     
 1=surface water, e.g. pond, river 
 2=underground water, e.g. well 
 3=rainwater collected or leftover 
water from rice-farming 
hhdrya  no. of hhlds engaged in this type of farming 14     
incdry  gross income earned last year from this  14     
 activity 
pastan  Is there any public pasture for raising 14     
 animals in village? (1=No, 2=Yes.)  14     
arpast  If yes, how many rais?   14     
hhcow  no. of hhlds raising cows for sale  14     
inccow  income earned per hhld per year  14     
numcow number of cows in village   14     
hhcowg no. of hhlds breeding improved breeds,  14     
 promoted by gov’t (including artificial  
 fertilization) 
hhbuf  no. of hhlds raising buffaloes for sale  14     
incbuf  income earned per hhld per year  14     
numbuf number of buffaloes in village  14     
hhbufg  no. of hhlds breeding improved breeds,  14     




*1hhind most popular cottage/hhld industry  16       
1=cloth weaving/knitting 
 2=weaving but not from cloth and not from 
 fibers/fibrous materials 
 3=weaving from fibers/materials from 
 fibrous plants  
 4=food preservatives using vegetables 
 5=food preservatives using animal foods 
 6=making tools from metals (e.g. knives) 
 7=making tools from clay (e.g. bricks, pottery) 
 8=jewellery, cutting gems, etc. 
 9=sculpture 
 10=embroidery 
 11=househod products from wood/fibers, 
 e.g. rattan chairs 
 12=cement products 
 13=others 
nh1hin  no. of hhlds engaged in this activity  16     
inc1hi  income per hhld/yr from such industry 16     
sal1hi  common method of selling   16     
 1=retail 
 2=wholesale 
 3=both retail and wholesale 
 4=household hired out labor only; person 
 buying this labor bought the raw materials 
 and took care of selling final product 
mth1hi  month when activity begins   16     
end1hi  month when activity ends   16     
raw1hi  sources of raw materials   16     86, 88,90 
1=within village 
 2=from nearby source outside village 
 3=from faraway source outside village 
pkg1hi  packaging method    16     86, 88,90 
1=no packaging 
 2=use natural materials for packaging (e.g. palm leaves) 
 3=paper packaging 
 4=metal-based packaging 
 5=plastic packaging 
 6=foam packaging 
 7=glass bottles 
 8=others 
2hhind  2nd most popular cottage/hhld industry 17     
 (See 1hhind for codes.) 
nh2hin  no. of hhlds engaged in this activity  17     
inc2hi  income per hhld/yr from such industry 17     
sal2hi  common method of selling   17     
159 
 
(See sal1hi for codes.) 
mth2hi  month when activity begins   17     
end2hi  month when activity ends   17     
raw2hi  sources of raw materials   17     86, 88,90 
 (See raw1hi for codes.) 
pkg2hi  packaging method    17     86, 88,90 
 (See pkg1hi for codes.) 
3hhind  3rd most popular cottage/hhld industry 17     
 (See 1hhind for codes.) 
nh3hin  no. of hhlds engaged in this activity  17     
inc3hi  income per hhld/yr from such industry 17     
sal3hi  common method of selling   17     
 (See sal1hi for codes.) 
mth3hi  month when activity begins   17     
end3hi  month when activity ends   17     
raw3hi  sources of raw materials   17     86, 88,90 
 (See raw1hi for codes.) 
pkg3hi  packaging method    17     86, 88,90 
 (See pkg1hi for codes.) 
 
mthleis month when farmers begin to have   17  86 
leisure time 
endleis  month when leisure time ends  17  86 
 
hhoct  no. of hhlds owning animals for own  17     
 labor use (cattle) 
hhorct  no. of hhlds owning and also partly  17  86  
renting animals for own labor use (cattle)? 
hhrct  no. of hhlds not owning and having   17     86  
 to rent animals for own labor use (cattle) 
hhrct86 no. of hhlds renting animals for labor use,   88-96 
 but not specific about whether or not these    
hhlds also own some animals. This question 
appears only in the 1986 survey, and is  
replaced in later years by hhorct and hhrct 
(see above) 
ctrent  rent for the above (baht/year)   17     
 
hhost  no. of hhlds with small (2-wheel)  17     
 farm tractors 
hhorst  no. of hhlds renting small farm tractors 17     
strent  rent for the above (baht/year)   17     
 
hholt  no. of hhlds with large (4-wheel)  17     
 farm tractors 
hhorlt  no. of hhlds renting large farm tractors 17     
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ltrent  rent for the above (baht/year)   17     
 
useland What percentage of agricultural land  18       
 was used, of total agr. land in village? 
 1: Agland is >=90% of ldag 
 2: Agland is 75-90% of ldag 
 3: Agland is 50-74% of ldag 
 4: Agland is <50% of  ldag 
nuse?l  reason for land not being fully used  18     
 1=bad soil 
 2=not enough labor 
 3=not profitable 
 4=no knowledge of how to plant 
 5=not enough water 
 6=low-lying land, prone to flooding 
 7=others 
sqlprb  what is quality of soil?   18     
 1=no problem 
 2=not deep enough 
 3=too much sand 
 4=??? 
 5=no nutrients 
 6=too salty (Or Alkaline) 
 7=too sour (Or Acidic) 
 8=not enough topsoil (erosion) 
hhorgf  no. of hhlds using organic fertilizer  18     86, 88,90 
hhsltr  no. of hhlds increasing soil fertility by 18     86, 88,90 
 growing plants with nitrogen-fixing bacteria 
 
hhold  no. of hhlds who own land, and don’t 18     
 rent at all 
hhrpld  no. of hhlds partly owning and partly  18     
 renting land 
hhrald  no. of hhlds owning no land (having   18     
 to rent all) 
llds  For those referred to in last question, who 18 
mostly do they rent from? 
1=family/relatives 
 2=others (not family) in same village 
 3=others (not family) but from different village 
sizld  total land area in village   18     
ldtitle  Mostly the type of land certificates held is: 18     
 1=title ownership 
 2=Naw Saw 3 
 3=Naw Saw 3 Kaw 
 4=reserve (Appln for landuse) 
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5=Saw Kaw 1 
 6=Saw Taw Kae 
 7=other document 
 8=no document 
ldagr  Out of total land, how much land is   18     
 for agriculture? 
arffor  area set aside for community forest  18     86, 88,90 
arpfor  area of comm. forest already planted  18      86, 88,90 
 
comped no. of villagers who have completed  19      
 compulsory education but not beyond 
jhsch  no. of villagers who have completed   19     86 
 junior high school 
hsch  no. of villagers who have completed   19     
 high school 
mohsch no. of villagers who have education  19     
 beyond high school 
phsch  no. of villagers currently in junior   19     86, 88,90 
high school 
pmosch no. of villagers currently in high school 19     86, 88,90 
 
illitr  no. of those aged 14-50 who cannot  19     
 read or write their names 
 
vctrng  no. of villagers getting vocational training 19     86 
 
wkotmb Do any villagers work outside tambon? 22     
 (1=No, 2=Yes.) 
hhotmb no. of hhlds with members working   22     
 outside tambon 
wotmb  no. of women working outside tambon 22     86, 88 
motmb  no. of men working outside tambon  22     86, 88 
potmb  no. of people working outside tambon 22   
lagwot  lowest age of women working outside  22     86, 88 
 tambon 
hagwot highest age of women working outside  22     86, 88 
 tambon 
lagmot  lowest age of men working outside  22  86, 88 
 tambon 
hagmot highest age of men working outside  22  86, 88 
 tambon 
lagpot  lowest age of people working outside 22 
 tambon 





wktype common type of work    22      




 4=services e.g. taxis 
 5=skilled services, e.g. mechanic, carpenter, 
 bricklayer, plumber 
 6=miner or plantation/forestry worker 
 7=rubber  
 8=others 
wktpw  common type of work  for women  22     86, 88 
 (for jobs outside tambon) 
 (Codes same as for wktype.) 
wktpm  common type of work  for men  22     86, 88 
 (for jobs outside tambon) 
 (Codes same as for wktype.) 
wkpl  common job site    22     
 (for jobs outside tambon) 
 1=within ampho (county) 
 2=within changwat (province) 
 3=outside changwat but within same region 
 4=other regions (there are 5 regions in all in Thailand) 
 5=in Bangkok 
 6=in other countries 
wkplw  common job site for women   22     86, 88 
 (for jobs outside tambon) 
 (Codes as for wkpl.) 
wkplm  common job site for men   22     86, 88 
 (for jobs outside tambon) 
 (Codes as for wkpl.) 
wktime common time period of work   22     
 (for jobs outside tambon) 
 1=every day 
 2=in between rice planting (i.e. during off-season)  
 3=less than 3 months 
 4=more than 3 months 
wktmw common time period of work for women 22     86, 88 
 (for jobs outside tambon) 
 (Codes as for wktime.) 
wktmm common time period of work for men 22     86, 88 
 (for jobs outside tambon) 




7.3 Appendix: Summary of Agricultural Policy Measures in Thailand 
Measure Soybean Rice 
Farm Level   












Production or acreage controls  + 
Guaranteed price +  
Marketing and Processing level   
Intervention buying or price support program  + 






International trade   
Import tariff or surcharge + 
1977-now 
 
Import/export quota +*  
Export subsidies or taxes  + 
1950-86 
Non-tariff barriers +*  
Source: Adapted from Kajonwan Itharattana Market prospects for Upland crops in Thailand The 
CGPRT Working Paper series, November 1996. *The WTO commitment of import volume in 1995 for 
soybean was 278,947 tons with the tax rate of the import in quota of 5% and 88.1 % for the Non-quota 
import. 
Table 1: Summary of Policy Measures In Thailand for rice and soybean 
 
Commodity Price elasticity Income Elasticity 
Soybean   
Direct consumption -1.74 0.39 
soybean Meal -0.87 1.77 
soybean oil -0.62 1.23 
Rice   
rice and rice products -0.08 0.013 
Source: Kajonwan Itharattana Market prospects for Upland crops in Thailand The CGPRT 
Working Paper series, November 1996 




7.4 Appendix: Selectivity of Response
In the first step, I estimate four different models – a fixed effects model for the 
unbalanced panel, a fixed effects model for the balanced sub-panel, a random effects 
model for the complete unbalanced panel and finally, a random effects for the 
balanced sub-panel. I compare the coefficients on regressors. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are identical, uses the caveat of the Hausman test. The 
Hausman specification test is used to determine if the random effects model should be 
used or the fixed effects model. (It assumes that the specified model is correct.) Thus 
a rejection of the test (christened hereon the quasi-Hausman test) of equality of the 
coefficients from the balanced panel and the unbalanced panel is an indicator that 
there is some selectivity.  
The empirical model that I estimate for rice area is as follows: 
iti
K
k kitkitit uxricearea εβα +++= ∑ =10)log(  
where ricearea is the village level rice area measured in rai, 0α is the constant, 
kx is the vector of K exogenous explanatory variables, iu is the village level effect or 
the unobserved village level heterogeneity depending on specification, and itε is the 
idiosyncratic error term so that 0),(,)(,0)( 2 === εσεε uCovVarE itit for all villages 
i and all time periods t. Depending upon the specification, iu is allowed to be 
correlated with the other exogenous regressors (fixed effects estimation) or not 
(random effects estimation).  
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Estimating the equation from a balanced sub-panel only, may make the 
estimates inconsistent if selection is correlated with either of the error terms. Using 
this intuition, Nijman and Verbeek (1992) construct tests to test for non-random 
selection. For the fixed effects estimation,  
0}present isvillage|~{ =itE ε for all villages i and all time periods t
(1) 
is necessary and sufficient to prove that villages have been randomly selected. 
Random selection of villages will ensure consistency of fixed effects estimates. itε~ is 
the deviation of the idiosyncratic error term from its mean, where the mean is 
evaluated over the villages that are observed. Note that selection of villages can be 
dependent upon individual village effects here since the village level fixed effect 
iu does not enter the condition. Intuitively this makes sense because the village level 
effects capture this propensity to be selected.  
For random effects estimation model58 the condition for ensuring consistency 
is much stronger than the one for fixed effects estimation since the error term is 
different: 
 0}present isvillage|{ =+ itiuE ε for all villages i and all time periods t
(2) 
 
58 Following Woolridge (2002), the only distinction between a fixed effects estimation model and a 
random effects estimation model is, that in the former the village level effect is allowed to be 
correlated with other exogenous regressors in the estimation equation. In the Random effects 
estimation model, this is not allowed. This is the only distinction I make.  
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This condition requires the unobserved village level heterogeneity to also be 
independent of selection, along with the idiosyncratic error term. This condition is 
thus much stronger than the one required for fixed effects estimates to be consistent. 
Using these rules, tests may be constructed to test if villages have been non-randomly 





























where B represents the balanced sub-panel, U the unbalanced, complete panel 
dataset and FEβ̂ and REβ̂ represent the estimates from the fixed effects model and 
random effects model respectively. Hypothesis 1 ( 10H ) is a test of the equality of 
estimates from a fixed effects model applied to the complete panel and from the 
balanced sub-panel. With random selection, there should be no difference between 
these estimates. In the alternative, the estimates from the balanced sub-panel are 
inconsistent. Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 are tests for the random effects estimator. Notice 
that hypothesis 4, i.e. 40H is the traditional Hausman test of specification and 
hypothesis 3, i.e. 30H is the Hausman test applied to the balanced sub-panel. If all the 
null hypotheses are rejected then all the estimates are inconsistent and selection must 
be modeled.  
Results in the tables below show the following (results for the fourth null 
hypothesis are discussed in the main text). Table 1 below shows that one cannot reject 
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the null hypothesis that there is no systematic difference between fixed effects 
estimates from the balanced data (i.e. villages that are only present for all six years) 
are different from the Fixed effects estimates from the complete data. Table 2 shows 
that the random effects estimates for the two datasets are significantly different. Table 
3 shows that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no systematic 
difference between the fixed effects estimates and random effects estimates from the 
balanced dataset.  











data Difference S.E. 
BAAC credit use -1.3906 -1.6200 0.2294 1.0557 
NPR=1 x BAAC credit use 1.5278 0.3465 1.1813 1.3399 
Year -0.0128 -0.0036 -0.0092 0.0210 
NPR=1 x year -0.0328 0.0134 -0.0462 0.0433 
Log(Population) 0.4883 0.6694 -0.1810 0.1137 
NPR=1 x L(Population) 0.0897 -0.2776 0.3674* 0.1548 
L(Travel time to mkt.) -0.1006 -0.0398 -0.0608 0.0816 
NPR x L(Travel time) -0.0366 0.1040 -0.1406 0.1033 
Short run water dummy 0.0793 0.1032 -0.0239 0.0891 
NPR x SR water dummy -0.0209 -0.0369 0.0160 0.1138 
Proportion of adults 0.5717 0.5740 -0.0023 0.2428 
NPR x Propn. Of adults -0.9666 -0.5801 -0.3865 0.3694 
Acidic soil dummy -0.0097 -0.0517 0.0420 0.1014 
NPR x acidic soil dummy  0.1321 0.0136 0.1185 0.1725 
No. of observations 1349 2268   
Test for H0:Difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2 (14 df) 18.2    
Prob>Chi2 0.1977    
Table 1: Estimates from Fixed effects Instrumental variables regressions, 
comparing balanced data and complete data, Forest Reserve Villages, Thailand 
(1986-1996) 
 














BAAC credit use -0.3577 -1.3103 0.9526 0.6730 
NPR x BAAC credit use -0.7159 -1.1861 0.4702 0.6687 
NPR dummy -4.2295 -4.2599 0.0304 2.2521 
Year -0.0334 -0.0125 -0.0209 0.0121 
NPR x year 0.0418 0.0710 -0.0292 0.0319 
Log(Population) 0.5989 0.8121 -0.2132 0.0942 
NPR x L(Population) 0.2698 -0.1722 0.4420 0.1276 
L(Travel time to mkt.) -0.0039 -0.0329 0.0290 0.0800 
NPR x L(Travel time) -0.0501 0.1061 -0.1562 0.0926 
Short run water dummy 0.0458 0.0878 -0.0421 0.0593 
NPR x SR water dummy 0.1163 0.0354 0.0809 0.0790 
Proportion of adults 0.3947 0.4994 -0.1046 0.1472 
NPR x Propn. Of adults -0.8418 -0.2932 -0.5486 0.2393 
HYV rice dummy  3.2355 2.6736 0.5619 0.5452 
NPR x HYV rice dummy -1.0317 -1.8393 0.8076 0.5616 
Acidic soil dummy -0.1278 -0.1577 0.0299 0.0643 
NPR x acidic soil dummy  0.0891 -0.0306 0.1197 0.1412 
Test for H0:Difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2 (17 df)* 98.33    
Prob > chi2** 0.00    
* chi2(17)= (b-B)’(b-B)/[(V_b – V_B)]; ** (V_b – V_B) is not positive definite. 
Table 2: Comparison of Estimates from Random effects Instrumental variables 
regressions, from balanced data and complete data, Forest Reserve Villages, 
Thailand (1986-1996) 
 












data Difference S.E. 
BAAC credit use -1.3906 -0.3577 -1.0329 1.1840
NPR x BAAC credit use 1.5278 -0.7159 2.2437 0.8104
Year -0.0128 -0.0334 0.0206 0.0266
NPR x year -0.0328 0.0418 -0.0746 0.0033
Log(Population) 0.4883 0.5989 -0.1106 0.1564
NPR x L(Population) 0.0897 0.2698 -0.1801 0.2032
L(Travel time to mkt.) -0.1006 -0.0039 -0.0967 0.0306
NPR x L(Travel time) -0.0366 -0.0501 0.0135 0.0315
Short run water dummy 0.0793 0.0458 0.0335 0.0733
NPR x SR water dummy -0.0209 0.1163 -0.1372 0.0720
Proportion of adults 0.5717 0.3947 0.1769 0.1141
NPR x Propn. Of adults -0.9666 -0.8418 -0.1248
Acidic soil dummy -0.0097 -0.1278 0.1182 0.0890
NPR x acidic soil dummy  0.1321 0.0891 0.0430 .
Test for H0:Difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2 (14 df)* 20.88
Prob > chi2** 0.1048
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Table 3: Comparison of estimates from Fixed effects and Random Effects 
Instrumental variables regressions  for villages only present for all six years, 
Forest Reserve Villages, Thailand (1986-1996) 
 
7.5 Appendix: Testing for Item Non-response
Multinomial logit model results 
 Short Run Crops Long Run Crops 
Travel Time to Market -0.004 (-2.91)** 0.005 (4.54)** 
Log(Population) 0.89 (5.7)** 0.25 (1.82)* 
Distance to Chiang Mai 0.005 (1.87)* 0.02 (6.87)** 
Adequate Water 1.14 (4.3)** 1.23 (3.51)** 
Constant -3.82 (-4.1)** -2.00 (-2.36)* 
 N =1545 N=1535 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. 
Table: Probability ( Positive area devoted to crop compared to Probability of Zero area 





AIT  Asian Institute of Technology 
ALRO  Agricultural Land Reform Office 
APR  Ambiguous Property Rights 
ARD  Office of Accelerated Rural Development 
BAAC  Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
B-P  Breusch-Pagan 
DLD  Department of Land Development 
DOAE  Department of Agricultural Extension 
DOL  Department of Land 
DOLA  Department of Local Administration 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization 
FE  Fixed Effects 
G2SLS Generalized two stage least squares 
HH  Household 
HYV  High Yielding Variety 
ICDP  Integrated Conservation and Development Programs 
Kg  Kilogram 
LDV  Lagged Dependent Variable 
LM  Lagrange Multiplier 
LSDV  Least Squares Dependent Variable 
Mkt  Market 
MOAC Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
MOSTE Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment 
NAREBI National Resources and Biodiversity Institute 
NESDB National Economic and Social Development Board 
NESDP National Economic and Social Development Plan 
Na  Data not available (because it was not collected) 
No  Number 
NPR  No secure Property Rights 
NS-3  No-So-Sarm (Certificate of Use) 
NS-3K  No-So-Sarm-Kor 
NS-4  No-So-Sarm (Title Deed) 
Obs  Observations 
PA  Protected Area 
Propn  Proportion 
RE  Random Effects 
RFD  Royal Forest Department 
STK  So-tho-ko 
TDRI  Thailand Development Research Institute 
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